Antidote to William Whitaker's Sola Scriptura Arguments, Part 13: More Logically Circular Subjectivism and "Co-Opting" the Holy Spirit as the Supposed "Final Judge" for All Interpretation Disputes

See the introductory post, New Upcoming Project: Refutation of William Whitaker's Disputation on Holy Scripture on Sola Scriptura.

I am utilizing a copy of the book available at Internet Archive.

Whitaker's words will be in blue. Page numbers will correspond to the above book version.

* * *

His fourth and last argument is drawn from the reason of the thing. God, says he, was not ignorant that there would be in his church at all times many controversies and difficult questions concerning the faith. Therefore he would not have well provided in things necessary for his church, if he had not established and left to it some judge of those controversies. But God hath excellently well provided for his church always, especially in respect of things necessary. Therefore he hath left some judge. I answer; God hath, indeed, left his church a judge; but the question now is, who is that judge? upon which a controversy is raised between us and the papists. We say that the judge is the Holy Spirit speaking in the scriptures. (pp. 444-445)

Now we're back to radical subjectivism and the resulting endless divisions again. Each party claims to be following the Holy Spirit, but they don't agree. The truth is not various and self-contradictory. Therefore, one party or both in a disagreement must be teaching falsehood, which is from the devil, not God. But how do we decide who is right? We can't appeal to Scripture (under Protestant assumptions) because each claimed to have a direct line to the Holy Spirit, and already did so. That doesn't resolve it.  We can't appeal to an infallible Church guided by the Holy Spirit, whose duty it is to guard a sacred deposit passed-down, because that is precisely what Protestantism rejected. So there is no solution. It is talking a good game, with the result being chaos and confusion and lots of people being taught falsehood (and having it called truth).

But the Jesuit draws up three assertions upon this subject. First, he says that this judge is not some spirit of private revelation. I answer; We concede this. The authority of such a spirit is secret, hidden and private; but the judge sought should possess a public, open, and universally notorious authority. (p. 445)

But that can't possibly be the Church! That would never do! He precludes as a possibility the only thing that can reasonably offer a solution to his literally mindless, viciously circular subjectivism.

Secondly, the Jesuit affirms that this judge is no secular prince. I answer: We concede this also. For we ascribe the supreme decision solely to the scripture and the Holy Spirit; . . . (p. 445)

Oh, that makes a lot of sense, for an Anglican, of all persons to state: the system that made the king the head of the Church, with the result being a wholesale slaughter of Catholics who dared to disagree with his opinions, on pain of treason, hanging, drawing, and quartering (hearts savagely cut out of live persons, intestines slowly drawn out, to prolong agony), women being crushed under rocks, etc. (see many documented examples).

Apparently, Whitaker feels no compunction to avoid saying anything whatever that sounds good, no matter how obviously non-factual or logically absurd it is. All for the "cause" . . . I guess since Henry VIII, Queen Elizabeth et al were the head of the Anglican "Church" then all their despicable persecuting actions were all led by the Holy Spirit. And it started (as we all know) because the butcher Henry VIII couldn't keep his size 60 waist red velvet robe on . . . very spiritual stuff, and a bit much to be suffered in a comparative analysis such as this.

. . . we say that the scripture itself publicly set forth and propounded is its own interpreter. (p. 445)

Scripture teaches that it is not (as shown in previous installments); therefore, if the Bible itself informs us that it needs an authoritative interpreter, then the position that Whitaker stakes out necessary collapses. His is a mere tradition of men without support in Scripture; ours is the scriptural one: always accepting biblical teachings as authoritative: not just when they are congenial to our prior biases and conceptions.

I answer: Scripture, as we have already said, hath one simple meaning, which may be clearly gathered also from the scriptures themselves: and although the scripture hath not voice and speech like a man, yet does it speak plainly as a law; and God himself speaks in the scripture, and scripture is on that account styled the word of God. With no less certainty, therefore, may we elicit a true meaning from scripture, than if God himself were to address us with an audible voice. Do we then desire a better judge and interpreter than God himself? He who reads the letter of a friend, does he fail to understand his friend's meaning, because the letter itself does not speak, or because he does not actually hear his friend speaking to him? No man in his senses would say that. Since the scriptures, then, are as it were a letter sent to us from God, we can from them understand the will of God, although they do not speak to us. "The heavens" (says the prophet, Ps. xix.)" declare the glory of God;" and yet they speak not: the scriptures have a yet more glorious and distinct utterance. (pp. 445-446)

Here is a prime example of Whitaker expressing a view that is almost purely "non-biblical" and a mere tradition of men. The only scriptural support is psalm 19, mentioned at the end, but that is hardly compelling for his particular purpose. So why should we believe him, even granting his own sola Scriptura false assumptions? Whitaker is more fun when he actually attempts an exegetical argument (something that is not a strong suit of his). Then at least we have something objective that we can wrangle over, and actually get somewhere with third-party observers. The way Whitaker often argues is the equivalent of, "I like vanilla ice cream; therefore, it is definitely the best ice cream flavor!" Who can rationally argue with that? Yet this is what he does with the Holy Spirit, Who is smuggled in as a pretense and supposed support for every contradictory human opinion.

Whitaker "reasons": "if the heavens declare the glory of God, surely it follows that men en masse can interpret  the [gratuitous, unproven premise] self-interpreting Holy Scripture without the necessary aid of an authoritative teaching Church." Anyone who thinks that the latter proposition follows from the former is, I submit, truly beyond rational discussion. Professor Kingsfield (John Houseman) of the old TV series, The Paper Chase (that I love) talked about "skulls full of mush" that he would mold into lawyers' minds. Whitaker gives us "exegesis full of mush." It's like trying to grab and dissect a cloud or a fragrance. No one can do it! It is outside the purview of reason from the outset.

Yea, unless that inward persuasion of the Holy Spirit be superinduced, the mind can never securely and resolutely acquiesce in any interpretation. . . . Our opinion is, that the supreme decision and authority in the interpretation of scripture should not be ascribed to the church, but to the scripture itself, and to the Holy Spirit, as well speaking plainly in the scriptures as also secretly confirming the same in our hearts. (p. 447)

More subjective mush . . . but Whitaker claims to have "some arguments" in favor of this, so let's see what he comes up with (and I am especially interested in biblical arguments).

For if scripture cannot otherwise be known but by scripture and the Holy Spirit, which was the conclusion we have arrived at already, in the third question; then certainly neither should we seek the sense of scripture from any other source than from scripture and the Holy Spirit speaking in scripture. For the sense of scripture is the scripture itself. (p. 447)

This is an absolutely classic, textbook illustration of circular reasoning; also known as "begging the question." The only good thing about it is that Whitaker at least realizes that sola Scriptura requires internal verification from Scripture for its essential principles. So far he has come up with nothing; a big zero. He keeps presenting the same recycled fluff over and over; it would be superfluous and boring to recount the innumerable instances in his book. But hope springs eternal. The Detroit Lions, after all, may win the Super Bowl one day. Likewise, before I die, I may actually witness a cogent, coherent, biblical argument for sola Scriptura. The universe could also come to an end tomorrow, or the Second Coming occur. Anything is possible! So we barge ahead, with that fervent hope, seeing what ol' Whitaker can give us.

Finally, councils, fathers, popes, are men; and scripture testifies that all men are deceitful. How then shall I acquiesce in their sentence? (pp. 449-450)

Finally, William Whitaker is a man; and scripture testifies that all men are deceitful. How then shall I acquiesce in his relentlessly eisegetical and logically bankrupt defense of sola Scriptura?

For I believe what God says to be true, because he says it, and seek no other reason; but when I hear scripture saying that "all men are liars," I dare not ascribe so much to man, lest I make him equal to God. (p. 450)

For I believe what God says to be true, because he says it, and seek no other reason; but when I hear scripture saying that "all men are liars," I dare not ascribe so much to William Whitaker's lies about Scripture and the rule of faith, lest I make him equal to God.



***