Eucharistic Sacrifice: The Witness of the Church Fathers & the Bible, Part III (vs. "CPA")

See Part One (overview and development of doctrine) and Part Two (biblical evidences).

The 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia offers an excellent compendium of patristic evidences for the Sacrifice of the Mass:

In the Didache or "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles", the oldest post-Biblical literary monument (c. A.D. 96), not only is the" breaking of bread" (cf. Acts, xx, 7) referred to as a "sacrifice" (Thysia) and mention made of reconciliation with one's enemy before the sacrifice (cf. Matt., v, 23), but the whole passage is crowned with an actual quotation of the prophecy of Malachias, which referred, as is well known, to an objective and real sacrifice (Didache, c. xiv). The early Christians gave the name of "sacrifice"; not only to the Eucharistic "thanksgiving," but also to the entire ritual celebration including the liturgical "breaking of bread", without at first distinguishing clearly between the prayer and the gift (Bread and Wine, Body and Blood). When Ignatius of Antioch (d. 107), a disciple of the Apostles, says of the Eucharist: "There
is only one flesh of Our Lord Jesus Christ, only one chalice containing His one Blood, one altar (en thysiasterion), as also only one bishop with the priesthood and the deacons" (Ep., ad. Philad. iv), he here gives to the liturgical Eucharistic celebration, of which alone he speaks, by his reference to the "altar" an evidently sacrificial meaning, often as he may use the word "altar" in other contexts in a metaphorical sense.

A heated controversy had raged round the conception of Justin Martyr (d. 166) from the fact that in his "Dialogue with Tryphon" (c. 117) he characterizes "prayer and thanksgiving" (euchai kai eucharistiai) as the "one perfect sacrifice acceptable to God" (teleiai monai kai euarestoi thysiai). Did he intend by thus emphasizing the
interior spiritual sacrifice to exclude the exterior real sacrifice of the Eucharist? Clearly he did not, for in the same "Dialogue" (c. 41) he says the "food offering" of the lepers, assuredly a real gift offering (cf. Levit, xiv), was a figure (typos) of the bread of the Eucharist, which Jesus commanded to be offered (poiein) in commemoration of His sufferings." He then goes on: "of the sacrifices which you (the Jews) formerly offered, God through Malachias said: 'I have no pleasure, etc'. By the sacrifices (thysion), however, which we Gentiles present to Him in every place, that is (toutesti) of the bread of Eucharist and likewise of the chalice Eucharist, he then said that we glorify his name, while you dishonour him". Here "bread and chalice" are by the use of toutesti clearly included as objective gift offerings in the idea of the Christian sacrifice. If the other apologists (Aristides, Athenagoras, Minucius Felix, Arnobius) vary the thought a great deal -- God has no need of sacrifice; the best sacrifice is the knowledge of the Creator; sacrifice and altars are unknown to the Christians -- it is to be presumed not only that under the imposed by the disciplina arcani they withheld the whole truth, but also that they rightly repudiated all
connection with pagan idolatry, the sacrifice of animals, and heathen altars. Tertullian bluntly declared: "we offer no sacrifice (non sacrificamus) because we cannot eat both the Supper of God and that of demons" (De spectac., c., xiii). And yet in another passage (De orat., c., xix) he calls Holy Communion "participation in the sacrifice" (participatio sacrificii), which is accomplished "on the altar of God" (ad aram Dei); he speaks (De cult fem., II, xi) of a real, not a mere metaphorical, "offering up of sacrifice" (sacrificium offertur); he dwells still further as a Montanist (de pudicit, c., ix) as well on the "nourishing power of the Lord's Body" (opimitate dominici corporis) as on the "renewal of the immolation of Christ" (rursus illi mactabitur Christus).

With Irenaeus of Lyons there comes a turning point, in as much as he, with conscious clearness, first puts forward "bread and wine" as objective gift offerings, but at the same time maintains that these elements become the "body and blood" of the Word through consecration, and thus by simply combining these two thoughts we have the Catholic Mass of today. According to him (Adv. haer., iv, 18, 4) it is the Church alone "that offers the pure oblation" (oblationem puram offert), whereas the Jews "did not receive the Word, which is offered (or through whom an offering is made) to God" (non receperunt Verbum quod [aliter, per quod] offertur Deo). Passing over the teaching of the Alexandrine Clement and Origen, whose love of allegory, together with the restrictions of the disciplina arcani, involved their writings in mystic obscurity, we make particular mention of Hippolytus of Rome (d. 235) whose celebrated fragment Achelis has wrongly characterized as spurious. He writes (Fragm. in Prov., ix, i, P. G., LXXX, 593), "The Word prepared His Precious and immaculate Body (soma) and His Blood (aima), that daily kath'ekasten) are set forth as a sacrifice (epitelountai thyomena) on the mystic and Divine table (trapeze) as a memorial of that ever memorable first table of the mysterious supper of the Lord". Since according to the judgment of even Protestant historians of dogma, St. Cyprian (d. 258) is to be regarded as the "herald" of Catholic doctrine on the Mass, we may likewise pass him over, as well as Cyril of Jerusalem (d. 386) and Chrysostom (d. 407) who have been charged with exaggerated "realism", and whose plain discourses on the sacrifice rival those of Basil (d. 379), Gregory of Nyssa (d. c. 394) and Ambrose (d. 397). Only about Augustine (d. 430) must a word be said, since, in regard to the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist he is cited as favouring the "symbolical" theory. Now it is precisely his teaching on sacrifice that best serves to clear away the suspicion that he inclined to a merely spiritual interpretation.

For Augustine nothing is more certain than that every religion, whether true or false, must have an exterior form of celebration and worship (Contra Faust., xix, 11). This applies as well to Christians (l. c., xx, 18), who "commemorate the sacrifice
consummated (on the cross) by the holiest oblation and participation of the Body and Blood of Christ" (celebrant sacrosancta oblatione et participatione corporis et sanguinis Christi). The Mass is, in his eyes (De Civ. Dei, X, 20), the "highest and true sacrifice" (summum verumque sacrificium), Christ being at once "priest and victim" (ipse offerens, ipse et oblatio) and he reminds the Jews (Adv. Jud, ix, 13) that the sacrifice of Malachias is now made in every place (in omni loco offerri sacrificium Christianorum). He relates of his mother Monica (Confess., ix, 13) that she had asked for prayers at the altar (ad altare) for her soul and had attended Mass daily. From Augustine onwards the current of the Church's tradition flows smoothly along in a well-ordered channel, without check or disturbance, through the Middle Ages to our own time. Even the powerful attempt made to stem it through the Reformation had no effect.

Furthermore, in my previous paper, John Calvin & St. Cyril of Jerusalem: Comparative Eucharistic Theology, I chronicled the opinion of leading Church historians (Philip Schaff, The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, Jaroslav Pelikan) as to the prevalence and prominence of the doctrine of the Sacrifice of the Mass in the Fathers. Here are a few excerpts (reference sources in the other paper, and bolded emphases added):

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Philip Schaff:

In general, this period, . . . was already very strongly inclined toward the doctrine of transubstantiation, and toward the Greek and Roman sacrifice of the mass, which are inseparable in so far as a real sacrifice requires the real presence of the victim.

The realistic and mystic view is represented by several fathers and the early liturgies, whose testimony we shall further cite below. They speak in enthusiastic and extravagant terms of the sacrament and sacrifice of the altar. They teach a real presence of the body and blood of Christ, which is included in the very idea of a real sacrifice . . .

The Catholic church, both Greek and Latin, sees in the Eucharist not only a sacramentum, in which God communicates a grace to believers, but at the same time, and in fact mainly, a sacrificium, in which believers really offer to God that which is represented by the sensible elements. For this view also the church fathers laid the foundation, and it must be conceded they stand in general far more on the Greek and Roman Catholic than on the Protestant side of this question.

The term mass, which properly denoted the dismissal of the congregation (missio, dismissio) at the close of the general public worship, became, after the end of the fourth century, the name for the worship of the faithful, which consisted in the celebration of the eucharistic sacrifice and the communion.

The ante-Nicene fathers uniformly conceived the Eucharist as a thank-offering of the church; the congregation offering the consecrated elements of bread and wine, and in them itself, to God. This view is in itself perfectly innocent, but readily leads to the doctrine of the sacrifice of the mass, as soon as the elements become identified with the body and blood of Christ, and the presence of the body comes to be materialistically taken.

. . . The doctrine of the sacrifice of the mass is much further developed in the Nicene and post-Nicene fathers, . . .

. . . 2. It is not a new sacrifice added to that of the cross, but a daily, unbloody repetition and perpetual application of that one only sacrifice. Augustine represents it, on the one hand, as a sacramentum memoriae, a symbolical commemoration of the sacrificial death of Christ; to which of course there is no objection. But, on the other hand, he calls the celebration of the communion verissimum sacrificium of the body of Christ. The church, he says, offers (immolat) to God the sacrifice of thanks in the body of Christ, from the days of the apostles through the sure succession of the bishops down to our time. But the church at the same time offers, with Christ, herself, as the body of Christ, to God. As all are one body, so also all are together the same sacrifice. According to Chrysostom the same Christ, and the whole Christ, is everywhere offered. It is not a different sacrifice from that which the High Priest formerly offered, but we offer always the same sacrifice, or rather, we perform a memorial of this sacrifice. This last clause would decidedly favor a symbolical conception, if Chrysostom in other places had not used such strong expressions as this: "When thou seest the Lord slain, and lying there, and the priest standing at the sacrifice," or: "Christ lies slain upon the altar."

The sacrifice is the anti-type of the Mosaic sacrifice, and is related to it as substance to typical shadows. It is also especially foreshadowed by Melchizedek’s unbloody offering of bread and wine. The sacrifice of Melchizedek is therefore made of great account by Hilary, Jerome, Augustine, Chrysostom, and other church fathers, on the strength of the well-known parallel in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

From: F.L. Cross and E.A. Livingstone, editors, The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, Oxford Univ. Press, 2nd ed., 1983, pp.476, 1221:

It was also widely held from the first that the Eucharist is in some sense a sacrifice, though here again definition was gradual . . . In early post-NT times the constant repudiation of carnal sacrifice and emphasis on life and prayer at Christian worship did not hinder the Eucharist from being described as a sacrifice from the first . . .

From early times the Eucharistic offering was called a sacrifice in virtue of its immediate relation to the sacrifice of Christ.

Jaroslav Pelikan:

By the date of the Didache [anywhere from about 60 to 160, depending on the scholar]. . . the application of the term 'sacrifice' to the Eucharist seems to have been quite natural, together with the identification of the Christian Eucharist as the 'pure offering' commanded in Malachi 1:11 . . .

The Christian liturgies were already using similar language about the offering of the prayers, the gifts, and the lives of the worshipers, and probably also about the offering of the sacrifice of the Mass, so that the sacrificial interpretation of the death of Christ never lacked a liturgical frame of reference . . .

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Anglican patristics expert J.N.D. Kelly can be added to the list, too (I've added the references in his footnotes in brackets):

. . . the Eucharist was regarded as the distinctively Christian sacrifice from the closing decade of the first century, if not earlier. Malachi’s prediction (1:10 f.) that the Lord would reject the Jewish sacrifices and instead would have 'a pure offering' made to Him by the Gentiles in every place was early seized [did. 14,3; Justin, dial. 41,2 f.; Irenaeus, haer. 4,17,5] upon by Christians as a prophecy of the eucharist. The Didache indeed actually applies [14, 1] the term thusia, or sacrifice, to the eucharist, and the idea is presupposed by Clement in the parallel he discovers [40-4] between the Church's ministers and the Old Testament priests and levites . . . Ignatius's reference [Philad. 4] to 'one altar, just as there is one bishop', reveals that
he, too thought in sacrificial terms. Justin speaks [Dial. 117,1] of 'all the sacrifices in this name which Jesus appointed to be performed, viz. in ther eucharist of the bread and the cup, and which are celebrated in every place by Christians'. Not only here but elsewhere [Ib. 41,3] too, he identifies 'the bread of the eucharist, and the cup likewise of the eucharist', with the sacrifice foretold by Malachi. For Irenaeus [Haer. 4,17,5] the eucharist is 'the new oblation of the new covenant', . . .

It was natural for early Christians to think of the eucharist as a sacrifice. The fulfillment of prophecy demanded a solemn Christian offering, and the rite itself was wrapped in the sacrificial atmosphere with which our Lord invested the Last Supper. The words of institution, ‘Do this’ (touto poieite), must have been charged with sacrificial overtones for second-century ears; Justin at any rate understood [1 apol. 66,3; cf. dial. 41,1] them to mean, ‘Offer this.’ . . . Justin . . . makes it plain [Dial. 41,3] that the bread and the wine themselves were the 'pure offering' foretold by Malachi . . . he uses [1 apol. 65,3-5] the term 'thanksgiving' as technically equivalent to 'the eucharistized bread and wine'. The bread and wine, moreover, are offered ‘for a memorial (eis anamnasin) of the passion,’ a phrase which in view of his identification of them with the Lord’s body and blood implies much more than an act of purely spiritual recollection. Altogether it would seem that, while his language is not fully explicit, Justin is feeling his way to the conception of the eucharist as the offering of the Saviour's passion.

(J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, San Francisco: HarperCollins, revised edition, 1978, 196–197)

Kelly also thinks that "Irenaeus's thought moves along rather different lines and does not link the eucharist so closely with Christ's atoning death" (p. 197). This poses no problem for Catholics (assuming it is true), because one can always find exceptions to the general patristic consensus among individual Fathers. The Protestant still has to account for why the sacrificial view eventually completely dominated in the development of eucharistic theology after the 3rd or 4th century, and why, if this is rank heresy, it did so. Can the entire Christian Church fall into heresy? Would not the Holy Spirit protect His Church? Etc. Protestants who attempt to square their views with the Church Fathers, are, I submit, always fighting a distinctly uphill, difficult battle. Hats off to any who make the attempt (at least that is better than being ahistorical), but I don't think it can be done.

For further similar patristic utterances, see the Catholic Answers collection, The Sacrifice of the Mass, Envoy's The Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, and the article, Is the Mass a Sacrifice?, by
Jason Evert.

Eucharistic Sacrifice: The Witness of the Church Fathers & the Bible, Part II (vs. "CPA")

See Part One. In this portion, I shall give an overview of what Catholics feel is solid biblical evidence in support of the Sacrifice of the Mass:

The theme of the Epistle to the Hebrews is Christ as our High Priest. As such, the "priestly" verses are very numerous (for example, 2:17, 3:1, 4:14-16, 5:1-10, 6:20, 7:1-28, 8:1-6, 9:11-15, 24-28, 10:19-22). The teaching here acquires much more meaning within Catholic Eucharistic theology, whereas, in evangelical, non-sacramental Protestant interpretation, it is necessarily "spiritualized" away. For nearly all Protestants, Jesus Christ is a priest only insofar as He dies sacrificially as the "Lamb" and does away with the Old Testament notion of animal sacrifice. This is not false, but it is a partial truth. Generally speaking, for the Catholic, there is much more of a sense of the ever-present Sacrifice of Calvary, due to the nature of the Mass, rather than considering the Cross a past event alone.

In light of the repeated references in Hebrews to Melchizedek as the prototype of Christ's priesthood (5:6,10, 6:20, 7:1-3,17,20), it follows that this priesthood is perpetual (forever), not one time only. For no one would say, for example, that Christ is King (present tense) if in fact He were only King for a short while in the past. This (Catholic) interpretation is borne out by explicit evidence in Hebrews 7:24-25:

He holds his priesthood permanently, because he continues for ever. Consequently he is able for all time to save those who draw near to God through him, since he always lives to make intercession for them.

If Jesus perpetually intercedes for us, why should He not also permanently present Himself as Sacrifice to His Father? The connecting word, consequently, appears to affirm this scenario. The very notion, fundamental to all strains of Christian theology, that the Cross and the Blood are efficacious here and now for the redemption of sinners, presupposes a dimension of "presentness" to the Atonement.

Granting that premise, it only remains to deny that God could, would, or should truly and actually re-present this one Sacrifice in the Mass. God certainly can do this, since He is omnipotent. He wills to do this because Jesus commanded the observance of the Lord's Supper (Luke 22:19). Lastly, one can convincingly contend that He should do this in order to graphically "bring home" to Christians His Passion, Crucifixion, and Resurrection, and to impart grace in a real and profound way in Communion. The one propitiatory Atonement of Calvary is a past event, but the appropriation of its spiritual benefits to Christians is an ongoing process, in which the Mass plays a central role.

The Sacrifice of the Mass, like the Real Presence in the Eucharist, is an extension of the Incarnation. Accordingly, there is no rational a priori objection (under monotheistic premises) to the concept of God transcending time and space in order to present Himself to His disciples. Nor is there any denying that the Sacrifice of Calvary is always present to God the Father and to Jesus Christ, God the Son. How then, can anyone deny that God could make the Cross sacramentally present to us as well?

Hebrews 7:24: "He holds his priesthood permanently, because he continues forever" is not just a one-time priestly sacrifice of Himself that has no application to His priesthood beyond the time it occurred in history). Yes, we agree that Jesus sacrificed Himself once on the Cross (7:27). But that is a one-time act, in history. Why, then, does 7:26 continue to refer to Jesus as a "high priest" in the present tense, "exalted above the heavens"? It is this paradoxical interplay between the one act and the "present-ness" of Jesus' priesthood that suggests a timeless nature of the sacrifice: precisely what Catholics claim is occurring at the Mass: the one-time sacrifice is being made present to us, because Jesus is a priest "forever."

It makes little sense to me to keep referring to Jesus as a "priest" in the present tense when He is (according to most Protestants) no longer doing at all what a priest does (sacrifice). Jesus sacrificed Himself as the Lamb of God. That was His priestly act (this is stated explicitly in 7:27, so it cannot be doubted).

But if that was strictly a past tense and not perpetual, why keep calling Him a priest after He is glorified in heaven? It would seem much more sensible to refer to His one-time priestly act, rather than continuing to call Him something denoting a characteristic activity that He is no longer performing.

If He is actively saving men -- present and future tense -- (as is undoubtedly true), but is doing so as a priest then He is presently saving by the sacrifice of Himself (i.e., the priestly act) which is an act made eternally "now". Thus we are right to the heart of the Sacrifice of the Mass, which is the same concept. Jesus saves us as a priest. The sacrifice is of both an ongoing and salvific nature. This is the Mass!

Jesus' Sacrifice is not only present to us on earth, but also in heaven. An "altar" is mentioned as in heaven, in the book of Revelation many times (6:9, 8:3,5, 9:13, 11:1, 14:18, 16:7). Why is this, if altars and priesthood ceased with the one Sacrifice of Jesus? This is after Jesus' Resurrection and Ascension. Nor is it just Jesus at this altar in heaven. We are told that the "prayers of the saints" are being offered there (5:8-9, 8:3-4). Altars are also mentioned elsewhere in the New Testament.

The climactic scene of the glorious portrayal of worship and adoration in heaven occurs in Rev 5:1-7. Verse 6 describes "a Lamb standing as though it had been slain." Since the Lamb (Jesus, of course) is revealed as sitting in the midst of God's throne (5:6, 7:17, 22:1,3; cf. Matthew 19:28, 25:31, Hebrews 1:8), which is in front of the golden altar (8:3), then it appears that the presentation of Christ to the Father as a Sacrifice is an ongoing (from God's perspective, timeless) occurrence, precisely as in Catholic teaching. Thus the Mass is no more than what occurs in heaven, according to the clear revealed word of Scripture. When Hebrews speaks of a sacrifice made once (7:27), this is from a purely human, historical perspective (which Catholicism acknowledges in holding that the Mass is a "re-presentation" of the one sacrifice at Calvary). However, there is a transcendent aspect of the Sacrifice as well.

Jesus is referred to as the Lamb 28 times throughout Revelation (compared to four times in the rest of the New Testament: John 1:29,36, Acts 8:32, 1 Peter 1:19). Why, in Revelation (of all places), if the Crucifixion is a past event, and the Christian's emphasis ought to be on the resurrected, glorious, kingly Jesus, as is stressed in Protestantism (as evidenced by a widespread disdain for, crucifixes)? Obviously, the heavenly emphasis is on Jesus' Sacrifice, which is communicated by God to John as present and "now" (Revelation 5:6; cf. Hebrews 7:24). The very notion of "lamb" possesses inherent sacrificial and priestly connotations in the Bible.

If this aspect is of such paramount importance even in the afterlife, then certainly it should be just as real and significant to us. The Sacrifice of the Mass bridges all the gaps of space and time between our Crucified Savior on the Cross and ourselves. Therefore, nothing at all in the Mass is improper, implausible, or unscriptural.

The Book of Hebrews and the scenes in heaven in the Book of Revelation are suffused with a worldview and “atmosphere” which is very "Catholic.” The Mass, rightly understood, fulfills every aspect of the above passages, most particularly in the sense of Christ as the ultimate Priest for Whom the earthly priest "stands in," and in the timeless and transcendent character of the Sacrifice "made present" at Mass, but never deemed to be an addition to, or duplication of, the one bloody Sacrifice of our Lord at Calvary.

St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 10:14-22, in an explicitly eucharistic passage, uses language suggesting that he sees the eucharist as a sacrifice involving an altar (hence priesthood, hence the Sacrifice of the Mass): He mentions the "altar" of the Old Covenant in 10:18 and makes a direct analogy with the altar of the New Covenant in 10:21:

You cannot drink of the cup of the Lord and the cup of demons. You cannot partake of the table of the Lord and the table of demons.

Catholic theologian and exegete Fernand Prat, S.J., comments on 1 Corinthians 10:

Wishing to show to the Corinthians that participating in idolatrous banquets is forbidden, whatever intention one may bring to them, because it is a scandal, a danger, and a formal act of idolatry, the Apostle appeals to their consciences: ". . . Behold Israel according to the flesh. Are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" And St. Paul, deducing a code of morality from this doctrine, concludes in these words: "The things which the heathens sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils and not to God. I would not that you should be made partakers with devils [then the above passage follows]." If the arguments of the Apostle are not fallacious, the eucharistic communion is for Christians what the eating of food sacrificed to idols was for the Gentiles and what the sacred repast was for the Jews. Now the sacred banquet has a religious significance: it constitutes an act of worship in that it is a
complement of the sacrifice and unites the faithful with the sacrificing priest, with the altar where the victim was immolated and with the victim itself.

(The Theology of St. Paul, translated from the 10th French edition by John L. Stoddard, Westminster, MD: The Newman Bookshop, 1952, vol. 2 of 2, 268)

Even non-sacramental Baptists and many other Protestants have not completely avoided the language of priestly sacrifice, since they still speak of the "Lord's table"and even an "altar call." What altar? That is the language of priesthood and sacrifice. So Protestants can't help retaining a remnant of New Testament eucharistic and sacrificial, priestly talk. Hebrews 13:10 states that "we have an altar." Again, why, if the old system of priesthood is gone and the only priesthood of the New Covenant is that of Christ at Calvary? This is the New Covenant.

Eucharistic Sacrifice: The Witness of the Church Fathers & the Bible, Part I (vs. "CPA")

Overview of CPA's Position

"CPA", a Lutheran, has written a multi-part series on his blog about Dom Gregory Dix's book, Shape of the Liturgy:

The Sacrifice of the Mass

Why Do We Need to Eat Christ's Body?

Sacrifice? Could You Unpack That Please?

Dix on the Ante-Nicene Theology of the Eucharistic Sacrifice

More on Sacrifice

In a nutshell: Dix argues that sacrifice was indeed a prominent motif in the Fathers, even in the ante-Nicene period. CPA disputes this. Here are a few of his comments (in green), to give readers a capsule summary of his position (from the last two papers listed above):

Dix first emphasizes, against skeptical critics, that the sacrificial understanding of the crucifixion was not added on later, but the only possible interpretation of the crucifixion that could make sense and allow the continued existence of movement formed around Jesus . . .

. . . in the reading the sources he presents, nowhere do we see the idea that the Body and Blood of the Lord is actually being offered to God by the bishop or church.

we can suddenly notice that the "offering" of Christ's sacrifice and the "re-calling" of Christ's sacrifice are in fact not the same thing, or at any rate, not the same words, and that by his own account, in Clement, Justin, and Hippolytus, the offering of bread and wine are offered and Christ's sacrifice is re-called. Dix himself throughout implies that offering the bread and wine is synonymous with offering Christ's sacrifice (as opposed to the church's own sacrifice of thanksgiving), but without offering evidence that any ante-Nicene father before Cyprian treated the issue in the same way.

When it comes to Cyprian himself, he notes the innovation but adds, "There is no reason whatever to suppose that Cyprian was the inventor of defining the eucharistic sacrifice, or in any intentional way its partisan" (p. 115). But there is not reason to suppose he wasn't either. There appears to be no evidence either way, since the idea that the Eucharist "offers the Lord's passion" is simply unknown in any previous source.

. . . There is more theological meat here than Dix seems to have recognized, meat which clearly aligns Justin's understanding of the Eucharistic sacrifice as a thank-offering for creation and redemption. In fact, Justin is clearly not saying that this rememberance of Christ's sacrifice is a re-presentation, a renewed propitiatory action (to use Tridentine terminology) of Christ's death. So far from being some sort of intermediate between Cyprian's doctrine of the Eucharist as a propitiatory offering of the Lord's passion, and Irenaeus's doctrine of it as a thank offering for creation and redemption, Justin Martyr is clearly simply expounding the Irenaean viewpoint. Assuming, as would seem legitimate, that Irenaeus certainly accepted that the Eucharist was a memorial/re-calling/remembrance of the Lord's Passion, one can thus say that all of the ante-Nicene authors, except Cyprian, understand the Eucharist in a three-fold way:

1) as a thanksgiving sacrifice of created things by the church as a whole to God for the gifts of creation and redemption;
2) as a remembrance/re-calling/anamnesis of the Lord's passion
3) that it is the true Body and Blood of our Lord.

None link sacrifice to anamnesis so as to make it an offering of Christ's sacrifice.

. . . Dix has in no sense proven his point that the propitiatory offering of the Lord's passion, to use a combined Cyprianic-Tridentine way of speaking, is either a part of the pre-Cyprianic Christian doctrine, or that Luther was a bizarre exception in holding to the Real Presence apart from a propitiatory-sacrificial understanding of the Eucharist.

. . . That understanding, that the priest re-presents Christ's passion as a propitiatory sacrifice cannot be found before Cyprian (c. AD 255) . . .

. . . the nature of the sacrifice be understood as a thanksgiving sacrifice, not a propitiatory sacrifice. While the ante-Nicene fathers are pretty vague on this whole distinction, the preponderance of early evidence shows that thanksgiving is indeed the strongly dominant note.

Development of Eucharistic Doctrine in the Fathers

I would emphasize that much of the tacitly assumed "difficulty" in progression of patristic views on this subject can be explained, I think, by the nature of the process of development of doctrine. John Henry Newman, in his Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, explained how the Fathers' theology built upon what came before, expanding and amplifying it in greater depth (which is exactly what we see with regard to "sacrifice," as with all other aspects of theology):

Doctrine too is percolated, as it were, through different minds, beginning with writers of inferior authority in the Church, and issuing at length in the enunciation of her Doctors. Origen, Tertullian, nay Eusebius and the Antiochenes, {366} supply the materials, from which the Fathers have wrought out comments or treatises. St. Gregory Nazianzen and St. Basil digested into form the theological principles of Origen; St. Hilary and St. Ambrose are both indebted to the same great writer in their interpretations of Scripture; St. Ambrose again has taken his comment on St. Luke from Eusebius, and certain of his Tracts from Philo; St. Cyprian called Tertullian his Master; and traces of Tertullian, in his almost heretical treatises, may be detected in the most finished sentences of St. Leo. The school of Antioch, in spite of the heretical taint of various of its Masters, formed the genius of St. Chrysostom. And the Apocryphal gospels have contributed many things for the devotion and edification of Catholic believers.

The deep meditation which seems to have been exercised by the Fathers on points of doctrine, the disputes and turbulence yet lucid determination which characterize the Councils, the indecision of Popes, are all in different ways, at least when viewed together, portions and indications of the same process. The theology of the Church is no random combination of various opinions, but a diligent, patient working out of one doctrine from many materials. The conduct of Popes, Councils, Fathers, betokens the slow, painful, anxious taking up of new truths into an existing body of belief. St. Athanasius, St. Augustine, St. Leo are conspicuous for the repetition in terminis of their own theological statements; on the contrary, it has been observed of the heterodox Tertullian, that his works "indicate no ordinary fertility of mind in that he so little repeats himself or recurs to favourite thoughts, as is frequently the case even with the great St. Augustine." {367}

Here we see the difference between originality of mind and the gift and calling of a Doctor in the Church; the holy Fathers just mentioned were intently fixing their minds on what they taught, grasping it more and more closely, viewing it on various sides, trying its consistency, weighing their own separate expressions. And thus if in some cases they were even left in ignorance, the next generation of teachers completed their work, for the same unwearied anxious process of thought went on. St. Gregory Nyssen finishes the investigations of St. Athanasius; St. Leo guards the polemical statements of St. Cyril. Clement may hold a purgatory, yet tend to consider all punishment purgatorial; St. Cyprian may hold the unsanctified state of heretics, but include in his doctrine a denial of their baptism; St. Hippolytus may believe in the personal existence of the Word from eternity, yet speak confusedly on the eternity of His Sonship; the Council of Antioch might put aside the Homoüsion, and the Council of Nicæa impose it; St. Hilary may believe in a purgatory, yet confine it to the day of judgment; St. Athanasius and other Fathers may treat with almost supernatural exactness the doctrine of our Lord's incarnation, yet imply, as far as words go, that He was ignorant viewed in His human nature; the Athanasian Creed may admit the illustration of soul and body, and later Fathers may discountenance it; St. Augustine might first be opposed to the employment of force in religion, and
then acquiesce in it. Prayers for the faithful departed may be found in the early liturgies, yet with an indistinctness which included the Blessed Virgin and the Martyrs in the same rank with the imperfect Christian whose sins were as yet unexpiated; and succeeding times might keep what was exact, and supply what was deficient. Aristotle might be reprobated by certain early Fathers, yet {368} furnish the phraseology for theological definitions afterwards. And in a different subject-matter, St. Isidore and others might be suspicious of the decoration of Churches; St. Paulinus and St. Helena advance it. And thus we are brought on to dwell upon the office of grace, as well as of truth, in enabling the Church's creed to develope and to absorb without the risk of corruption.

(Part II, Chapter 8, Sections 10-11)

This is how development always proceeds; hence what we see as we examine this subject is precisely what we would expect to find. The earlier writers believe in a primitive form what the later writers develop into a more complex, nuanced theology. That's altogether to be expected, and entails no great difficulty for the Catholic position.

But CPA's view (if I am understanding it correctly) requires the odd scenario of having to believe that no Father before St. Cyprian really taught what he did (not even in kernel form), and then somehow the Cyprianic view (for some strange reason that we are not told) overwhelmed all others and became the status quo (and involved inherent blasphemies and outrageous perversions of true eucharistic doctrine). These corruptions would have to wait for "Super-Fathers" Luther and Calvin to arrive on the scene, to denounce the status quo and received Tradition, and help usher the Church back to the true gospel, which - so they endlessly informed their followers - had been obscured in a sacerdotal, idolatrous haze for the previous thousand or so years.

In my opinion, this outlook is not only implausible; it also trivializes and cheapens the necessary, remarkable theological groundwork of the Church Fathers. It requires one to interpret their legacy as a chaotic mess, often teetering on the edge of severe heterodoxy, or indeed, crossing over into it. Rather than take them for what they are, it too quickly superimposes (or presupposes) later theology which is arguably itself heterodox (in this case, Lutheranism, vis-a-vis the sacrifice of the Mass). But I am getting ahead of myself.

I wanted to lay on the table my ultimate presuppositions: I believe that, as a whole, patristic theology develps consistently, in one direction, and that it culminates in the fully-developed Catholic Church. Protestants, it seems to me, must deny that this was what happened in history. they have to either deny the validity of development of doctrine itself, or argue that the consistent developments all went in the direction of Protestantism, while the corrupt strains of thought formed medieval and modern Catholicism. This is no easy task at all. Cardinal Newman wrote about this general line of thought, in his Difficulties of Anglicans (Lecture 12, Part 7):

No other form of Christianity but this present Catholic Communion, has a pretence to resemble, even in the faintest shadow, the Christianity of Antiquity, viewed as a living religion on the stage of the world . . . You may make ten thousand extracts from the Fathers, and not get deeper into the state of their times than the paper you write upon; to imbibe into the intellect the Ancient Church as a fact, is either to be a Catholic or an infidel . . . it was that Antiquity, instead of leading me from the Holy See as it leads many, on the contrary drew me on to submit to its claims. But, even had I worked out for you these various arguments ever so fully, I should have brought before you but a secondary portion of the testimony which the Ancient Church seemed to me to supply to its own identity with the modern. What was far more striking to me than the ecclesiastical phenomena which I have been drawing out, remarkable as they are, is a subject of investigation which is not of a nature to introduce into a popular lecture; I mean the history of the doctrinal definitions of the
Church. It is well known that, though the creed of the Church has been one and the same from the beginning, yet it has been so deeply lodged in her bosom as to be held by individuals more or less implicitly, instead of being delivered from the first in those special statements, or what are called definitions, under which it is now presented to us, and which preclude mistake or ignorance. These definitions, which are but the expression of portions of the one dogma which has ever been received by the Church, are the work of time; they have grown to their present shape and number in the course of eighteen centuries, under the exigency of successive events, such as heresies and the like, and they may of course receive still further additions {395} as time goes on. Now this process of doctrinal development, as you might suppose, is not of an accidental or random character; it is conducted upon laws, as everything else which comes from God; and the study of its laws and of its exhibition, or, in other words, the science and history of the formation of theology, was a subject which had interested me more than anything else from the time I first began to read the Fathers, and which had engaged my attention in a special way. Now it was gradually brought home to me, in the course of my reading, so gradually, that I cannot trace the steps of my conviction, that the decrees of later Councils, or what Anglicans call the Roman corruptions, were but instances of that very same doctrinal law which was to be found in the history of the early Church; and that in the sense in which the dogmatic truth of the prerogatives of the Blessed Virgin may be said, in the lapse of centuries, to have grown upon the consciousness of the faithful, in that same sense did, in the first age, the mystery of the Blessed Trinity also gradually shine out and manifest itself more and more completely before their minds. Here was at once an answer to the objections urged by Anglicans against the present teaching of Rome; and not only an answer to objections, but a positive argument in its favour; for the immutability and uninterrupted action of the laws in question throughout the course of Church history is a plain note of {396} identity between the Catholic Church of the first ages and that which now goes by that name;—just as the argument from the analogy of natural and revealed religion is at once an answer to difficulties in the latter, and a direct proof that Christianity has the same Author as the physical and moral world. But the force of this, to me ineffably cogent argument, I cannot hope to convey to another.

The 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia applies this analysis to the subject of eucharistic sacrifice:

Harnack is of opinion that the early Church up to the time of Cyprian (d. 258) the
contented itself with the purely spiritual sacrifices of adoration and thanksgiving and that it did not possess the sacrifice of the Mass, as Catholicism now understands it . . . . .

Were this assertion correct, the doctrine of the Council of Trent (Sess. XXII, c. ii), according to which in the Mass "the priests offer up, in obedience to the command of
Christ, His Body and Blood" (see Denzinger, "Enchir", n. 949), could hardly take its stand on Apostolic tradition; the bridge between antiquity and the present would thus have broken by the abrupt intrusion of a completely contrary view. An impartial study of the earliest texts seems indeed to make this much clear, that the early Church paid most attention to the spiritual and subjective side of sacrifice and laid chief stress on prayer and thanksgiving in the Eucharistic function.

This admission, however, is not identical with the statement that the early Church rejected out and out the objective sacrifice, and acknowledged as genuine only the
spiritual sacrifice as expressed in the "Eucharistic thanksgiving". That there has been an historical dogmatic development from the indefinite to the definite, from the
implicit to the explicit, from the seed to the fruit, no one familiar with the subject will deny. An assumption so reasonable, the only one in fact consistent with Christianity, is, however, fundamently different from the hypothesis that the Christian idea of
sacrifice has veered from one extreme to the other. This is a priori improbable
and unproved in fact.

Church historian Jaroslav Pelikan, writing as a Lutheran (he is now Orthodox) essentially concurs:

The definitive and precise formulation of the crucial doctrinal issues concerning the Eucharist had to await that controversy and others that followed even later. This does not mean at all, however, that the church did not yet have a doctrine of the Eucharist; it does mean that the statements of the doctrine must not be sought in polemical and dogmatic treatises devoted to sacramental theology. It means also that the effort to cross-examine the fathers of the second or third century about where they stood in the controversies of the ninth or sixteenth century is both silly and futile.

. . . As Irenaeus's reference to the Eucharist as "not common bread" indicates, however, this doctrine of the real presence believed by the church and affirmed by its liturgy was closely tied to the idea of the Eucharist as a sacrifice. Many of the passages we have already cited concerning the recollection and the real presence spoke also of the sacrifice . . .

. . . Liturgical evidence suggests an understanding of the Eucharist as a sacrifice, whose relation to the sacrifices of the Old Testament was one of archetype to type, and whose relation to the sacrifice of Calvary was one of "re-presentation," just as the bread of the Eucharist "re-presented" the body of Christ.

. . . Great theological refinement was needed before these modes of speaking could be built up into a eucharistic theology; above all, the doctrine of the person of Christ had to be clarified before there could be concepts that could bear the weight of eucharistic teaching.

(The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine: Volume 1: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600), University of Chicago Press: 1971, 166-168, 170)

END OF PART ONE

The Hiroshima and Nagasaki Debate: Did I Commit the Fallacy of Appeal to Authority or Call My Opponents "Murderers"?

Fallacy of Appeal to Authority

One frequent charge in critiques about what I have written on this topic is that I have committed the "appeal to authority" fallacy (in Latin: argumentum ad verecundiam) over and over again in my replies. In fact, once my perspective is correctly understood, and clarified through example and further argument, the unbiased observer will readily see that I have never committed it at all.

I never once made a statement to the effect of, "my position on this issue is correct, and is logically proven solely because persons x, y, and z said so," or, "I am citing all these authorities to prove my case, in lieu of my own argumentation," or, "believe what I am arguing because persons A and persons B say so." No such thing ever occurred. Nor do I believe any of this - being perfectly aware of what the fallacy is, and desiring (like any fairly able debater) always to avoid it. No one can prove that I am guilty of committing the fallacy. "Much ado about nothing."

The charge has been made simply on the basis that I have indeed cited many people (no argument there!). But the false, unproven hidden premise in the charge is the assumption that my own intention regarding the purpose and function of these citations is in terms of the nature of the fallacy. Failing any real proof that I am committing the fallacy, my critics thus produced no statement like the ones above that could provide actual substantiation of the charge.

Instead, they merely repeated it over and over, as if that is compelling (the fallacy of argumentum repeatum irrelevantum ad nauseum?) and simplistically assumed what they were trying to prove (which is, of course, one of the most famous fallacies).

One can produce citations for many reasons other than appealing to them as alleged self-sufficient "proof" of one's position. Rather commonly, in my writings (anyone who follows them - and this includes my critics - would readily know this), I like to chronicle the opinions of others (something like what is also known in academic circles as "review of the literature").

I have several entire papers which are primarily overviews or compilations of opinion, such as on the subjects of romanticism, or the mind-body question, the ontological argument for God's existence, or nominalism, or the history of views on development of doctrine, among many others. The Internet makes this easy. One can locate information relevant to a topic at hand, that previously would have only been available by visiting a library, doing much research, and making photocopies, etc.

This is a wonderful development in technology and ease of access to information, yet some folks denigrate it as "being a Google scholar." Rather than rejoice in the wonderful opportunities for education therewith enabled, they would rather assume a sourpuss, elitist-type attitude of despising my supposed inability to properly cite sources. Obviously, this process (like anything in this fallen world) can be abused. But whether I have abused it is the question. In any event, it is good in and of itself to chronicle opinion. I did this at length.

In doing so (citing lots of material), one obviously does not intend to convey an impression that one agrees with every jot and tittle of every source cited. This state of affairs is obvious in, e.g., links pages which might offer references pro and con, on any given issue. It's commonly understood that not every link is of equal value, and it's also understood that when laymen and webmasters or blogmasters do this (non-scholars) that absolutely scholarly rigor is neither assumed nor required (though an approximation of that and attempt to approach it insofar as one is able, with his abilities, is clearly a good thing).

That's true in my own case. Not being a scholar myself (though my critics seem to be under the rather odd illusion that I have claimed to be one, or at least an "expert" on topics outside of my range of knowledge), and almost always not an "expert" on the topic I am treating, I will (with, hopefully, the appropriate humility and recognition of my limitations of knowledge) cite many others who have the knowledge and qualifications that I don't have.

To disdainfully call such a process "playing Google scholar" is misguided on at least two grounds: 1) doing such is not making a pretense to being a "scholar" in the first place; thus it is a rather silly, patronizing misnomer; 2) the (in this case, unproven) assumption is made that the person is assuming that all sources are equally compelling or credentialed. "Jordan Potter," a friend who frequents my blog, hit the nail on the head when he stated (paraphrase): "I thought it was obvious that this is a blog, not a peer-reviewed academic journal." Bingo! Expecting a non-scholar to be a scholar in all respects is clearly not a fair - not even a sensible - requirement.

Contrariwise, foolishly acting as if one's own arguments practically reach the level of scholarly detachment and sublime factuality, is equally absurd. In other words, I have been acting as a self-proclaimed layman and non-scholar (thus I cite others a lot, rather than give my own opinion on such momentous issues, which holds no weight at all, standing on its own), and have been accused of playing the pseudo-scholar, while the most vocal and prolific of my opponents acted as if he were on a higher level, when in fact, he has no more standing in academia or credentials than I do.

But before going on further, and debunking the latest ludicrous charges to come my way, let's make sure we understand exactly what this fallacy of appealing to authority, or argumentum ad verecundiam is. To do so we shall consult the most well-known textbook on logic: Irving M. Copi's Introduction to Logic (my copy is the 5th edition, New York: Macmillan, 1978). Copi provides a clear definition and explanation on pages 94-95 (note how what he says in in perfect accord with my own approach to use of sources, and reasoned argument in general):

In attempting to make up one's mind on a difficult and complicated question, one may seek to be guided by the judgment of a genuine, acknowledged expert who can be expected to have studied the matter thoroughly. One may argue that such and such a conclusion is correct because it is the best judgment of such an expert authority. This method of argument is in many cases perfectly legitimate, for the reference to an admitted authority in the special field of that authority's competence may carry great weight and constitute relevant evidence. If laymen are disputing over some question of physical science and one appeals to the testimony of Einstein on the matter, that testimony is very relevant. Although it does not prove the point, it certainly tends to support it. This is a relative matter, however, for if experts rather than laymen are disputing over a question in the field in which they themselves are experts, their appeal would be only to the facts and to reason, and any appeal to the authority of another would be completely without value as evidence.

But when an authority is appealed to for testimony in matters outside the province of that authority's special field, the appeal commits the fallacy of argumentum ad verecundiam. If in an argument over religion one of the disputants appeals to the opinions of Darwin, a great authority in biology, the appeal is fallacious. Similarly, an appeal to the opinions of a great physicist like Einstein to settle a political or economic argument would be fallacious . . . in this day of extreme specialization, to obtain thorough knowledge of one's field requires such concentration as to restrict the possibility of achieving authoritative knowledge in others.

My critic cited one Glen Whitman (no further source given) similarly:

This fallacy occurs when someone tries to demonstrate the truth of a proposition by citing some person who agrees, even though that person may have no expertise in the given area. For instance, some people like to quote Einstein's opinions about politics (he tended to have fairly left-wing views), as though Einstein were a political philosopher rather than a physicist. Of course, it is not a fallacy at all to rely on authorities whose expertise relates to the question at hand, especially with regard to questions of fact that could not easily be answered by a layman - for instance, it makes perfect sense to quote Stephen Hawking on the subject of black holes.

At least in some forms of debate, quoting various sources to support one's position is not just acceptable but mandatory. In general, there is nothing wrong with doing so. Even if the person quoted has no particular expertise in the area, he may have had a particularly eloquent way of saying something that makes for a more persuasive speech. In general, debaters should be called down for committing argumentum ad verecundiam only when (a) they rely on an unqualified source for information about facts without other (qualified) sources of verification, or (b) they imply that some policy must be right simply because so-and-so thought so.

Note the last sentence, which is key. My critics claim I have committed both (a) and (b), when in fact I have committed neither, as will be further demonstrated in due course. (a) is factually-untrue and easily shown to be so; (b) cannot be proven because my opponents cannot produce any hard evidence that I have ever asserted the fallacy or argued as if it were true, and the nature of my argument. So I haven't committed this fallacy at all.

A case could arguably be made, then (though I would not make it myself), based on Copi's and Whitman's own statements, that Whitman is no expert on logic, since it isn't his field (he is an economist); therefore, citing him for the definition is a possible example of the appeal to authority fallacy. As I said, I wouldn't state this, because logic is a basic field that underlies a liberal education and other fields of study. At any rate, however, I cited a philosopher and the most well-known textbook of logic for my definition, whereas my critic cited an economist from an unknown source.

Let me briefly illustrate, then, the utterly groundless charges that my opponents have been making, in terms of this fallacy. As explained above at some length, (b) is not true of my argument. That can be disposed of. If my critics think otherwise, then the burden of proof is on them to produce some hard evidence. Of course they have yet to do so, and thus have been engaging in the fallacy of circular argument, or begging the question, all along, since the mere presence of a bunch of citations does not prove that the person utilizing them was engaged in the fallacy, as properly explained above. I was not.

So we are left with the claims of (a); in Whitman's words: "they rely on an unqualified source for information about facts without other (qualified) sources of verification." Now, my opponents have been trying to build a futile, foolish case that I have relied almost exclusively on unqualified sources to the exclusion of qualified sources. If true, this would clearly constitute an instance of the fallacy. The only problem is that this is untrue, and quite easily shown to be so.

Furthermore, my opponents, being able to read (and presumably, to comprehend an argument) must know this to be untrue by simply looking over my sources (I assume that they have at least read my papers; I don't accuse them of not reading them, as I have been falsely accused vis-a-vis some of theirs).

Leaving aside all the Catholic figures that I have cited, since the debate was largely about how to apply Catholic just war theory in this instance, what military figures have I cited? Well, it's a very long list; among others, I cited the following military authorities or political figures: Eisenhower, Leahy, Hoover, MacArthur, Clarke, Hap Arnold, Curtis LeMay, Halsey, and Montgomery (all opposed to the bombings). Furthermore, I devoted an entire paper to primary documents from Harry Truman and his closest advisors.

Somehow, incredibly, my opponents seemed to think that recourse to Truman's own letters and diaries had no bearing on the act of dropping these bombs, which he authorized. Go figure. Rather than deal with that extremely relevant data (including Truman himself calling the very acts "murder"), they choose to absolutely ignore it and pretend that it didn't exist as part of my presentation. Primary documents relating to the decision mean nothing; Truman's own thoughts are an utter non sequitur and meaningless, according to how my opponents have been acting. But of course this is ludicrous.

I conclude, then, based on the above reasoning, that I have committed no fallacy. The charges against me regarding supposed fallacies I committed, had no basis whatsoever; they have now been completely refuted.

Have I Called My Opponents "Murderers" or Advocates of Murder, or Callous About the Loss of Life, Etc?

I have vehemently denied this accusation, even swearing under God that I neither believe this, nor have ever asserted it. If something I wrote suggests to my opponents that I believe this, then it was either written unclearly, or they have misinterpreted it, or derived an illogical conclusion from it which does not follow. Much of the confusion rests upon the Catholic distinction between subjective culpability vs. objective acts.

I don't believe for a second that Catholic bomb proponents think they are defending murder. Obviously, their position is held in good faith, and they feel that the acts were militarily and ethically justified. Subjectively, then, they do not think it is murder at all; therefore, they are not defending that proposition.

Yet, objectively speaking, opponents of the bombings as immoral believe it to be murder, as that is what immoral killing is. This is no huge revelation; indeed, it is self-evident. It doesn't follow, however, that opposing those who justify the bombings amounts to calling them murderers. Likewise, I wouldn't say that even most women who commit abortion are guilty of "murder" in the full, subjectively culpable sense (the same one that makes a person guilty of mortal sin). They are so ignorant and exploited in many cases, and emotionally distraught, that it is almost meaningless to even apply such a charge to them.

The doctors committing the acts, however,. are definitely guilty of murder, because they know too much. Civil law makes the same distinctions, with, e.g., its categories of different forms of killing or murder, and differential guilt: first degree murder, second degree, premeditated, manslaughter, self-defense, justifiable homicide, temporary insanity, crimes of passion, etc.

I have not impugned my opponents' motives or status as good Catholics, at all. I've also been falsely charged with pretending that my view on this is the only one permissible for Catholics to hold, or that it has been asserted by the magisterium. Again, this is false on both counts. Not guilty as charged.

For my part, I shall go through the papers I wrote on this topic and search for the word "murder" and see if I have ever remotely applied it to them. It won't do for them to simply cite one of my sources which happens to take a different view than I do, because there are places where I would disagree with the one I cite (this being one instance). Some writers I cite apply the term murder or even (in Pope John Paul II's case) genocide to the bombings (e.g., Joseph Sobran), but this can easily be understood as a use of the objective sense, without necessarily implying that advocates are subjectively advocating murder. This is a crucial distinction to always bear in mind.

Furthermore, I have either cited statements, or made several of my own, concerning my view that Truman was not a murderer in the subjective sense, or an evil man, or a "moron" (as one opponent "read my mind" and thought that I concluded), or so forth (even though he himself used the word murder to describe the acts). I've argued that, if I don't think that of the man who made the decision, why would my opponents assume that I think otherwise about them?

Here is what I found using the search capabilities of my keyboard: I used the word "murder" in my paper on double effect, but it was clearly in the sense of an objective description of the act, from my perspective. In the same context (same paragraph), I was careful to assert that "I freely grant the good intentions and good faith of those who disagree with me on this. But I cannot agree with their moral logic." This does not entail calling them murderers and applying the moral opprobrium that this implies. I simply don't regard my opponents on this issue as "bad men," or "monsters," as one of them claimed.

I used the word again in part IV of the first paper, but it was in reference to today's terrorists. Then when I described the bombings in the next sentence I used the word killing. I was making an analogy of sorts, yet this is still in the objective sense and does not entail calling advocates of the bombings murderers.

In the same paper, I wrote: ". . . we went right to mass murder because we had gotten very used to it and comfortable with it by then." It is easy to see (with the benefit of hindsight) how this could be taken the wrong way, and it was poorly and insensitively worded, I freely grant. Yet even here I was describing the objective nature of the act as I believe it to be, not the subjective viewpoint of those who advocate it. That's what I believe, and that's what I meant. In this specific instance, I blame myself to some extent, in the sense described above.

The same perhaps applies to my phrase, "the murder of 200,000 men, women, and children." I am describing my own view of the objective nature of the act. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand that an immoral killing is murder. So this is really only stating the obvious. Again, it does not follow that I regard my opponents as murderers, simply because I use the word to describe the acts as I see them.

It would be like applying the word "murder" to the killing of preborn babies by virtue of abortifacient contraceptives. Most people using contraceptives (let's say, the many millions of pro-life Protestants who do) are not even aware that this is taking place. How can they be "murderers" if they don't even know anything about this? They can't. They aren't culpable, if they don't have enough information (having been kept ignorant by a medical community which loves contraception and tolerates abortion itself).

But by the same token I could say something like, "mass murder is taking place by means of abortifacient birth control pills." The two ways of decribing the same scenario do not contradict each other, because it has to do with the objective / subjective distinction. My conclusion is objectively true by Catholic moral standards. It doesn't follow that the contracepting women and their husbands or boyfriends are thus murderers or that they desire to murder their children.

So in this instance, I would contend that bomb proponents, for whatever reason, have not been persuaded that the acts that they defend are murder. I'm sure that if they were convinced of that, that they would oppose the acts as I do. In any event, I have not called them murderers, nor do I believe they are, and I am happy to issue my personal apology to the parties involved for sloppy language and insensitivity regarding how such language would likely be received.

That concludes my survey of my use of the word murder. Apart from unfortunate expression (which everyone who writes is guilty of times without number, being human), I contend that, once again, the charges levied against me have been shown to be quite unwarranted.

John Wesley (1703-1791), founder of Methodism (who remained a lifelong Anglican)

John Wesley: Sermon on Judging Others

This is very insightful and we can all learn much from it. It comes from Upon Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount: Discourse 10. I have posted roughly the first half of the sermon.

"Judge not, that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again. And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye? Or how wilt thou say to thy brother, Let me pull out the mote out of thine eye; and, behold, a beam is in thine own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then thou shalt see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye.

"Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine; lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you.

"Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you. For everyone that asketh, receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened. Or what man is there of you, who, if his son ask bread, will give him a stone? Or if he ask a fish, will give him a serpent? If ye, then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good gifts to them that ask him? Therefore all things whatever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets." Matt. 7:1-12.

1. Our blessed Lord, having now finished his main design, having first delivered the sum of true religion, carefully guarded against those glosses of men whereby they would make the Word of God of none effect; and having, next, laid down rules touching that right intention which we are to preserve in all our outward actions, now proceeds to point out the main hindrances of this religion, and concludes all with a suitable application.

2. In the fifth chapter, our great Teacher has fully described inward religion in its various branches. He has there laid before us those dispositions of soul which constitute real Christianity; the tempers contained in that "holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord;" the affections which, when flowing from their proper fountain, from a living faith in God through Christ Jesus, are intrinsically and essentially good, and acceptable to God. In the sixth he hath shown how all our actions likewise, even those that are indifferent in their own nature, may be made holy, and good, and acceptable to God, by a pure and holy intention. Whatever is done without this he declares is of no value with God: Whereas, whatever outward works are thus consecrated to God are, in his sight, of great price.

3. In the former part of this chapter, he points out the most common and most fatal hindrances of this holiness: In the latter, he exhorts us by various motives, to break through all, and secure that prize of our high calling.

4. The first hindrance he cautions us against is judging. "Judge not, that ye be not judged." Judge not others, that ye be not judged of the Lord, that ye bring not vengeance on your own heads. "For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again:" -- A plain and equitable rule, whereby God permits you to determine for yourselves in what manner he shall deal with you in the judgment of the great day.

5. There is no station of life, nor any period of time, from the hour of our first repenting and believing the gospel till we are made perfect in love, wherein this caution is not needful for every child of God. For occasions of judging can never be wanting. And the temptations to it are innumerable; many whereof are so artfully disguised that we fall into the sin before we suspect any danger. And unspeakable are the mischiefs produced hereby, -- always to him that judges another, thus wounding his own soul, and exposing himself to the righteous judgment of God; -- and frequently to those who are judged, whose hands hang down, who are weakened and hindered in their course, if not wholly turned out of the way, and caused to turn back even to perdition. Yea, how often when this "root of bitterness springs up," are "many defiled thereby;" by reason whereof the way of truth itself is evil spoken of, and that worthy name blasphemed whereby we are called!

6. Yet it does not appear that our Lord designed this caution only, or chiefly, for the children of God; but rather for the children of the world, for the men who know not God. These cannot but hear of those who are not of the world; who follow after the religion above described; who endeavor to be humble, serious, gentle, merciful, and pure in heart; who earnestly desire such measures of these holy tempers as they have not yet attained, and wait for them in doing all good to all men, and patiently suffering evil. Whoever go but thus far cannot be hid, no more than "a city set upon a hill." And why do not those who 'see" their "good works glorify their Father which is in heaven?" What excuse have they for not treading in their steps? -- for not imitating their example and being followers of them, as they are also of Christ? Why, in order to provide an excuse for themselves, they condemn those whom they ought to imitate. They spend their time in finding out their neighbor's faults, instead of amending their own. They are so busied about others going out of the way, that themselves never come into it at all; at least, never get forward, never go beyond a poor dead form of godliness without the power.

7. It is to these more especially that our Lord says, "Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye;" -- the infirmities, the mistakes, the imprudence, the weakness of the children of God; -- "but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?" Thou considerest not the damnable impenitence, the satanic pride, the accursed self-will, the idolatrous love of the world, which are in thyself, and which make thy whole life an abomination to the Lord. Above all, with what supine carelessness and indifference art thou dancing over the mouth of hell! And "how then," with what grace, with what decency or modesty, "wilt thou say to thy brother, Let me pull out the mote out of thine eye;" -- the excess of zeal for God, the extreme of self-denial, the too great disengagement from worldly cares and employments, the desire to be day and night in prayer, or hearing the words of eternal life? -- "And behold a beam is in thine own eye!" Not a mote, like one of these. "Thou hypocrite!" who pretendest to care for others, and hast no care for thy own soul; who makest a show of zeal for the cause of God, when in truth thou neither lovest nor fearest him! "First cast out the beam out of thine own eye:" Cast out the beam of impenitence! Know thyself! See and feel thyself a sinner! Feel that thy inward parts are very wickedness, that thou art altogether corrupt and abominable, and that the wrath of God abideth on thee! Cast out the beam of pride; abhor thyself; sink down as in dust and ashes; be more and more little, and mean, and base, and vile in thine own eyes! Cast out the beam of self-will! Learn what that meaneth, "If any man will come after me, let him renounce himself." Deny thyself, and take up thy cross daily. Let thy whole soul cry out, "I came down from heaven," -- for so thou didst, thou never-dying spirit, whether thou knowest it or no, -- "not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me." Cast out the beam of love of the world! Love not the world, neither the things of the world. Be thou crucified unto the world, and the world crucified unto thee. Only use the world, but enjoy God. Seek all thy happiness in him! Above all, cast out the grand beam, that supine carelessness and indifference! Deeply consider, that "one thing is needful;" the one thing which thou hast scarce ever thought of. Know and feel, that thou art a poor, vile, guilty worm, quivering over the great gulf! What art thou? A sinner born to die; a leaf driven before the wind; a vapour ready to vanish away, just appearing, and then scattered into air, to be no more seen! See this! "And then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye." Then, if thou hast leisure from the concerns of thy own soul, thou shalt know how to correct thy brother also.

8. But what is properly the meaning of this word, "Judge not?" What is the judging which is here forbidden? It is not the same as evil-speaking, although it is frequently joined therewith. Evil-speaking is the relating anything that is evil concerning an absent person; whereas judging may indifferently refer either to the absent or the present. Neither does it necessarily imply the speaking at all, but only the thinking evil of another. Not that all kind of thinking evil of others is that judging which our Lord condemns. If I see one commit robbery or murder, or hear him blaspheme the name of God, I cannot refrain from thinking ill of the robber or murderer. Yet this is not evil judging: There is no sin in this, nor anything contrary to tender affection.

9. The thinking of another in a manner that is contrary to love is that judging which is here condemned; and this maybe of various kinds. For, First, we may think another to blame when he is not. We may lay to his charge (at least in our own mind) the things of which he is not guilty; the words which he has never spoke, or the actions which he has never done. Or we may think his manner of acting was wrong, although in reality it was not. And even where nothing can justly be blamed, either in the thing itself or in the manner of doing it, we may suppose his intention was not good, and so condemn him on that ground, at the same time that he who searches the heart sees his simplicity and godly sincerity.

10. But we may not only fall into the sin of judging by condemning the innocent; but also, Secondly, by condemning the guilty to a higher degree than he deserves. This species of judging is likewise an offence against justice as well as mercy; and yet such an offence as nothing can secure us from but the strongest and tenderest affection. Without this we readily suppose one who is acknowledged to be in fault to be more in fault than he really is. We undervalue whatever good is found in him. Nay, we are not easily induced to believe that anything good can remain in him in whom we have found anything that is evil.

11. All this shows a manifest want of that love which _ou logizetai kakon,_ -- thinketh no evil; which never draws an unjust or unkind conclusion from any premises whatever. Love will not infer from a person's falling once into an act of open sin that he is accustomed so to do, that he is habitually guilty of it: And if he was habitually guilty once, love does not conclude he is so still, much less, that if he is now guilty of this, therefore he is guilty of other sins also. These evil reasonings all pertain to that sinful judging which our Lord here guards us against; and which we are in the highest degree concerned to avoid, if we love either God or our own souls.

12. But supposing we do not condemn the innocent, neither the guilty any farther than they deserve; still we may not be altogether clear of the snare: For there is a Third sort of sinful judging, which is the condemning any person at all where there is not sufficient evidence. And be the facts we suppose ever so true; yet that does not acquit us. For they ought not to have been supposed, but proved; and till they were, we ought to have formed no judgment; -- I say, till they were; for neither are we excused; although the facts admit of ever so strong proof, unless that proof be produced before we pass sentence, and compared with the evidence on the other side. Nor can we be excused if ever we pass a full sentence before the accused has spoken for himself. Even a Jew might teach us this, as a mere lesson of justice abstracted from mercy and brotherly love. "Doth our law," says Nicodemus, "judge any man before it hear him, and know what he doeth?" (John 7:51.) Yea, a Heathen could reply, when the chief of the Jewish nation desired to have judgment against his prisoner, "It is not the manner of the Romans" to judge "any man, before he that is accused have the accusers face to face, and have licence to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him."

13. Indeed we could not easily fall into sinful judging were we only to observe that rule which another [Seneca] of those heathen Romans affirms to have been the measure of his own practice. "I am so far," says he, "from lightly believing every man's or any man's evidence against another, that I do not easily or immediately believe a man's evidence against himself. I always allow him second I thoughts, and many times counsel too." Go, thou who art called a Christian, and do likewise, lest the heathen rise and condemn thee in that day!

14. But how rarely should we condemn or judge one another, at least how soon would that evil be remedied, were we to walk by that clear and express rule which our Lord himself has taught us! -- "If thy brother shall trespass against thee," or if thou hear or believe that he hath, "go and tell him of his fault, between him and thee alone." This is the first step thou art to take. "But if he will not hear, take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established." This is the second step. "If he neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church," either to the overseers thereof, or to the whole congregation. Thou hast then done thy part. Then think of it no more, but commend the whole to God.

On the Ethics of Replication of Music, Books, Movies, Software, Etc., Part II

See Part One. Tim Johnson's words are in green. Others are in various colors.

>With the same argumentation, one could say that it is not wrong to travel without a train ticket provided that you wouldn't travel at all if there were ticket inspectors in every train.

No, because that was not the crux of my argument or ultimate justification for these practices; only a secondary consideration, based on the counter-observation that I was depriving someone of what he would otherwise have. The heart of my argument is the various analogies and the reductio ad absurdum. There is only one way to ride a train: you pay for the ticket and get on and ride (or you do the Woody Guthrie / hobo thing and hop a freight train). I can't buy a " used train ride" at some store. Someone can't pass a train ride that they had on to me. I can't take out a train ride at a library. But someone can give me a ticket as a gift (which is closer to my other arguments).

None of this (except the last thing) is true with books and music, because of libraries, radio, TV, VCR's, etc. They are able to be replicated for personal use. If you think that is stealing, are you prepared to say that all libraries and used places, etc., should be illegal?

>I think you are way off base on the software and music thing. It is totally different than the book example. With the book being bought, sold, bought, etc. there is only 1 copy of that book in the format put out there by the publisher. You are buying the physical copy of the book, not the contents. With the software you are also buying the physical copy to be used by one person/PC generally. While multiple people CAN read a book or listen to music at the same time, the book cannot occupy TWO LOCATIONS at the same time. Nor can the same CD be played in TWO LOCATIONS at the same time. To do this, you have to MAKE A COPY. You would have to install the software twice (thereby creating a second usable copy), copy the CD or photocopy the book. It is pretty well recognized that copying an entire book at Kinkos is forbidden, though I am not sure what the exact laws are. Not a lawyer.

This is a distinction without a difference, and already dealt with in my paper. There is no difference; in each case, something is being used without the producer getting compensated for it. There could be 100 copies of my books being sold used on amazon.com. That's 100 times I will get no royalties. Likewise, I can use various software at the library or Kinkos, or as part of an old computer someone gave me, and good ol' Microsoft doesn't get more income from it. Thus, the results are the same in each case. But it's very difficult to conclude that this is stealing, because of all my analogies, leading to a reductio ad absurdum. No one wants to outlaw used sales. Yet no one can show me how they differ fundamentally in principle from what they regard as "stealing" or "theft."

>So should I be able to make a photocopy (at work or otherwise) of Biblical Defense that I borrow from a friend because I wouldn't buy it otherwise?

I think it stinks, but I can't make a compelling case against it. That's why this is an interesting discussion. We all loan books to people. Libraries loan books. Everytime that happens, some author misses some royalties. Your friend could loan you the paperback book to read, or you could photocopy it and read it. I don't see any ultimate distinction, because in both cases the book is read without you putting up the whole price. So it's a bit of a paradox. If it's stealing, then libraries are the biggest houses of theft around. Since no one that I know thinks libraries and used bookstores are immoral and in massive violation of one of the Ten Commandments, then we must conclude that these other things are likewise not stealing, because they don't differ in principle from all this stuff that society has long accepted as perfectly moral and legal.

>Should I be able to photocopy it only if I can't afford it otherwise?

Libraries have photocopy machines to be used for some purpose, don't they? I think it is a dilemma that I can't totally figure out myself.

>Should I be able to sell my copy when I am done reading it?

I think we can all agree that the principles outlined in my post would forbid selling anything and making a profit. I refer only to personal use. Once you start making a profit, then you are stealing the recompense due to the creator (or publisher, printer etc.). You're not the creator. On the other hand, music stores with used CDs and used bookstores do exactly that: they profit from re-selling something. So it's a paradox again. This is the point at whch my friend could no longer answer. He saw the force of my reductio.

>I would hope the answer would be "NO!" from you on all three. I would be benefitting from your work by reading it and then selling the copy that I likely didn't pay for myself.

But you can benefit from a library copy. That's the whole point.

>So why should Microsoft and musicians have their work copied and passed along to people that use it, benefit from it, enjoy it and possibly even resell the copies they made? It seems like no one would have a right to their own intellectual property this way.

Why is there TV and radio and Internet MP3s, and CD burning and tape recorders and iPods, and DVD recorders, which can replicate all these things? Why are they legal and why are they not illegal, if all copying is immoral? What do you expect people to do with a DVD recorder? Stick to movies of kids playing in the pool only?

>That said… I, like almost everyone at one time or another, have not always lived up to the ideals I speak for here. Doesn't mean I don't know I've done things wrong. But I am not trying to justify it anymore. I used to make the same arguments you make about not buying it anyways. I justified it by saying the same thing only with the caveat that I would buy legit copies of stuff I used to make money.

As with Phil, you have not gotten to the heart of my argument, which I have briefly restated in this reply. It remains true, however, that I am not depriving anyone of their profit or royalty if I would never buy the product new in the first place. If I don't buy it new: no profit for the producer. If I get a copy of that which I wouldn't have bought: no profit for the producer. I just think it is one consideration among many. If I take a book off the shelf at Borders, however, and walk off with it, this is stealing, because that particular book (like thr train ride in his example) would have been sold, and the profit made by the store, the publisher, and author. When I obtain a used copy, those people got their recompense from the original purchase, but now someone else is reading it, and they don't get the profit for the second person. Same thing with a library.

>The key point was that the government has the right to say what is illegal. It may not make sense to you but they have that authority. You can tell the government they are being logically inconsistent by not making used book stores and libraries illegal. They have the right to pass logically inconsistent laws. Still there is the question of are we morally obligated to obey the law? Are you saying Catholics have no such obligation? It certainly isn't their highest obligation but it is there.

When did I say that anyone should break a law? I argued positively for the law in my post, by saying that Napster has won in court. That was an argument in my favor, not against me. Software is no different, as far as I can see. Someone can give me a copy as a gift. Or they can let me use it on their computer. Or they can give me an old computer with the program on it. Or I can go to Kinkos or a library and use a computer with a program. If I'm the only one who used the gift, then it is no different from the gift purchaser using it. There is a one-to-one correspondence. But in the other four instances, more than one person is using the same program, which is logically and ethically indistinguishable from replication, in my opinion. In all four cases, and with "non-profit" replication, one program is being used by more than one person, and Microsoft is not receiving recompense for any user beyond the first.

>I think that it is reasonable to say that public authorities have a right - even a duty - to make culture and education (records and books) available to the entirety of the population, even to the poorest ones.

Of course it should. I agree wholeheartedly. But this is indistinguishable from replication, in result and effect. By acknowledging this, you grant the heart of my argument. The task of someone disagreeing with me is to show how replication is essentially or fundamentally different from libraries and used stuff. You have even brought up the topic of some people being too poor to afford things; therefore, they ought to be able to obtain it at lesser or no cost. Exactly!

So the principle behind libraries and rummages is to allow the less-fortunate to be able to obtain what more fortunate folks can easily buy new. This is only one aspect of my argument (a relatively minor and secondary one), but I'm trying to show how it only helps my case to point this out. This might get into Chestertonian Distributivist territory . . .

>One could of course argue that then the authorities should pay the authors, which actually is what they do in many countries.

They ought to do it here, too, then, in some fashion. I lose out when used copies of my books are sold. How about used bookstores giving the creator a cut? I'm all for that. :-) As it is, they make a profit on my book simply because it is used. Why should they make money by obtaining a used book, whereas I, the writer, receive none? This guys with a used bookstore will make even more than I made with the initial royalty (I only get about $1.70 for my new book, which is list price $19.95).

It's paradoxical, which is why this discussion is so fascinating and fun. But you don't see me moaning and groaning (apart from this passing reference) about how I'm getting screwed by amazon or whatever, whereas the rich rock stars and music publishers are going nuts because they might make 10 million instead of 11 million (and even that is disputable, according to some things I've read). I'm at least willing to accept reality: people will buy my book used. I wish they would all buy it new, but it ain't gonna happen.

Actually, I make more money selling 11 books for $25 than I do when one of my paperbaks is sold. That's pure profit for me, and I make the money that I would make when 15 paperbacks of mine are sold. The consumer also gets each book for $2.27, so that is a clear case of the Internet bypassing the "middle men." It's creator right to consumer . . .

I don't, however, say they are "stealing" when they buy my book used. Contrariwise, those who say that Napster is stealing need to show how it is any different from a used book or CD. I see no difference. In fact, Napster would be more ethical according to these critics' own reasoning, because they do pay the artists something, and they have tracks that need to be purchased also.
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My argument has been that borrowing is indistinguishable in effect from having or owning a copy. I can borrow a CD and play it 14 times in 10 days. Or I can buy it and play it 13 times in 10 days. What's the difference? I "possessed it" in a large sense more so when I borrowed it than if I had bought it and played it less, because all that is relevant in owning a CD is how much it is played. It's a classic distinction without a difference. So if this is how copyright law works, it is thoroughly confused, in my opinion.

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>Couple of things… 1. I am not trying to refute your arguments. I am not debating you. 2. I am offering what I see as problems with your reasoning and how things work in the real world.

Another distinction without a difference. :-) How is that NOT debate or critique? :-) I don't bite. This is a fun discussion. I WANT folks to disagree with me and try to overthrow my argument. That's what is the challenge and the learning experience. I haven't totally figured this thing out, either. I'm just trying to look at things clearly, objectively, logically, and ethically.

>I don't want to start a back and forth on this because I don't have a lot of time to read and respond.

For all that, you're doing darn good! LOL I'm trying to get back in my pool and I keep getting all these great posts to reply to. :-)

>So these will be quick. 3. I am not saying that all copying is immoral. What I am saying is that copying that creates NEW copies without consent of the producer (when the law or the producer says you can't) of the item is wrong.

Okay, show me how it is different from the other cases. This, no one has yet done.

>If I reproduce a piece of copyrighted or trademarked artwork or gizmo or device and used it without the permission of the original producer, that would be wrong.

Only if you made it somehoe "yours" insofar as the outsider viewed it (say, the logo of your blog or something).

>If I take music I have paid for and make a mix CD for my own use or download to my MP3 player, that is not. It's pretty well accepted that this is an OK practice since I am using something I have already paid for.

Private use, sure.

>Same with recording TV shows for personal use. These are things broadcast freely over the airwaves or that I pay for via cable.

Yeah, but a lot of these shows (esp. on public TV) have ads at the end where you can buy the thing for $19.95. You have in some sense deprived them of that profit by taping it.

>If I record to watch and rewatch, that is generally accepted. Even giving away these generally is seen as OK because of the source. I haven't really thought much about whether giving someone a copy of the latest episode of Stargate: SG1 is immoral. I would say that since society and the law seems to make no bones about it because of its format and transmission (free through the TV) it would be OK.

One of my main points . . . this kind of thing is totally acceptable and is implied by the very existence of recording equipment.

>Because books have always been seen as both a physical product and an intellectual one, they kind of fall in the middle I think. You buy the physical product and can do with it as you will. But the law pretty much makes it clear that copying an entire book, article, etc. is not legal. Copying more than a certain amount for specific reasons will get you into trouble because you are creating a new physical (virtual with the internet) product. Passing a book from person to person is an age-old custom. There's no copying. There is no creation of new physical product.

It doesn't matter (not philosophically; whatever the laws — which might be good or bad themselves — might say). The result is the same: the book is read by those who receive it in such a manner without them having to purchase it and without the author receiving what seems to be their just due. If one copy of my book was passed around to 3000 people, I would lose 2,999 royalty payments, or approximately $5098, by the rates for my newest book. This would all be perfectly acceptable, so you say (if it can be passed to five people, it can be passed theoretically to 5000), because it is "an age-old custom." Yet when folks pass around MP3's, it is stealing and immoral? Or if I use Microsoft Word 2000 at a library or Kinkos, I have stolen from Microsoft? See how the analogies are so deadly to this "case"?

>When the library loans that book out, ownership has not changed and no new product is created.

That's irrelevant, as shown.

>Same with video rentals and even the software rental places that were around about 15 years ago. When you return the book, video or the software, it is presumed you did not copy it.

Yes, but you watched something you might optherwise have paid more money for at a movie theatre or a place which sells new DVD movies. And again, the producer or whomever makes the profit received none from you. Blockbuster did, though, didn't they?

>In the case of the software, it was pretty explicitly stated that you did not copy it and that you uninstalled it from your computer. Same is true when you sell software or give it away.

What I'm saying is that such a law makes no sense, seeing that the same software is available at libraries, Kinkos, and in used computers given away.

>If I understand your argument clearly, you are equating use (or transfer of ownership) of something with ownership/new purchase of something.

In terms of the relationship of the user to the product, yes. But the relationship of the user to the creator is different, because the latter receives no further profit.

>In other words the use of something requires the producer to be compensated for each use or transfer of ownership of that item.

That would be "ideal," as my friend in the initial discussion agreed. But then that "ideal" was a loophole in his argument big enough for a truck to drive through. I think that is when he himself saw that he couldn't refute my objections. He conceded the whole store . . .

>In the case of software for instance, license agreements generally state that you can install it on a desktop and a laptop providing that only one copy is in use at a time. It usually says nothing about how many people can use it.

Again, the same ultimately meaningless distinction . . .

>Neither does a book, video or CD. That's part of the agreement when you buy. Courts seem to have upheld the license agreement pretty consistently.

This discussion is not merely a legal one, but a philosophical / ethical one, which transcends laws.
>Not sure if anyone was ever prosecuted for violating the multiple use at one time thing. I doubt it, so that would likely never have been challenged in particular. Nor is it likely that the particular point of making a single copy of a program for personal use has been prosecuted or challenged. That said, I think it would be wise to assume the entire license is valid and legal.

Yes it is. That doesn;'t mean that the reasoning behind it might not be inconsistent or nonsensical, given other realities regarding replication and use.

>If you make copies of something for personal use of something you already own. I see no issue there. Even if you copy an entire book.

Agreed.

>Not sure why you would except to have one you could mark up, but hey.

I have fun making new CD's of existing CD's, like the Beatles and Beach Boys: like "singles with B-sides, in mono," or something like that.

>It seems to me that making a copy of something for your personal use that is currently considered illegal would be immoral. It shouldn't matter that you would not have paid for it in the first place. It shouldn't matter that you could rent or borrow it for little or nothing. The point is that you have created something you had no right to. Just because you can do something, doesn't mean you have the right or that you should just because you want to.

Of course. But you have to defeat my analogies. No one has yet.

>There are CD and DVD burners and recordable audio and video cassette players because you can have legitimate uses of them. I can transfer music I make to tapes and give them away. I can make copies of my home movies and give them away.

That's your own product, which you own in the first place, so there is no difficulty or ambiguity there.

>The existence of the technology doesn't justify the usage in ways that you shouldn't.

The nature of the "shouldn't" is precisely what we are discussing . . . we all agree on the general principle. It is how it is sensibly applied, which is the issue.

>I would think this would be plainly obvious that you don't take what is not yours.

Exactly. But general proverbs and truisms do not solve our problem. Rigorous examination of the issues is required.

>Using a PC at Kinkos or the library is perfectly within the bounds of the license agreement.

Back to the legal thing again . . . it's okay if that is the only way you want to analyze it, but my discussion goes deeper than law, to the ethics and principles ostensibly behind law. What is legal is not always what is right (clearly so).

>And borrowing a book is understood to be perfectly normal and has been for hundreds of years.

Which is why my argument is so compelling . . . :-)

>Perhaps at one time, someone might not have thought of prosecuting someone for handcopying a book they wanted, because who would have the time? Technology has created the possibility of crimes that didn't exist at one time.

Also, it has made sloppy thinking more prevalent . . .

>I am curious why you think making a copy of Biblical Defense from a friend's copy stinks?

Because I don't get any recompense for it.

>Under your reasoning, it should be a morally neutral action if I wouldn't have otherwise bought it.

I have stated that this discussion is eminently paradoxical. Instinctively, I believe that I should get a "cut" for every time my book is read. That seems very clear and just. Yet I can't defeat my own analogies that show me that there will be times when it is morally read without me getting paid. Within the framework of my reductio ad absurdum, it is morally neutral . . . until my reductio is defeated, that will be my opinion, but that doesn't mean that I don't feel conflicted about it, or uneasy with that state of affairs. I'm affected by this, as an author. At the same time, I download from Napster, which is perfectly legal, and, I think, perfectly moral. But what I'm trying to do is reason through the ethics, not just lash out with knee-jerk reactions, like many in the music business are doing.

>It would seem you would not be harmed by this action.

I am because I make roughly one-third my living off of book royalties. It's not like I am wealthy by other means and have a book on the side. It's what I do. It's my vocation. Every time I am deprived of one of these royalties, I am harmed in a very real, practical way. I gotta pay my bills. I work hard writing and doing apologetics, and am trying to receive halfway decent, just wages for that service I am providing for others. So buy some books, guys! LOL

>So why does it stink?

See the above.

>I did buy all your books by the way when you ran that $25 special a while back. Great bargain.

Thank you very much. So you are making it possible for me to do what I do, and I will be eternally grateful for that, to you and all others who buy books or make a donation. I can use many more, believe me. I don't beg and plead. I simply make the need known, and hope that people who have already said that they thought my work was valuable, to help make it possible to keep doing it.

>OK. So it wasn't really short. :)

But it was FUN. See? No one should be wary of "debating" me. I'm just a big teddy bear . . . :-)

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Here's an interesting paper: "Ethics in a Peer-to-Peer World".

*****

I assume once you get your cut from the used book store, you will promptly send part of the money to the distributor of your original book. The distributor will then send some to the publisher who will then send some to his paper and ink suppliers. The paper supplier will then forward a payment to the trucking company that hauled the pulp to make the paper. The trucking company will than send some money to the people who cut the wood for the pulp. The forestry workers will then send some money to the people who own the wood lot. The owner of the wood lot will send some to the government. The govenrment will then share the proceeds with all the citizens since society as a whole made it possible for you to write the book in the first place. All these people helped to make your book possible so why should somebody be able to buy your book as a used item without their being compensated for their work?

Perhaps royalties are set based on an estimate of the number of books that will be resold, copied or loaned. If this is the case and people hang on to your book you actually come out ahead.

The following is from your original post

No to all, in my opinion. I think the ethics depends (largely, but not solely) on whether someone was going to buy a product in the first place.

This can be taken two ways.

1) I have no intention of buying this product so I can copy it for free.
2) No one will ever buy this product so I can copy it for free.

Concerning number 1: I have no intention of buying a lottery ticket. Does it then follow that I can shoplift the ticket from the drugstore counter?

Concerning number 2: It is 5 minutes to closing time. Five of my buddies who along with me have no intention of buying lottery tickets are behind me in the lineup at the counter. Twenty lottery tickets remain to be sold. Obviously the tickets will not be sold before their expiry time. Do I then have the right to shoplift as many tickets as I can?

Good stuff. Your first reductio is fun; however (commonly and legally), it is the author who receives royalties for further copies sold. The publisher, of course, gets an even bigger cut, but has far more expenses. The middle man gets his cut too. So I don't see how your chain (though great fun) can really be applicable to the issue of royalties and compensation for publisher and profit for bookseller.

As for your second part, #2 does not apply to my argument. #1 does, but has to be clarified and modified somewhat. I should modify the relative importance of this factor (my language above in that regard is excessive). This particular line of thought is in response to the specific sub-charge that sales of an item are harmed by copying in various ways, but it's not really central to my argument, as I have developed it and clarified through the challenges presently received.

I made the point that to copy something when you wouldn't have bought the item new, does not deprive the creator of any profit because if you don't buy it new in any event, they don't profit, and if you copy it, they don't profit. Copying has been shown, I think, to be both legal and moral in most cases, by the reductios I have offered, and also by law (for the most part), and by accepted uses, such as tape recorders and VCRs. No one has shown me that libraries don't deprive creators of royalties, just like various forms of replication do. I continue to see no ethical difference in all these examples.

In the paper I linked to above, one interesting fact they showed was that the more someone burned CD's, the more new CD's they bought. Obviously, then, any slump in sales in the music industry can't be blamed on CD burning and MP3's. The cause will have to be sought elsewhere. And one can probably make the case that available MP3s actually create more interest in music and thus more sales. In this case, the effect on music sales (from this sector) would be the exact opposite of what the contention of the opponents of Napster et al is.

Outright theft, shoplifting or stealing off the shelf is not condoned by anyone, of course. This is itself a reductio for a position contrary to my own. The difference is that replication, by definition, copies something already purchased or "put out" for public consumption (such as a TV show or songs on the radio). If it is understood that there are a wide variety of instances where things already purchased can be copied or used by another (in effect — in many respects — the same as copying), then this is essentially different from theft. No one will argue that you can simply take a product off a shelf. But if your brother or friend buys it and then you utilize it in some way, by listening, reading, using, etc. or replicating it (you could, e.g., be in the next room or in the car when he plays his new CD), then that gets us back to my reductios, where it becomes very difficult to want to outlaw libraries and all used sales and "secondary" uses, etc.

There is also the ethical distinction between:

1) not buying, and
2) taking and not paying for

Everyone recognizes that there is nothing wrong with deciding not to purchase some item on the store shelf. But you can't take something without buying it. Once someone buys it, it may be replicated (excluding profitable uses), but someone did buy the item under consideration. It was sold and thus provided as much profit as it individually could. Or if, say it is a movie, it may have been shown on TV, which allows people to tape it. That's clearly not theft because the creator somewhere along the line allowed it to be broadcast.

So it comes down to the nature of sharing "intellectual property." I continue to find this subject a fascinating instance of a profound paradox. I think any position one takes entails conundrums and intuitive "problems."

Dave, first of all, this is very good food for thought. Definitely a perspective I'd never considered before, and it makes a lot of sense.

My one "ethical concern" with the Internet is that it basically multiplies the possibilities of copying music, movies, books, etc. by a magnitude far greater than ever before. How so?

With libraries and video rental stores, they at least (1) have to have bought all of the copies that they loan out, and (2) can only rent each out to one person at a time. Of course, as individuals may make copies of the copies they are renting/borrowing, then the possibilities can increase here as well.

But with the Internet, the possibilities are almost unlimited in comparison. Basically, there seems to be much less control (if any at all) with the Internet and newer technology. I can't say with certainty that this necessarily makes it wrong, but I think this at least explains why many people (including myself) are much more hesitant to support all of the copying and free downloading taking place in this arena.

Going along with this, the concern is also that when such a new and universal easy way of copying/free downloading is available, won't people be more and more inclined to think that they never "really" need or want to buy something, not because they don't want it or can't afford it, but precisely because the free access to it is so widely available?

(Note: I apologize if this has already been said, but I didn't have the time to read everything.)

I think these are serious concerns. I, like you, don't have it all worked out. My main purpose in my post was to rebel against the cavalierly-expressed notion (Dennis Prager's remarks of this sort on his radio show intially motivated me) that almost all replication is stealing, as if it is a simple, non-ambiguous matter. It's not, as I think we all have shown, from all the viewpoints expressed.

It's precisely the intersection of the factor of "increasing possibilities for replication" and the seeming lack of any change of overall ethical principle involved in same that is paradoxical. In other words, at what quantitative point can we say that replication of something becomes wrong? For if it was right in Instance #1, how could it switch over to being wrong in Instance #4,032? Intuitively, it seems different, but at what point did the ethical principle change, and how and why?

The ethical principle (whatever it is), it seems to me, has to be present in the first instance. Thus, abortion is (from the Christian, biblical perspective) wrong whenever it occurs, not just because it occurs 1.5 million times a year in the US. If it's wrong once, it's wrong 1.5 million times (and the numbers increase the monstrous evil, because each instance is wrong, and these are multiplied by the millions; God help us). And if it is essentially right and justifiable, then numbers are irrelevant.

If replication of this sort is wrong, it is (or should be) the first time, and that includes a simple photocopy at a library or a copy made on a VCR or audio replication equipment. But then that seems to take it too far. And on and on the paradox goes . . .

The "mindset" factor that you discussed at the end might possibly be one pathway to resolve this, but thus far, I don't think it's been shown that widespread replication is hurting the music industry. As one study showed, purchases of CD's are positively related to how many CD's one burns, not inversely proportionate. No one in their right mind would say that Microsoft is hurting, as far as that goes . . .

A Cool Mathematical Analogy For the Holy Trinity, Part II

See Part One. Patrick's words will be in green. He is a philosopher.

I'm not sure I see how Elena's post helps. The alleged problem with the Trinity isn't that we can't really understand it or that it's nonsense. If this were the supposed problem, then analogies could help. But, the problem is different. The alleged problem is that we understand the doctrine quite well enough to see that it is logically contradictory. The foe of the Trinity says, in effect, you can use all the Lewisian "flatland" analogies or musical analogies or geometrical analogies you like: none of them will change the fact that there's a self-contradiction in the heart of the doctrine.

To elaborate. The doctrine, very roughly, tells us that the Son is God, the Father is God, and the Holy Spirit is God; but the Son is not the Father or the Holy Soirit, the Father is not the Son or the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is not the Father or the Son. In other words, it looks like the doctrine commits us to the following contradictory views. First, the Son is God: S=G. Second, the Father is God: F=G. Third, it's not the case that the Father is the Son: ~(F=S).

If S and F are both identical with G, then S must be identical with F. Think of it mathematically: 4+4=8, and 6+2=8. Therefore 4+4=6+2. But in the case of the Trinity, this necessary and obvious truth about identity is denied. So, the charge goes, the doctrine is contradictory.

One might try to reply to the charge by cashing out the "is" in "The Son is God" as indicating something other other than identity. But what? Obviously, it's heretical to think of it as a parthood relation. (The Son is not part of God: God is not composed of the the three Divine Persons, for God is absolutely simple and incomposite.) So what other sense of "is" can you substitute if not identity?

One might try invoke the doctrine of "relative identity." This is a rather technical move, which some very competent philosophers have endorsed in recent years (most notably van Inwagen). But it's tricky, not least because it involves the rejection of a real identity relation and may wind up heretical after all. And the logically revisionary character of the move detracts from its attractiveness. I do believe, though, that Suarez endorsed relative identity in the case of the Trinity, so it surely has precedent in the philosophical tradition. Of course, St. Thomas had no sympathy for this sort of move: but again, it's awfully tough to make St. Thomas's view work out.

I myself believe with the certainty of Faith in the revealed truth of that God is Three Persons in one Substance, but I still recognize the seriousness of the logical problem here. And I don't think thought experiments like Lewis's or Elena's really help with that.

Interesting. Isn't the logical problem overcome, though, by the prior recognition of the possibility that one Being can subsist in three persons? For us, one Being is one person, but how can it be ruled out logically (or axiomatically) that Being and person may not always be in a one-to-one relationship? I think, then, that the flatland analogy is quite relevant, precisely because it hits upon this difference of perception and defined realities which is the prior axiomatic consideration before we even get to logic. The flatlander says that there are only two dimensions, so that talk of a third dimension is meaningless and incomprehensible to him.

So Lewis was maintaining that this is how we are with regard to the Holy Trinity. We can't imagine one Being (even God) existing with more than one Person. But who's to say that we understand all of reality and that there isn't something more?

We know that there is a third dimension and that a cube has a oneness in a "greater" sense than a square possesses oneness. It's more complex, yet it remains a single entity. We can't comprehend with our thinking abilities alone, how God could subsist in three Persons, but it is not logically impossible or intrinsically self-contradictory, in my opinion. I think it's just very difficult to grasp, and must be accepted primarily by faith.

Revelation claims that it is a communication from this greater world. We arrive at the Trinity from revelation, not natural reason. But it's not inherently contradictory if we allow the possibility of three persons in one God, and don't rule it out beforehand.

That's how we can say the Father is not the Son, etc., and not be contradictory, because it isn't polytheism we're talking about, but rather, distinction of Person only.

You ask: "Isn't the logical problem overcome, though, by the prior recognition of the possibility that one Being can subsist in three persons? For us, one Being is one person, but how can it be ruled out logically (or axiomatically) that Being and person may not always be in a one-to-one relationship?"

I don't see how the logical problem is overcome by saying (something that I, of course, believe wholeheartedly) that person and substance need not always stand in a one-to-one relationship. Indeed, there are philosophers today who would gladly grant that there can be more than one person in relation to only one substance. Imagine you believe that being a person is strictly a matter of having the capacity for (conceptual) thought. So if an object can think, it's a person. But now imagine a human being who has suffered some kind of serious brain surgery (a commisurotomy, which severs the brain hemispheres, say), and can, as a result, think in two disconnected "centers" of thought. In a case like this, many people would be inclined to say that there are two persons that somehow inhabit that one human body. So it's not inconceivable, by any means, that there be more than one person in relation to just one substance.

The real question is—what's the nature of those person/substance relations? In the imaginary case above, we wouldn't be at all tempted to say it's an identity relation. Neither of the two persons is identical with the human body. But in the case of the Trinity, the claim is exactly that: the persons are all identical with the Divine substance, but they are not identical with one another.

I think it is easy to gloss over the difficulty here. Even the great Dominican Thomist Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange treats the issue far too cavalierly. In his Reality, he wrote: "The objection runs thus: Things which are really identified with one and the same third thing are identified with one another. But the divine relations and the divine persons are really identified with the divine essence. Hence the divine relations and the divine persons are identified with one another. The solution runs thus: Things which are really identified with one and the same third thing are identified with one another; yes, unless their mutual opposition is greater than their sameness with this third thing. Otherwise I say no. To illustrate. Look at the three angles of a triangle. Are they really distinct one from the other? Most certainly. Yet, each of them is identified with one and the same surface."

Now I myself find this very perplexing. The angles surely are really distinct. But nobody would try to suggest that angle A=surface Y, where surface Y is the whole triangle! Angle A=surface Y if and only if surface Y just is that particular part of the triangle that the angle, so to speak, occupies. But then there's no problem of identifying angle A and angle B with some third thing (i.e. surface Y). For it would be silly to say angle A=surface Y, and angle B=surface Y. On the contrary, angle B=surface Z. Indeed, as I pointed out in my initial post, it's quite obviously heretical to cash out the "is" in "the Son is God" as implying a parthood relation between the Son and God. So there's no comparison between Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange's "illustration" and the actual case at hand.

I'm inclined to think the matter cannot simply be brushed off as a matter of our failure to grasp the mystery. Of course, we can't adequately grasp the mystery, and the full truth of the matter will not be revealed to me until (God willing) I behold the Beatific Vision. But we can deal with the logical issues. I think they have to be solved, and, as I say, I'm skeptical that flatland-type illustrations help.

Changing keys: I'm sure illustrations like that do help people who aren't deeply troubled by the (slightly technical) logical worry I'm posing. St. Patrick's lesson with the shamrock, Frank Sheed's brilliant discussion of the Trinity, Lewis's analogy or Elena's might very well be of great help in leading people to a better grasp of this central truth of the Christian Faith, and so I don't mean at all to deny their value. I only want to deny their value in defusing the real logical worry.
What I'm not grasping is your objection! You wrote:

"the persons are all identical with the Divine substance, but they are not identical with one another."

I still don't see how this is a logical contradiction, once you grant the possibility of the trinitarian premise: God can subsist in three persons. To make a VERY imperfect analogy, I am a father, a son and a husband. All those things are me (though not all of me; as I said, it's imperfect):

A. Dave is a son.
B. Dave is a father.
C. Dave is a husband.

Once you grant what you did ("Indeed, there are philosophers today who would gladly grant that there can be more than one person in relation to only one substance"), then why do you still maintain that a logical contradiction is entailed? I don't think it is. So in the above analogy, I can be all three things, but that doesn't mean they are identical with each other:

a son qua son is not a father qua father, (etc.)

The concept of "Dave" (the totality of my being, self, or whatever term you wanna use) includes all these things (and many more) as an overarching concept, without contradiction:

1A) Dave is a son of Graham and Lois Armstrong.
1B) This son of Graham and Lois Armstrong is Dave
Armstrong. So "son" = "Dave".

2A) Dave is a father of four children: three boys and a girl.
2B) This father of four children: three boys and a girl is Dave. So "father" = "Dave."

3A) Dave is the husband of Judy.
3B) This husband of Judy is Dave. So "husband" = "Dave."

But no contradiction is entailed. This father and this son and this husband are all me, but it doesn't follow that a father equals a son: that they are the same thing in relation to each other; no, they are different in that relational sense.

Therefore, if I can be all three things simultaneously and yet remain the same person, yet son and father and husband remain distinct categories, why is it contradictory for God to contain three persons (analogous to my three relational attributes) and remain one God, and also for the three persons to be distinct in relation to each other, yet each being God?

Perhaps I'm missing something here, and I am quite aware that you are trained in philosophy and I am much less so, but that's what was in my mind (for better or worse), so I thought I'd throw it out to keep the dialogue going. I really want to learn more about this. I think it's very stimulating. This is the kind of "bottom line" philosophy and mind-exercise that I love.

I think the trouble with your analogy about your being a husband, a father and a son is that at least the first two are what might be called "phase sortals," as opposed to what might be called "substance sortals." Your being a husband is an entirely contingent matter: you could have existed without being a husband. (I demonstrate this truth by pointing out that you did exist, for quite a few years, without being a husband, and it's always valid to infer possibility from actuality!) Similarly, your being a father is entirely contingent.

Your being a son is a trickier matter, since one might think that sonhood is an essential property—something you couldn't possibly fail to instantiate if you exist. This is hard to make a decisive ruling on: is it possible that God have created you—not someone otherwise exactly like you, but actually you—without your having been the son of your parents? I'm inclined to say "no," but I admit to being in over my head here. So sonhood is a tough one to figure, as far as its essentiality goes. But we'll say more on this in a moment.

Go back to fatherhood and husbandhood. Given what we've said about the contingency of your exemplifying these properties, it follows straightaway that you, Dave, are not identical with some object (or essence) we might name "Father Dave." If you, Dave, were identical with that thing, then you could not possibly exist without that thing existing. But you did exist without that thing existing. So fatherhood is just a property you exemplify contingently, and thus it is not going to help with the Trinity, where, again, the central logical worry is the identification of the persons with the Divine Essence.

You might think sonhood is different than fatherhood, if you agree with my tentative suggestion that your being a son is an essential property. Since (for the sake of argument) you could not fail to exist without being a son, then that property is, at any rate, relevant to the discussion. I still don't think so. To see why, consider the following. It might make sense to say that you, Dave, are (identical with) a son. It might make equal sense to say you are identical with an animal; to say that you're identical with a carbon-based life form; to say that you're identical with a thing with an immortal soul; to say that you're identical with etc. All of these identity statements might be accurate, but that's just because they're all different, partial ways of describing what it is to be a human being. None of the descriptions really purports to be identifying you, Dave, with that partial description. If they did, they'd be false. (I mean, it's true that you're identical with a son, but that's not all that's true of you: it's only a very partial, and pretty uninformative, description.) In the case of the Divine Persons, this isn't going to work, or at least, I don't see clearly how it will work.

It certainly will not work if it makes Sonship a mere essential property of Godhood, in the way that sonship is an essential property of yours. For then "sonhood" becomes simply a partial way of describing God, and that's no good. (I don't know if this reduces more clearly to Modalism, or to a rejection of the incompositeness of God, but I think it reduces to one or the other.) But if this isn't what it's doing, then I don't see what it is doing.

A further point is that all the properties that you identified as part of the concept of Davehood (so to speak) are quite compatible. There is no conflict—nothing at all worrisome—about your being both a husband and a father. It is, however, precisely the point of the Trinity that the persons have incompatible relations. The Holy Spirit, for example, proceeds from the Father and the Son. The Father, however, does not proceed from anyone. These properties are contradictory. So the issue is a lot more complicated than your having a number of quite compatible properties.

I'd sure be happy if I could wind up endorsing something like St. Thomas's solution to the problem. But as I say, it's trickier than it might seem. The central issue is identity. I think if you're going to solve the puzzle, you've got to clearly show how the real identification of two things with a third thing doesn't require you to identify the two things. I don't think the analogies help with this.

Incidentally, there are some recent papers on these problems available online. They are, in some instances, pretty technical. Michael Rea has written a couple of papers [one / two ].
A nice paper by Trenton Merricks is available. [link]

A key paper to see in terms of defending Relative Identity is van Inwagen's "And Yet They are Not Three Gods, But One God," but I don't believe that one is online. If you have access to an academic library, you can find it in his collection God, Knowledge, and Mystery.

I should also point out that I have never really thought philosophically about the Trinity. I believe the doctrine, and so I believe there is no contradiction to be found. But I've never even tried to work out my own solution. Perhaps, once I get to it, I'll find St. Thomas's compelling. Perhaps I'll lean more towards Suarez. I don't know. Anyway, I just wanted to point out that I'm groping here as much as (or, perhaps, significantly more than) anyone. My perplexity over the details is very real.

The Biblical, Primitive Papacy: St. Peter & the "Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven": Scholarly Opinion (Mostly Protestant), Part II

See Part One. "Protestant Scholar"'s words will be in green. My previous words will be in purple.
>The majority of what is written is your blog entry is not a problem for Protestants. That is why you can quote a number of Protestant scholars that agree with most of your statements. For example the following:

1. Jesus gives Peter authority
2. The giving of the keys represent ecclesiastical authority
3. The authority is to declare what is right and wrong.
4. Isaiah 22:22 is in view
5. Peter has a primacy and is considered a leader.

I’m not sure why you think this is necessarily something that Protestants should interact when many would say, “Amen”.

This evidence is perfectly consistent with a primitive papacy which would develop just as every other doctrine developed. It (among much more biblical evidence) proves that Peter was the leader of the apostles and had extraordinary authority. No such person exists in the Protestant world today. Therefore, Catholicism is following the biblical model in this regard far more than any brand of Protestantism. Ironic, isn't it? But then Protestants have ruled out any definitive biblical teaching on ecclesiology and Church government (and have never resolved their own eternal differences in that regard). We think the Bible is much more perspicuous and practically helpful as a guide than that.

>The point you must argue exegetically and quote Protestant scholars agreeing with you is that this establishes a Papacy with a line of succession flowing only through Peter and Peter only is given this authority.

That is a deductive argument, and I wouldn't expect Protestants to agree with it (nor do I assert that they do) because they obviously don't accept those notions (being Protestant). Though deductive, this is also a biblical argument with a fair degree of evidence in its favor. We can establish apostolic succession itself from the Bible. The apostles were to be succeeded by the bishops, and they passed down their office to priests and other bishops, through succession. This is thoroughly established in early tradition:

Now, since there was a strong leader among the first disciples and we have all this biblical indication of how much say and power he had, it follows that Jesus (Who gave Peter the keys) set up this system of government in perpetuity for the Church. It makes no sense for one state of affairs to hold for the earliest Christians, and then another, or many, for later ones. So if Peter was the leader, then his successors would also be. Peter died in Rome; thus the Roman bishops were considered to be his successors. And they received his charism as earthly head of the Church.

I don't trust [William] Webster for the time of day. I've refuted him in depth twice and he is very unreliable in historical matters, especially concerning factuality.

>So are you insinuating that these quotes may not be totally accurate or flat out untrue?

No; what I am suggesting is that one can't trust Webster for a dispassionate presentation of patristic views, because he picks and chooses and is highly selective in what he presents, and he dopesn't know how to properly interpret the overall picture. He doesn't have a clue (sad to say) about development of doctrine, either. He has demonstrated that time and again and has been soundly refuted by many folks (myself, Steve Ray, and others).

You think otherwise? Very well, then, please write to Webster or give him a call and urge him to respond to my two lengthy, devastating refutations of his work that he has completely ignored (what else is new with anti-Catholics? — the same old story. If you can't "beat 'em", flee for the hills and make yourself scarce . . . ).

Or do you think that he couldn't, wouldn't, and shouldn't waste time with my stuff because it was worthless and had no substance? If so, then why are you here dealing with it (albeit most inadequately)?

>These are quotes from the fathers so on what basis do you not trust them?

It's not the quotes themselves, but the above factors that I have a problem with. Webster has proven himself untrustworthy as an amateur scholar. So one cannot go by what he presents, as if that is the whole picture.

Besides, the argument does not require agreement from absolutely every Father. Nor do we have to have the same biblical arguments being offered by them in order for the papacy to be a legitimate office. We would fully expect there to be differences in the early stages, just as there were, e.g., on the biblical canon. "Unanimous consent" does not mean "absolutely every one" as we often assume today. One has to understand exactly what the Latin term this comes from, meant.

>Yes, but you have prove nothing exegetically that demands a refutation. On the contrary what demands your attention is the present day Catholic interpretation of Matthew 16:18 in comparison to the mind of the fathers.

It's very funny to me that Protestants invariably demand biblical, exegetical arguments for everything. So we give them that for most of our doctrines (some like the Assumption have only scant biblical indication, but not none). But then the biblical argument is ignored or largely ignored, or minimized and dismissed (as you have done), and (irony of ironies) the Protestant then appeals to the Fathers, as if they disprove Catholic doctrine.

Or if Protestant scholars are appealed to in particulars (as I have done), then the Protestant will attempt to put the Fathers against them. It's always highly interesting (and sometimes amusing) to watch Protestants trying to use the Fathers to disprove Catholic distinctives or to prove Protestant distinctives. Talk about an uphill battle! . . . it's like trying to singlehandedly push a grand piano (with no little wheels on its legs) up a steep slope.

The Fathers offer overwhelming support for the papacy, not in every particular, or with absolute unanimity (no doctrine has that — not in every particular), but with enough consensus that one cannot fail to be struck (and I would say, complelled) by it.

But you have dismissed all of my citations as not proving anything with regard to a strong papacy. This is untrue. These scholars show that Peter had an extraordinary authority which is quite suggestive of the pope as head of the church (especially at that very early stage of its development). Here are samples from my post:

1) "So Peter, in T.W. Manson's words, is to be 'God's vicegerent . . . The authority of Peter is an authority to declare what is right and wrong for the Christian community. His decisions will be confirmed by God'"

2) In the Old Testament a steward is a man who is 'over a house' (Gen 43:19, 44:4; Is 22:15, etc). In the New Testament there are two words translated steward: epitropos (Mt 20:8; Gal 4:2), i.e. one to whose care or honour one has been entrusted, a curator, a guardian; and oikonomos (Lk 16:2-3; 1 Cor 4:1-2; Titus 1:7; 1 Pet 4:10), i.e. a manager, a superintendent — from oikos ('house') and nemo ('to dispense' or 'to manage').

[as this is applied to Peter, clearly, he is "over" the Church and is its guardian, superintendent, and manager, since he was given the "keys of the kingdom" and since Jesus said He would build His Church upon Peter as the Rock. What more needs to be proven, as to the papacy? I find this to be very strong biblical data indeed]

But it's best for you to ignore all that and pass the whole thing off as of no significance, huh? Nice technique, but it is inadequate and does not disprove my argument in the slightest. It's merely another evasive technique.

3)

1) "Master of the palace" {Jerusalem Bible / New American Bible}
2) "In charge of the palace" {New International Version}
3) "Master of the household" {New Revised Standard Version}
4) "In charge of the royal household" {New American Standard Bible}
5) "Comptroller of the household" {Revised English Bible}
6) "Governor of the palace" {Moffatt}

[established through cross-referencing to the OT concept. These terms, then, would apply to Peter vis-a-vis the Church at large]

4) In allusion to the image of the key as the ensign of power, the unlimited extent of that power is expressed with great clearness as well as force by the sole and exclusive authority to open and shut.

[Wow; and this was written by a Methodist: Adam Clarke. He doesn't follow through with the obvious implications at all, but what else is new in Protestant exegesis of "Catholic verses" — the topic of my latest book: The Catholic Verses: 95 Bible Passages That Confound Protestants]

5) Godward he is called 'my servant' (v.20; cf. 'this steward', v.15); manward, he will be 'a father' to his community (v.21) . . . The 'shutting' and 'opening' mean the power to make decisions which no one under the king could override.

[The analogy, of course, is to God being the king, and Peter being His vice-regent or steward of the Church. No one can override his decisions except God Himself. That being the case, clearly God would protect his steward so he didn't make a decision contrary to the divine will — lest man could override His will and corrupt His Church (which He already promised could not happen). And hence we arrive right at the notion of infallibility]

6) Just as in Isaiah 22:22 the Lord puts the keys of the house of David on the shoulders of his servant Eliakim, so does Jesus hand over to Peter the keys of the house of the kingdom of heaven and by the same stroke establishes him as his superintendent.

7) Peter might be portrayed as a type of prime minister in the kingdom that Jesus has come to proclaim . . . What else might this broader power of the keys include? It might include one or more of the following: baptismal discipline; post-baptismal or penitential discipline; excommunication; exclusion from the eucharist; the communication or refusal of knowledge; legislative powers; and the power of governing.

8) In biblical and Judaic usage handing over the keys does not mean appointment as a porter but carries the thought of full authorization (cf. Mt. 13:52; Rev. 3:7) . . .

9) So then what Jesus is saying to Peter is that in the days to come, he will be the steward of the Kingdom.

10) So in the new community which Jesus was about to build, Peter would be, so to speak, chief steward.

The Early Protestants Were Ecumenical? NOT! (Part II) (vs. Dr. Paul Owen)

See Part One. Paul Owen's words will be in green; Patrick's in blue; Josh's in purple.

I see Dave. When the Protestants compromise, they are really just lying about their true beliefs.

It was Calvin and Luther who thought that Melanchthon dissembled. And Calvin thought Bucer did too. I am simply reporting it. So why don't you get angry at them instead of me? You characterize too broadly, of course. Most of the time, the Protestants did not do that, which is precisely a major contributing factor as to why these conferences never accomplished anything.

When the Catholics compromise, it is a noble effort at gaining peace.

I wasn't writing primarily about the Catholics at all. I would say they weren't all that ecumenical, either. It was a different age and a particular difficult circumstance then. Don't be silly enough to think that you know everything about what I think. I was responding to your insinuation that the Protestants acted much differently in these contexts compared to their harsher rhetorical statements. To an extent, yes, but not nearly as much as you paint it.

When the Protestants stick to their theological convictions on the Mass, they are being stubborn.

I wasn't talking about theological convictions (though this does strongly indicate anti-Catholicism) as much as allowing others who differ to worship as they please. It is not ecumenical to say to your theological opponent: "Your worship [which has hundreds of years of established Christian practice behind it] is diabolical, sacrilegious, blasphemous, abominable, sinful, and idolatrous: so much so that my party will not allow yours to worship in this fashion anywhere in our territories." A fine way to establish better relations and some semblance of reconciliation, huh Paul?

When Catholics stick to their theological convictions on the Mass, they are staying true to the Faith.

They believe what they do, yes. But that is not imposing the belief on others against their will. That's the difference. The Protestants were the upstarts in all this.

Melanchthon was an anti-Catholic, yet he managed to get criticised by his contemporaries for stretching too far to conciliate Rome.

Look at his view of the Mass. He was more conciliatory, of course (to the point of dissembling, like a typical Democratic candidate for President), but that doesn't necessarily mean he wasn't anti-Catholic (or quasi-anti-Catholic, which is the term I have been using).

The Reformers really were not interested in reconciliation, because they wouldn't give back property which changed hands when cities decided to choose in favor of the Reformation.

That would be the distinct impression left, yes. It seems the least that one can do is return stolen property, as a good will gesture. The bishops and priests were kicked out. Churches were plundered and stolen. They were owned by the Catholic Church, and in most cases had been constructed by the collective toil and contributions of simple townsfolk over several generations. Or do you deny all that? That would be something to see.

And they weren't interested in reconciliation because they didn't immediately throw up their hands and accept the doctrine of the Mass as Rome understood it.

They should allow Catholics to worship according to their conscience. It's a basic human right. If you deny that, then there is no hope whatsoever for any ecumenism, because one is denying one of the core beliefs and practices of other Christians.

Oh, and at Regensburg, it was only the Catholics who compromised on Justification, even though Luther insisted that the Protestants had given too much ground on that very subject.

I didn't make a statement on that one way or another. I would say that was probably the best example of an attempted compromise, from both sides. I was simply compiling some facts to ponder. As usual, you chose to ignore all that, and instead make non-helpful broad comments and send insults my way.

Long time, no see. I can't really say that I have any comphrensive comments to make about this post; I would note, however, that in the Reformation conflict harsh and negative polemics cut both ways. To give two examples from the Roman side, Pope Leo X's dismissal of Martin Luther (whom many contemporary Roman Catholics, such as Peter Kreeft, believe was on the right track concerning the Gospel vis a via 16th century Rome) as a "drunken German" and, more extremely, the Roman Catholic persecution of the French Huguenots. After 500 years I think it's time that we Roman Catholics and Protestants end squibbling about which side killed or supressed more of the other and simply repent of our errors.

A few thoughts with regards to the quotes from Carroll and Bainton about Beza (under your section on the Colloquy of Poissy):

I'm afraid that Beza's position has been somewhat represented. He was no Zwinglian. For example, Jill Raitt, in her The Eucharistic Theology of Theodore Beza: Development of the Reformed Doctrine, AAR Studies in Religion no.4, quotes Beza thusly (p.34, as quoted in Keith Mathison's Given for You):

"The bread which we break according to his (God's) institution, is the communication of the true body of Jesus Christ which was delivered up for us: and the cup we drink, is the communcation of the true blood shed for us, that is to say, in that same substance which he took from the womb of the virgin Mary and which he bore into heaven."

So it's a canard to say that Calvinists such as Beza believed in a solely "spiritual" communion with the body of Christ in the Eucharist if that's taken in a rationalistic way that denies the original Calvinist doctrine: that through the instruments of bread and wine, Christians receive the very body and blood of Christ. What is spiritual is the manner in which we receive Christ's body and blood: not in a carnal, physicalist manner but by the Spirit-empowered means of the sacramental elements.

I believe one of your sources said that Beza rejected the Real Presence, basing this upon Beza's rejection of a local presence of the body of Christ in the Eucharist. But, as Calvin noted, the fact that Jesus is in heaven does not impede Him for communicating Himself (i.e., being present) to His Church in that dynamic meeting between heaven and earth that is the Eucharist:

"Even though it seems unbelievable that Christ's flesh, separated from us by such great distance, penetrates to us, so that it becomes our food, let us remember how far the secret power of the Holy Spirit towers above all our senses, and how foolish it is to measure his immeasurableness by our measure. What, then, our mind does not comprehend, let faith conceive: that the Spirit truly unites things separated in space." (Institutes, IV.xvii.10)

I know that this raise the same questions that came up in our previous dialogues; I haven't had the time for posting my responses to your "Further Challenge…", but I should have some time in December to get that paper posted on my blog.

I agree, and I will take your word as to Beza's precise opinions on the Eucharist. In any event, he still flatly denied the Catholic view, and the way he stated it was not conducive to an ecumenical, conciliatory effort. Instead, it highly offended the Catholics present. It was imprudent and plain dumb (i.e., how it was expressed).

Both sides screwed up during those turbulent times? Of course. That has always been my position. As I stated in my reply to Paul, I try to give our side of things, and our critique of Protstant conduct and arguments, because it is so little known (I know I didn't have the slightest knowledge about a Catholic response to Luther and the "Reformation" when I was a Protestant). The present paper was a direct response to certain of Paul Owen's comments.

I denied them, and gave my reasons why, with heavy historical documentation. He came back with no arguments and lots of insults, including gross caricatures of my positions. It would be nice once in a while to receive a counter-argument on these matters. You have done so in the past. It's too bad that you aren't inclined to do so here. But that's okay; it's your choice, and we can't all respond to everything. At least you have remained a gentleman, and I appreciate that. And see, we do broadly agree, as I agreed with your reply comment.

I think the issue of the Reformers ought to be set aside for the time being.

It's an historical matter, which is part of what I do, so I can't set it aside. It's part and parcel of my apologetics, and I agree with the maxim that to understand the present, we must also study the past.

I think the back-and-forth on the rhetoric of the Reformers is obscuring the important point. The important point, as far as I can see, is the status of our contemporary Reformed Catholics, not the status of the long-dead Reformers.

Those are two different things, and I have no problem separating them (though without ignoring one, as you suggest). But it seems that Paul Owen can't figure out that I don't view him as a clone of Calvin.

Are our contemporaries, like Wilson, stooping to Jack Chick level claims? In an earlier post, Dave suggested that they were.

Yes, if he says there is a live possibility that we will promote Mary to God. In fact, I would contend that it is even more absurd for him to say this than Jack Chick, because he knows far better than to come up with this.

He [ I ] wrote: “It is a time for a bit of guts and speaking in defense of other Christians for a change, instead of the same old nonsense that I had hoped Wilson was opposing in this debate. But we end up with Tweedle-Dee and Tweedle-Dum, as it turns out. Do you detect some disgust in me? You perceive accurately. I think it is pathetic. For once, something could have been accomplished, and I have to read ridiculous old Reformed wives' tales polemics, on the level of Maria Monk or Jack Chick”

Dave's frustration here seems to be based largely on Wilson's claims about Mary and the Trinity.

Correct. And particularly because of the severe disappointment of seeing that in a talk which I had thought would be a positive, constructive thing. I'm much more pessimistic about Reformed ecumenism now than I was, so my strong language very much reflects that.

It is frustration I well understand. But I think this frustration has certainly caused a gross overstatement. I've read some Jack Chick. Wilson's opening statement, taken as a whole, is nothing at all like Jack Chick. What's more, I am quite sure that Dave will agree with that, upon reflection.

I don't have to reflect upon it (I already agreed), as I was referring strictly to the Mary comments when I wrote that.

Wilson's opening statement of course includes certain claims that Catholics will find deeply objectionable. That's because Wilson's not a Catholic.

No, it is because he is exceptionally ignorant about Catholicism. I didn't know all that much about Catholicism before I converted, but I would have never asserted anything this asinine when I was Protestant. It's mind-boggling.

He disagrees with us on some important stuff. But he's willing to take a great deal of unjustified heat for saying that our baptism is valid—that we really are Christians. That's the whole point of his closing line about trying to get White to be harder on Rome. Wilson is willing to be harder on us, it seems, because we really are Christians. White, of course, thinks we are not.

Why is it that I don't feel that this is all that much of a "concession"? When you see the sort of thing he does believe about us, I really could care little whether he regards me as a Christian or not. I am an "equal" to him in Christ the way a slave was equal to his master as a man. After all, they were both men, right?

Whether White or Wilson is more like the Reformers is, perhaps, an interesting question. But as I say, in the present context that question obscures the point. The point is that Wilson is doing some very good stuff.

I've already said that I admire the "Reformed Catholic" strain of thought as a whole. I expect grown men to be able to disagree and have a thoughtful conversation about honestly-held differences, without getting all on their ears and becoming insulting. My critique is within an overall attitude of respect. But I have no respect for statements that ignorant regarding Catholic Mariology. Nor do I have any patience left for that kind of inexcusable error and insult (which is obvious).

Catholics, again, will insist that he's got his weaknesses. In particular, his point about Mary and the Trinity was a gross error. Dave's reading of that passage was not, as Paul suggested, "wooden." Dave was not to blame for interpreting that passage harshly.

Thank you. But apparently that was part of the reason I am supposedly "unreasonable" on a grand scale, and not truly interested in dialogue.

It is pretty evident that that passage was at best very badly put, and at worst, (as Paul himself said) just plain stupid. Perhaps Dave might be convinced to go ahead and grant to Paul and Tim the more charitable reading.

I'm waiting for a clarification or retraction. I see no reason to modify my present opinions.

That is, perhaps Dave can be convinced to think that Wilson just made a fair enough point extremely badly, rather than thinking that he made an absurd point clearly enough. (Indeed, I firmly hope that we will be getting a clarification from Wilson, either in person or by proxy, on this point, and that the Tim/Paul interpretation will be vindicated.)

I don't think such a statement can be wholly accounted for by clarification and nuancing. Some things are of such seriousness and revealing nature that it is obvious that they reflect a deep strain of thought in the one who states them. In my own opinion (I speculate), I think it is fear and prejudice, frankly, on the part of Protestants, against Mary, which causes them to become outright irrational oftentimes when discussing the subject.

I demonstrated this about John Q. Doe (also a Calvinist). When he gets to St. Alphonusus and Mary, however, he becomes almost ridiculous and cares little about objective reading of an author in context at all (which is ironic because he charges me with the same regarding Luther). I did a paper on that: it's listed on my sidebar. That's a case in point. I contend that otherwise reasonable, intelligent, insightful men, can be led far astray by fears and prejudices. Nowhere is this more true than with the Blessed Virgin (followed by the pope).

But I also think it's only fair for Paul to admit—as he has certainly not yet done—that his own reading of the text is far from the most natural reading.

Don't look for that here anytime soon, given his low opinion of me. But if he does admit it, praise God.

I'd like to see Paul openly grant that my reading (and Dave's, and Jonathan's, etc.) is the most straightforward and natural way to take Wilson's point. I'd like to see Paul, in fact, recant the charge that Dave's reading was "wooden." That was not a fair charge to make.

That's the least of the charges he has made, when you read his recent posts! LOL

It is Paul's reading that is strained and unnatural. I only hope it is, for all that, the correct one.

I have no such hope, but perhaps it can be explained in a way to convince me.

Perhaps if Dave would admit to having been a bit too hard on Wilson,

I still believe the substance of what I said. One can always soften the way they expressed things, upon reflection. That is true for me, as for anyone else.

and Paul would admit to having been a bit too hard on Dave,

:-) That would mean I truly do like to dialogue, and I don't think Luther and Calvin were scumbags and scoundrels through and through . . . :-) Obviously, Paul's feelings about me have been brewing for some time. He only got mad enough to express them after this latest exchange. A very common phenomenon . . .

and everyone would agree to leave the Reformers out of the picture for awhile,

I can't do that, because it is part of my apologetics. I'm not scared of learning more about history, and I don't see why anyone else has to be. Tim Enloe does the same thing from his perspective: he's making all sorts of historical arguments that he thinks back up his perspective on various matters. He can rail about the pope and Catholic corruption all day long and that's fine and dandy, and I don't see Paul Owen trying to get him to moderate his tone and be all "conciliatory" and so forth. There is no end to what he can say about the "bad popes" (real or exaggerated).

But let a Catholic like me criticize the sacred cow "Reformers" and it is Chicken Little and I'm a big bad wolf who doesn't care about dialogue and supposedly detests Protestants. One tires of this. There is no large difference at all between the two endeavors. Tim is criticizing medieval and post-Tridentine Catholicism as an orthodox, classical, ecumenical Protestant and I am criticizing primitive Protestantism as an orthodox, Tridentine, and ecumenical Catholic. If his enterprise is perfectly allowable why is mine is a big scandal and affront? I have replied to Tim's theories time and agin, whereas mine are mostly ignored. It's a clear double standard, and I won't bow to it.

ALL PROTESTANTS PLEASE NOTE, AND READ THREE TIMES: I do not (repeat, NOT) equate current-day Protestants with the early ones. Quite the contrary. It is precisely because I make a big distinction that I think it is such a simple matter for Protestants today to denounce things in the "Reformers" that they got plain wrong. After all, N.T. Wright does this. Lots of scholars do. It's no big deal. It is part of my duty as a Catholic apologist to respond to the lies and distortions of history that are used to present my Church in an unnecessarily unfavorable light (and Protestants in an exaggeratedly favorable light). There are plenty of actual bad things that both sides have done throughout history, without resorting to distortions and caricatures and historical revisionism (on both sides).

we could come to some agreement on the important point. Here it is, in my book:

Resolved: that Wilson is to be applauded for his commitment to Ecumenism (in the true sense of that word)

But I disagree with that. You don't achieve ecumenism by falsely believing that your Catholic "brethren" are gross idolaters in three different ways: the Mass, images, and Mary, and by stating that they are in a distinct danger of making Mary God and baptising in her name along with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Sorry, that is not "ecumenical" in my book. It is "quasi-anti-Catholic" — which was the point of my critique.Tim and Paul don't believe these things. Many "Reformed Catholics" do not. But some apparently still do. I don't think that is the ecumenical position ("in the true sense of that word").

and for his courage in standing up to James White and co.

I question how much he is doing that, after reading this piece . . .

Once we can all agree that Wilson and the rest of the Reformed Catholics are our friends—that our disagreements, though real and deep, can be talked through without animus, in a spirit of reconciliation—then perhaps some of the impulse to overreact can be overcome.

Oh, sure, absolutely. But that is not the tenor of Paul Owen's remarks about me lately. He is making me his enemy: not even of his "camp" — as you can read above. I've been ecumenical on both sides of the fence. It is nothing new to me.

I'm just rambling now, so let me keep going. I'm a philosopher, as some here know. I'm trained in one "school" of philosophy. Call it school A. Last week, I went to a conference to read a paper: I knew full well that my audience would be made up largely of people trained in a different school—call that one school B. What's more, a good part of the thrust of my paper was to say that B was getting some important stuff wrong, and that it stood to learn from A. I also noted that the converse was true: A stood to learn some important stuff from A. Let me assure you that I chose my words carefully. I don't believe I dissembled in any way, but the things I chose to emphasize in a room full of B philosophers were different than they would have been had I been speaking to a room full of A philosophers.

Sure. I don't see anything wrong with that.

It seems to me obvious that Wilson had to do the same. He had to emphasize the "Reformed" aspect of his Faith in the debate.

He could do that without lying and casting aspersions upon our Church. You can be as firmly against Mariology as all get-out without becoming ludicrous and claiming that Catholics are teetering on the edge of making her into God (I did it myself before 1990; I particularly loathed infallibility and railed on and on against it, much as Tim does against the papacy). I do the same thing from the opposite perspective. You see me making these strong arguments against Luther and Calvin and various Protestant beliefs, but I am still ecumenical. In fact, I have been accused of caving to the Protestants by so-called "traditionalists." But Paul Owen seems to think I am a "quasi-anti-Protestant" with a nefarious apologetic agenda (an old tired charge by those who fail to fair-mindedly read my work, or to read it at all). It all depends from what perspective one is.

I will always be a controversial figure, apparently, but we are to expect that in this line of work because we take positions and vigorously defend them. It's the old nonsense that apologetics is intrinsically contrary to ecumenism, conciliarism, and dialogue. It is not. And I try to demonstrate that in my writing and in how I conduct myself. I fail often, but that doesn't make the whole attempt to do all these things futile or contradictory (simply because I may screw up as a human being).

If he ever speaks to a roomful of Catholics, perhaps he emphasizes the "Catholic" side of his faith. I don't think there's anything going on here like hiding what one really believes in order to avoid stepping on toes (which Dave suggests is characteristic of liberalism). I think there's just an attempt to communicate effectively.

Again, he could have done that without going to the offensive and false extreme that he did.

For this reason, I just want to try to suggest that all of us Catholics need to be sure to cut Wilson some slack. He was in a tough spot. From what I read in his opening statement, he did an excellent job of presenting his position carefully and as persuasively as he could, given his audience.

I have no problem with that. I appreciate your conciliatory tone. You are more charitable than I am. But I retain my same opinion until clarification might persuade me otherwise. I couldn't find anything else that Wilson wrote about Mary online, so I have no further information. We have had one Protestant person here, who talks to him, suggest that he takes a rather low view of Catholic corruption. He seemed to support our interpretation of the Mary remarks.

I do apologize for going on so. But I'm getting depressed by the debate over this Wilson thing.

Believe me, lots in apologetics is depressing. Don't let it get you down.

I really want to say that I respect and appreciate the Reformed Catholicism movement (insofar as I know anything about it, which frankly isn't all that far),

Me too.

and I respect and appreciate what Wilson did in the debate.

I can't say that I follow you in that opinion. That's not to deny that some elements of it were helpful, but overall I think it was a net loss and a lost opportunity to accomplish much in ecumenical terms. I'm extremely disappointed in this, and hope beyond hope that something good can come of it. But this is what we deal with as Catholics, on an ongoing basis. It seems that a miracle of God's grace is required to overcome the inherited animus against our beliefs and our Church. I believe that: nothing short of supernatural grace can dissuade folks from the usual claptrap and myths that get bandied about concerning Catholicism.

Conversion to Catholicism: Is It Usually Essentially Reactionary & Emotional, or Proactive & Rational?, Part II

See Part One. Kevin Johnson's words will be in blue; Travis's in green.

I really think you are making a mountain out of a molehill.

Not at all. I am merely dealing with one particular aspect of Schlissel's article. What's wrong with that? Why do you have a problem with it? Are you saying that no one can comment on portions of an article, simply because they are not the main point of it? I find that rather odd.

Pastor Schlissel's comments are not "writing about Catholicism", they are addressing a problem that is inherent in certain current Reformed circles.

Thats irrelevant to my concerns. He made certain statements in the context of dealing with this other issue of endless Reformed fighting and lack of charity. The statements stand on their own. He is talking about how Reformed bickering causes people to convert. I can readily agree that it is a contributing factor. But the problem is that he goes beyond that to assert or strongly imply that there are no good positive reasons to convert to Catholicism, only negative reasons to "deconvert" from some form of Protestantism.

At best, he allows for only a very few who convert for other reasons. I have already "produced" two: myself, and Thomas McKinney, who commented above. I can easily produce many more, with documentation, if you wish to press this point. But if that was not Pastor Schlissel's intent, he is welcome to defend his remarks or give them their proper elaboration. Or (best of all) he can retract them.

If you want to see what Pastor Schlissel has written about Rome recently, you should review his other article I posted on the Reformed Catholicism website entitled "What Thinkest Thou?" but again it is written to the Reformed community and not to Roman Catholics.

I responded to that already. If you go to the link you give above, you'll see my lengthy comments there.

Not all of us are going to always write in a way that satisfies all parties.

That's why criticism is so crucial, so we don't all stay in our little bubbles and fail to realize how we are being perceived by "outsiders" or how insular our reasoning may increasingly be.

I think you ought to be glad that such articles are being written though and that attention is being paid to these things even if we in the Reformed world don't always see it the way you or other Roman Catholics might.

As I've stated 100 times, I am delighted that internal criticisms are being made and that the wacko, fringe anti-Catholics are being opposed. But what do you expect me to do: shut up because there are some good things, when I see some things that I think are worthy of criticism? That's not in my nature. Remember, I am a Socratic. I will always challenge and get people to examine their own beliefs more closely. And I know, Socrates became very unpopular and was eventually killed. I am well aware that not a lot of people appreciate this methodology. :-)

You seem to have difficulty accepting the concept that one can largely like, admire, and respect something, yet have big problems with parts of it. This is one such case. It is wonderful, fantastic, that one Reformed is speaking out against Reformed errors and excess and lack of love. That's great. That's what it is all about. I used to speak up against charismatic excesses when I moved in those circles. I rebuked my own pastor in a letter once and he, in turn, rebuked me unfairly from the pulpit and virtually "excommunicated" me. So I appreciate such internal protests. I've lived them in my own life, and paid a price on more than one occasion for doing so.

But that doesn't mean that I will not criticize what I feel needs to be criticized. The same goes for "Reformed Catholicism" as a whole. If you guys want to hear my opinion, I will be happy to give it. I think a lot of this trend or movement or whatever you wish to call it, as I have repeatedly stated, but I think it has some glaring errors and inconsistencies, just as I think all forms of Protestsntism do. This is some big surprise?

What bothers me the most, though, is how somehow many of you guys in your camp seemingly have this perception that I am your "enemy" or have some personal thing against some of you, simply because I make some criticisms. I think there is a great deal of oversensitivity. You should be thankful that you have a guy like me around who respects you and wishes to become as friendly as you will allow me to, but who will also honestly speak his mind within a context of overall respect. "Faithful are the wounds of a friend."

But instead, the usual response when I have replied has been abruptness or offense and an effort to get away from the discussion as soon as possible. In a few cases such as your own and "Josh," you have promised to respond to something we have discussed (Calvin and the Eucharist compared to the Fathers' views) but have taken months to do so. But at least you have the desire. Good for you.

But if you don't want that, I can split. I want to be in places where free discussion and critique and close examination of competing ideas is not only allowed, but positively encouraged and accepted as good things, not something to be avoided or dreaded. Your blog is one of the last Reformed locations where I have felt welcome and have been treated with cordiality. For that I thank you.

*****

I think we can make a distinction between solid, rational, self-consistent reasons that we may disagree with, but which are still rational criteria, as opposed to mere emotionalism or disgust or reactionary impulses.

As I see it, the rationales for conversions might be consistent and even quite respectable, relatively speaking, but (now I speak as a Catholic partisan) can be attacked on the presuppositional level. This is why I write so often about sola Scriptura and the Church and the crucial role of Tradition. Every Christian must grapple with those issues one way or another.

So if the roles were reversed and I was analyzing a non anti-Catholic conversion to Protestantism, I could surely grant that a person sincerely believed that sola Scriptura were true over against the three-legged stool of Bible, Church, Tradition, or that he could not accept Catholic Mariology, for whatever reason, or the papacy, or insisted on adult, believer's baptism only, for what he felt were compelling biblical reasons. Etc., etc. I can disagree without denying that the person sincerely thought through the issues.

I can acknowledge that the person is consciously basing his decision on his biblical or historical reasoning and making his choice in good conscience, based on what he knows. I don't have to doubt his self-report, or question his reasoning abilities. I don't have to make out that it must always or almost always be the case that he is merely going on emotion and a disgust at Catholic nominalism or lousy homilies, or mechanical-appearing worship in individuals, or biblical illiteracy, or catechetical ignorance, or Bingo or swearing or excessive drinking, or sexual laxity, or any number of faults that we have in our circles, just as every Christian group has.

It is about granting some respect and dignity to a very serious thing: a conversion. I don't deny that there are also many who convert for much less serious reasons (including the famous "convert to get married" scenario). I am opposing the degree to which Pastor Schlissel says these factors cause conversion to Catholicism. One expects this kind of talk in Protestant circles, concerning Catholic conversion. But I would hope us Catholics are also accorded the right to protest against it on factual grounds, as we see fit.

I went through conversion myself, twice, and I have observed dozens of conversion processes firsthand, sometimes being closely involved (including that a few very sharp Reformed people). And they were not as Pastor Schlissel portrays them. He has his own pastoral experience, which I don't deny, and I have my own long apologetic, and evangelistic experience. Somehow we must collect all this conflicting data together and present a coherent picture of what generally happens in a conversion.

If one was in an environment where people were bitching and fighting and backbiting and gossiping all the time, and majoring on the minors, and quarreling about trifles, then I would fully expect there to be an observation of many people becoming fed up with that and wanting to get out, because of the clear conflict with the Christian ideal of charity.

But then again, that is one environment, and doesn't represent all of Protestantism. And the people who left will have, I guarantee it, many reasons for doing so. Some may have been former Catholics, and so decided to go back after having discovered what one form of Protestantism in one place was like.

A big part of my objection, too, is my intense dislike for single causal explanations of almost anything. I find that intuitively, common-sensically false. This is one valuable thing I received from my studies in sociology and psychology (where I learned little of usefulness, unfortunately). Reality is always more complex than one simple explanation. Conversion is all the more so. It's an extraordinarily complex and painful process and simply can't be explained as primarily or solely due to being sick and tired of in-fighting, in almost all cases.

We may be in a postmodernist age, but people aren't that stupid. At least not in the high numbers that Pastor Schlissel claims.

*****

Speaking of conversion is one type of apologetics among many. There is not simply one type, whereby doctrine is upheld through various rational, biblical, historical means, etc. I do that in bundles, and I assume that you are aware of that, if you know anything about me.

The conversion story is not so much "straight" apologetics as it is a variant of the call to "bear witness" about what God has done in one's life, and the spiritual odyssey one has taken. It is valid in its own right.

Secondly, you neglect to see that we are human beings in communities, with experiences, emotions, stories, influences, psychological, personal, familial, temperamental, and many other factors all having an effect on both our beliefs and actions. The Schlissel piece did understand this aspect very well, because it is true that some (probably many) people do change beliefs largely based on experience in particular communities. These help to further form their perceptions and conceptions of theological truth and the human elements of ecclesiology. As I wrote, I disagreed with the extent to which he thought that one thing was the leading factor in conversions of Presbyterians to Catholicism.

Thirdly, this particular debate was a dispute about factual matters: "what in fact was the reason that such converts gave as their own rationale for conversion, and what was their actual motivation?" That has validity as a discussion in and of itself also. You say apologists should be interested in truth. That was precisely what interested me here: the particular truth concerning why people converted to Rome. I think that has the utmost relevance to both the truth of Catholicism and apologetics, albeit somewhat indirectly.

If, e.g., someone in the course of their conversion story tells me that doctrines x, y, and z all helped him become a Catholic, this is worth looking into, because if it worked that way with him, chances are it would with others. This is apologetically relevant, because apologetics asks: "WHY do we (Christians of a certain stripe) believe what we do?" So if a person is saying this was WHY he became a Catholic, that has apologetic relevance one step removed. This was the concept behind Surprised by Truth, the bestseller, to which I was privileged to be a contributor. It combined the conversion story and straight apologetics quite directly, because the folks in it all gave lots of "apologetic" reasons for why they converted.

Now, I fully agree; let everyone examine each factor that someone claimed was important in convincing them. My biggest three reasons were: contraception, development of doctrine, and a study of the "Reformation" period. I have since written tons of stuff about each area: major portions of books for the first and third topic, and an entire book on the second.

But why should I discount conversion stories simply because I also deal with each theological topic at length? It doesn't follow. People's lives present a story. The Bible is filled with stories. People resonate with them. They love testimonies and progressions from one lower plane to a higher one. It gives them hope; it challenges them, and helps persuade them that perhaps their life could be better than it is.

Lastly, I commented on this article because I thought it illustrated also a certain prejudice or tunnel vision (one might say condescension) that many Protestants have towards Catholics. it came out in this case by means of what I thought were quite naive and simplistic theories as to what Presbyterians converted. There was virtually no theology posited as a factor. And that was my beef: this has not been my experience or that of many converts that I know, so I felt it important to challenge the factuality of this assertion. In so doing, I am upholding the importance of theology, just as you urge — far from minimizing it.

Etc., etc., etc. So I couldn't disagree more. But thanks much for your thoughts. They were very stimulating.

*****

I'm as much in favor of emotions and intuition and so forth, in the context of Christianity as anyone, I think. I remain a "moderately" charismatic Catholic; I have had many spiritual experiences and have experienced supernatural gifts, even healings. My conversion to evangelical Protestantism in 1977 was very much along these lines, as were aspects even of my Catholic conversion.

Correctly understood, I would class these sorts of less "rational" or "doctrinal" — more "mystical" reasons, among those which are proactive reasons for conversion. This is distinct from mere "smells and bells" (as if choosing a religion were akin to picking an ice cream flavor or a carpet) or an aversion to Protestant bickering, I think you would agree.

That said, I would like to also note, however, that an overly experiential, non-doctrinal approach can readily lend itself to a sort of postmodernist mush of individualistic subjectivism. I find that the Bible generally puts experience and doctrine or some concrete objective criterion hand in hand. It excludes neither. I appreciate your mentioning of these factors, and I accept them (perhaps my title was thus a bit misleading; and I am happy to clarify), but I think the safest spiritual course is to combine them with objective "external" criteria: if not right away then at least eventually.

And we see that this is exactly what the Apostle Paul did, now that I think of it. He had the great mystical experience, but then he verified it later by checking in with the apostles and elders of the early Church (who provided "objective" witness of the genuineness of his conversion).

*****

Hi Travis,

I thought your response was excellent. Thanks, and here is my counter-reply. I don't think we disagree as much as you might imagine. I see it as mainly a dispute about categorization or what I often term "the [excessive] departmentalization of knowledge."

Well, let's define what it is we are talking about first. A standard dictionary definition of apologetics, which says (per www.dictionary.com) that it is either 1) "The branch of theology that is concerned with defending or proving the truth of Christian doctrines." or 2) "Formal argumentation in defense of something, such as a position or system."

Sure; no problem there.

Now if speaking of conversion, what role does conversion stories play in defending the truth or formal argumentation of your Christian tradition?

What they do is precisely to provide a sort of moral support or what I have called a "plausibility structure" for the belief-system that was thus adopted. This gets back to the notion: "human beings don't live in a rational, logically-airtight vacuum". Conversion stories provide indirect rationales for viewpoints because of the nature of the process itself and those who undertake it.

The people reading them see folks working through issues and ultimately adopting a position (in this instance, Catholicism). The stories in their detail show that the reasons were not frivolous or insubstantial; they have merit. They are usually mentioned in passing or simply identified, rather than elaborated upon at length (especially in oral presentations). I have three different versions of my story which differ in various ways. One of them was specifically designed to actually give explicit apologetic rationale for why I changed my mind. I think this one would meet even your criterion of what is to be properly deemed as "apologetics":

How Newman Convinced me of the Apostolicity of the Catholic Church

But this was a very "heavy," dense piece, not for everyone's taste. The nature of "story" means that extensive flights into hard reasoning for positions must take a back seat to the sense of narrative and development and the personal struggles. I'm not that great of a storyteller myself, and tend to always drift into more intellectual, philosophical concerns. Like I said, conversion stories are more along the lines of witness, rather than apolgetics per se.

But plausibility is a fascinating subject in its own right. Why do people find one thing persuasive and another not? What factors into that? Why do two people see the same set of data and one feels one way and the other the total opposite? Conversion stories to Catholicism mainly make Catholicism a more plausible, even (in hard cases) "thinkable" option. Now, this is not apologetics; it is not in itself the "reasons" for converting, or why Catholicism is true. It is, rather, the reasons leading to one person's decision to become a Catholic.

This is not altogether divorced from apologetics itself, as I have argued. We see analogies in other areas, notably science. Note the following analysis:

1. The Big Bang theory is regarded as true because of compelling evidences in many fields.

2. The Big Bang theory is regarded as true by virtually all astronomers and physicists today.

3. When the consensus was changing from Steady State and other theories to the Big Bang theory, various astronomers wrote in the academic literature as to why they changed their mind.

Now, if we compare this to apologetics and theology, #1 is the actual data, facts, hard arguments for the position. You and I would both readily agree on that.

#2 is simply stating a fact about present consensus. It is not an argument; merely a "demographic" or "sociological" or "poll-like" observation.

#3 is the equivalent of the conversion story. In writing such accounts, the scientists would give reasons from category #1. Likewise, when writing conversion accounts to Catholicism, most stories I have seen offer some sort of reasoning from apologetics itself. Not always, but often. But remember, "[the rational reasons] why I changed my mind" is a distinct proposition from "why what I changed my mind concerning, and adopted, is true."

There are a host of factors leading to conversion and they are not all apologetic. This is where your thesis is weak, I think. There are mystical and intuitive reasons, there is the moral argument (which has even been developed by philosophers in great detail, but need not be philosophical in a given individual), there is experiential and miraculous evidence (philosopher William Alston has developed this line in great depth), there are pragmatic and psychological and relevant emotional and highly personal considerations.

One might, e.g., read of accounts of miracles at Lourdes and Fatima, or about the Incorruptibles, or people being raised from the dead or healed in extraordinary ways, about the bi-location of saints like Padre Pio, or exorcisms, etc. They may witness some miracle themselves or be so moved by an act of love by some Catholic that this convinces them that Catholicism is the True Way.

This is eyewitness, legal-type testimony similar to that found in the Bible accounts of miracles. One may read of these and become convinced that Catholicism is true. Is this apologetics? I think so (of a sort). But you may not. Certainly the early Church thought miracles were highly important in their testimony and evangelization. They highlighted the Resurrection, and Jesus Himself came back to let Thomas put his hand in His wounds, etc.

I could go on and on (sorry, folks; this has stimulated my mind), but I will respond to more of your words . . .

That is, say you have some brilliant mind-numbing argument X, which successfully completes your apologetic. What does the addition of "here's person A's background story of coming to believe X" serve about the argument X's validity and soundness? Nothing much I don't think; I see no entailment relation between a fallible and subjective persuasion and the validity and soundness of an argument.

Me, neither. I agree. It simply creates more plausibility structure and makes it more likely that someone will be persuaded. It breaks down barriers and prejudices, especially if the person giving their story was highly-regarded in their former circles, or an esteemed thinker or academic.

In areas where there is great certainty that something is true or untrue, people don't care about conversion stories, and there are none. There is no flourishing market for conversion stories to a flat earth cosmology or belief that the moon is made of green cheese (except maybe in The National Enquirer or at CBS News, where facts and truth mean little).

There is no flurry of books telling about how someone was convinced of the Law of Gravitation. No one disputes it. But where Catholicism is concerned, lots of people wonder about it: the anti-Catholics, ecumenical Protestants who find it a curious phenomenon that won't go away (my own former category), insecure, poorly-educated Catholics who need a boost of confidence.

If people learn that there is a large movement of people all concluding the same thing, that itself is an indication that that thing may be true; it is (again) a matter of plausibility and believability, which is not itself an argument per se, but more of a bolster or support for the arguments, in the sense of "testimony". In other words, it is reasonable to believe: "IF indeed A is true (we grant this for the sake of argument), then we would expect to find reasonable, sensible people adopting it in substantial numbers." It's not true because people adopt it, but rather, truly reasonable, inquiring, open-minded people will adopt it if in fact it is true. See the difference?

Perhaps you would like to bring such an entailment relation to my attention if I am missing it?

I'm doing my best.

You are correct in your assumption that I am aware of other areas from your website and blog where you have offered apologetic accounts for your tradition; whether a rational, biblical, historical, or whatever route. That's why I had that conditional "these types" at the beginning of my response. I just don't see what role this kind of argument plays into that.

I hope my comments have helped explain it better, agree or disagree.

That is, I recognize the grouping of rational, biblical and historical means of argumentation as a part of a successful apologetic; but that doesn't mean that subjective and fallible "guitar acoustics" (as it were) are part of an apologetic as well. When it comes to apologetics, giving those reasons for the hope within, substance over style and not the other way around, correct?

I don't think conversion stories are irrelevant simply because they may not be devoted solely to rational reasons for faith, as explained.

In response to your second

I understand human beings have their experiences, emotions, etc. But remember that my comment was about apologetics and the formal defense of one's Christian tradition. So I neglected it then because I didn't, and still don't, see the relevance since my topical concern was apologetics.

That's fine, but my immediate concern was Schlissel's analysis of Catholic conversion. So whether that is classified as "apologetics" or not matters little to me. It is an important issue that affects my readers and Christians of all stripes, and thus worthy of attention and analysis. In any event, I think it is closely related to apologetics, as a "half-sister," if you will, just as I think something like philosophy of religion is.

The only way I can see how such things are relevant to a formal defense would be say, you give that brilliant apologetic argument X again, but now person A thinks X is unsound because it doesn't match up with their subjective experiences, emotions, stories, etc. If it helps your apologetic to bring up those stories, then it should cut both ways. If not then it seems you are guilty of committing the informal fallacy of special pleading, and it seems to be able to cut both ways.

Not at all, because I have agreed with you that it is not apologetics in your sense. This has become largely a matter of semantics, and I find that wearisome after a certain point. I'm much more interested in Christian-related issues than how they can be categorized and classified. You say it isn't apologetics; I say it is a half-sister to it and relevant. However we classify it, it interests me, and so I write about it. And it helps people to convert or become more confident in their Catholic faith, which is my job as an apologist after all.

And then that bring us to a logical disjunction. Either it such conditional as these experiences, emotions, etc are a part of a formal defense or it isn't, and I see no reason to think it is; and you're in some logical quicksand if you think it is.

I don't. But I don't think it is either irrelevant or irrational in terms of the overall context of "reasons for faith" or a "thinking man's faith" — which themselves transcend apologetic reasons.

In response to your third

That's fine and dandy that you corrected factual mistakes, but that only goes so far as the facts are relevant to a Catholic apologetic.

I think I have shown that there is some relevance.

The type of factual mistakes doesn't directly tie into an apologetic for one's tradition. That is, those categories that such examples fall into are a red herring from any rational debate on the truth of your tradition. I would mostly be repeating myself here why I think that is the case; the above should be sufficient.

And I think my answer is sufficient. When I replied to Schlissel, I agree: I wasn't doing apologetics strictly-speaking. But I never said that all I do is apologetics, either. I happen to be a professional apologist, but I write about a great many subjects, even things like politics, poetry, music and movie reviews, cultural analysis, romanticism, vegetarianism, ethical issues, etc.

I was responding to the factuality of his claims. This was more sociology than apologetics: "why did converts to Rome convert? What were their own reasons?" I disagreed with him on how to break that down. My main point was to assert that the process is far more proactive than reactionary and "negative": why someone joined place B (the Catholic Church) rather than left place A.

In short though, either way those facts pan out, is Catholicism false because of it? I don't see how that would follow.

You're right, and I have never disagreed with this. The "case" itself has to be made on other grounds. When someone is in process of possible conversion, I direct them to the various arguments I have on my site, and they can make up their own minds as to the relative strengths of competing claims.

Now what I said just right there about how such is a red herring would however work just fine as a response to Schlissel, would it not? I think that at the very least it would be useful to include it as a response, more so than following Schlissel down his bunny trails.

I'm happy for you to make your observations in this comments section, which is a continuation of my paper. I have no objection to it. In fact, I am delighted to have the opportunity to clarify in much greater depth. This is why I love dialogue so much.

Why bother making such a chase, when the chase itself is futile even if you catch what it is you’re after going down such a trail.

It is only "futile" if one assumes that I was arguing in circular fashion, or that I was confined to apologetics. As I was doing neither, I disagree that it is a futile exercise. I think ALL of these things help people make up their minds one way or another. If nothing else, at least people see Catholics and their non-Catholic brethren in Christ working through issues, and thinking, using their noggins. And that is always good, because Christians continue to labor under the stereotype of being dummies and simpletons.

It would be much more direct and proficient as an apologetic to simply point out the logical errors of such thinking.

You should do that! LOL

There might be some sense that we can agree. Your note about some apologist who gives doctrine x, y and z; and that this is worth looking into is fine. I’m just saying that x, y and z aren’t made any better as arguments by the addition of fallible/subjective persuasion.

The arguments themselves are not, but the "case" is, in terms of plausibility and persuasiveness. Now, of course, if there are logical fallacies in a given conversion story, those should be pointed out. Apart from that, it helps the case if someone make a persuasive conversion story that others find worthy of emulation in part or wholly.

So I’m not saying to completely discount conversion stories, etc either, that doesn’t even follow from what I said implicitly nor was it explicitly stated. My desire is to simply put them in their place.

Perhaps we don't disagree as much as you thought?

I have found anthologies like Thomas Morris’ collection via OUP God and the Philosophers useful in finding some arguments to look into further. The nice thing about such works is that they usually are a collection of the more intellectual types from a certain tradition, and the arguments are worth checking out that you might not otherwise hear about (especially if you are a neophyte).

Exactly. I have that book. This is a great example. Here are a bunch of good philosophers giving their story as to why they believe in God. They are not always (perhaps usually not) doing strict philosophy in these stories. This is something different. But does it help others, too, to believe in God? Absolutely! Because they (atheists or insecure, wavering theists) will say, "gee, van Inwagen and Alston and Adams and Mavrodes [et al] are no dummies; I am curious why they think they have rational reasons to adopt theism."

Look at what it says on the back cover:

"I am a philosopher because I am a Christian," writes Brian Leftow. "To many intellectuals, this probably sounds like saying that I am a dog because I am a cat."

We might make an analogy to Catholic conversion:

"I am a Catholic because I am a Christian," writes Dave Armstrong. "To many anti-Catholic Protestants and even ecumenical Protestants, this probably sounds like saying that I am a dog because I am a cat."

And so, the Catholic convert, like the theist philosopher, provides a great service by explaining how he can do this weird, odd, inexplicable thing. People are wondering about it, so they read it, and it has an influence.

But still, it is only the first baby step towards looking into such issues, and a bit hasty if you just came to a conclusion after reading one considering the usual lack of depth in addressing complex issues in the amount of space they write in..

I agree that one should do so, and that would be my suggestion as well, but it doesn't follow that we disdain the baby steps. You know: "a journey of a 1000 miles begins with the first step." You're throwing the "baby steps" out with the bathwater. :-)

But, the success of any argument one looks into is still not contingent on any of their fallible/subjective. They are useful granted you put them into the right context.

Good! Have I brought up anything that you didn't consider before about all this stuff?

Anyhow, I’ve said my piece and I don’t see this going anywhere very interesting.

I think it is a very interesting discussion; hence my long response. A lot can be said on this.

For what it is worth, I actually am a former OPC/PCA guy and am very aware of poor arguments, misconceptions and bias many in those camps dish out on Catholic theology;

Does that mean you are a Catholic convert yourself?

I just don’t think returning the favor in kind makes for an interesting apologetic discourse.

I don't see how I have done so.

Thanks for the great food for thought. I enjoyed writing about these things a lot. And I hope others receive some benefit from my ramblings.

I agree that we actually seem to be agreeing more I originally thought. Much of this could be accounted for in my more narrow definition of apologetics, so I think those comments are right now. A lot of what you include in your definition is what I classify as pyschological, which I draw a line between that and logical argumentation. But sinse you like subjective stories that are pyschologically comforting; I suppose it would be polite for me to answer your question.

Does that mean you are a Catholic convert yourself?

It could, but as of now; no, at least not yet. I'm a young 24 years old, and started reading a lot of philosophy/theology about 3-4 years ago after I realized how little I knew. I suppose you could say I got "the bug" and started reading a lot after realizing that. Long story short: I ran into tons of problems as I began to read works outside of the presbyterian/calvinist tradition I was raised in, so I rejected that largly for having a defficient authority structure and it's historical discontinuity with the Church Jesus founded. So, as you would image, those churches that have claims to some type of an apostolic succession is what i've been aiming at sinse then. Over the past 2+ years I've been toying with converting to EOC or RCC. So, I've been studying a lot on that. I've made a lot of progress getting the details of RC and EO theology down (a difficult task when they define many terms differently, and aren't always answering the same questions, etc). I also would like for when I make a move to one of the other to be certain enough that I probably won't jump ship soon after officially converting one way the other or anything like that. So, I still have a couple more years left before I officially "take a dive" into one or the other. Besides theology-related books, well actually by reading theology related books, I've quickly gained an interest in philosophy and how it relates to all this, etc. So I read an occational book there on that as well.

Not quite Surprised by Truth material, but that's me in a nutshell. I hope all the former protestants who read it are feeling all pyschologically warm and fuzzy now after reading it.

Just joshing with you. ;)

Thanks for sharing that. I wish you the best as you work through the issues on your continuing spiritual odyssey. Of course you know where I would prefer you to end up, but I am delighted at conversion to Orthodoxy also, because they possess all the sacraments and apostolic succession and most of the apostolic tradition.

I hope you will hang around here and make lots of comments. This was a great exchange, I thought.

Dialogue on John Calvin's Mystical Eucharist (Part II) (vs. Josh & Michael S. Horton & Alastair Roberts & John Calvin)

See Part One. Josh's words will be in green; Alastair Roberts' in blue; my older words will be in purple.

Hi Josh,

Thanks so much for your thoughts. My first reaction is a sort of freezing and not knowing where to begin with all this. Reformed Christians have a tendency to get SO technical and SO into every jot and tittle of a subject, complete with the obligatory big words and terms, and references to interminable and innumerable in-house fights (that we outsiders — frankly — care little about) that the non-Reformed feels overwhelmed. How does one begin to "answer" stuff like you and Al have been writing? :-) It's like asking for a bowl of rice pudding with raisins and being thrown into an Olympic-size pool of it and asked to retrieve and eat every raisin in it. LOL Just an affectionate criticism of how you guys often come across.

But I do love heavy writing in theology and all the information I have been learning in this area; no doubt about that. It's not so much the thing itself that is overwhelming, but knowing how to proceed to reply to it in any systematic manner. When there are so many particulars, often the mind (especially on a day like today when I am fighting some serious virus) just says, "Okay; I ain't in the mood to find all the needles in the haystack today." :-)

The second thing I would say is that I am confused: some elements of this presentation seem to be quite close to transubstantiation, and others seem to me either playing with words, and smacking of internal incoherence and inconsistency (my initial impression of Calvin's eucharistic theology) or a glorified "mystical Zwinglianism," or a system closer to that than to the Catholic and Lutheran beliefs.

Thirdly, could you or Al (or both) provide me with a simple, concise, comparison and contrast of Calvin's eucharistic theology and transubstantiation? What exactly do you think is the same, and what is different?

Hi Dave,

I'm glad that you've been able to understand some of Calvin's views; it's only my fault if you lost the raisins in the swimming pool :) As for your confusion, let me say a few things.

First, as Al said, Calvin's views did develop over time; he went from an early view that was more Zwinglian to defending instrumentalism (that God the Holy Spirit works through the sacraments to bring us into union with Jesus and to nourish us in that union) and the high view of sacramental efficacy that comes along with it. He did later lament his controversy with the Bullingerians that was the Consensus Tigurinus (which held to what you would call a mystical Zwinglianism; Bullinger more nearly held to parallelism [God works alongside the sacraments] than Calvin's instrumentality). But we have to give Calvin some slack here, because he was trying to move the Protestant churches toward unity (also, an often unknown fact is that Calvin signed, or at least accepted in some way, the Augsburg Confession!), and he of course had hoped that the Papacy would consent to a free ecumenical council as well. So part of the confusion is that Calvin himself matured in his views; and his mature views were that of what we would call a high sacramentology (Calvin denied ex operato opere in the Scholastic sense; for a good treatment of classical Protestantism vis a' via Rome on sacraments, I'd recommend the following essays by

Joel Garver: Ex opere operato and Sacramental Efficacy

The Sacraments and the Solas

Turretin on Baptism

The following summary (which is from B.A. Gerrish's, a Calvin scholar, "John Calvin and the Reformed Doctrine of the Lord's Supper", in Articles on Calvin and Calvinism, vol. 10, pp.234-36; quoted in Mathison on p.47) will give us an outline on which to hang further discussion on. Here's Gerrish summarizing John Calvin's eucharistic doctrine:

"1. The Lord's Supper is a divine gift. It is not merely the reminder of a gift [Josh: Calvin is ultimately no Zwinglian].

2. The gift that is given is Christ himself. In addition, it is the whole Christ that is given.

3. The gift is given through signs [instrumentalism], which are intimately connected [sacramental union] with the reality that is signified and which guarantee the presence of the reality that is signified.

4. The gift is given by the Holy Spirit. When Calvin says that Christ is 'spiritually present', he means that the body and blood of Christ are made present by the mysterious power of the Holy Spirit.

5. The gift is given to all who communicate, but those who receive the Supper without faith receive it to their condemnation.

6. The gift evokes gratitude, and this is the eucharistic sacrifice of thanksgiving and praise [Calvin denies that the Communion is propiatory sacrifice; rather, it is the sacrificial meal]".

So for John Calvin, Jesus is really and substantially present in the Supper, present by the Spirit; and really, he emphasizes that the worshiping Church is caught up to heaven to feed upon Christ there (where He is locally present according to His historical body). Before I distinguish Calvin from transubstantiation(and one could probably do that just by using Garrish's outline above), I must say that the background for Calvin's eucharistic theology is his emphasis upon union with Christ: that salvation consists in being united to Christ, the whole Person (but especially His humanity, the channel of His divine life). He developed this theology from reflecting on Paul's emphasis upon Christians being 'in Christ' and being raised up to heaven 'in Christ' (Eph. 1:3-23 is a great example). Because the Church has been "made alive together with Christ,…and made [to] sit together in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus" (Eph.2:5-6), she lives in heaven in one since now: "If then you were raised with Christ, seek those things which ae above, where Christ is, sitting at the right hand of God" (Col.3:1). It is not enough for Calvin that we have a 'spiritual' union with Christ; no, Calvin says that we have union with the whole Jesus, particularly His flesh which mediates our access to God:

"As Eve was formed out of the substance of her husband, and thus was a part of himself; so, if we are the true members of Christ, we share his substance, and by this intercourse unite into one body…Paul says that we are members of his flesh and of his bones. Do we wonder then, that in the Lord's Supper he holds out his body to be enjoyed by us, and to nourish us unto eternal life?" (Commentaries, 21:323; on Eph. 5:31).

Since Calvin emphasizes our true union with the humanity of Jesus, he naturally emphasises that we are nourished with the real body and blood of our Lord in the Eucharist. His doctrine of real presence flows from his insistence upon union with Christ for salvation.

When coming to this discussion, it's important that we define our terms. Now, according to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, the mode of the Lord's presence in the Eucharist is said to be by "the conversion of the bread and wine into Christ's body and blood that Christ becomes present in this sacrament." Transubstantiation says that the outward form of bread and wine remain; but the essence of them is converted into Jesus' body and blood. The Lutherans say that the essence of the bread and wine remains the same, but that Jesus' body and blood are added alongside them. Zwinglians assert that the bread and wine are symbols of Christ's body and blood, but they are not symbols that point to or are the means of receiving the present body of Christ; but Jesus is present in His divinity in the Supper.

Calvin denied all of the above. He affirmed with Rome and Wittenberge that Jesus is fully and really present in the Eucharist (in His whole Person), and that He is received through the bread and wine by those who eat in faith (eating is the means of reception, but an eating in faith); He denied that the Body of Christ was locally enclosed within the elements, or that the elements were converted into the historical body of Jesus; and thought this to be unnecessary becaue of the work of the Spirit (a real miracle!). Against Zwingli and the Baptists, He maintained that the Eucharist, while partly consisting in signs (the elements), consisted of signs that pointed to and were means of receiving the reality.

Simple contrast with transub.: no conversion of element into body and blood; no local or enclosed presence. Affirmations with transub.: Real presence; body and blood truly received by those who eat in faith; body and blood objectively offered to all; sacrament means of receiving Christ. The positive points of his doctrine are in Garrish's outline above (that's the forest that the trees are going to be in).

Hope that that clears some stuff up for you; I'll try and respond to the critique of the 'Chalcedonian philosophical objection' later. I look forward to further discussion!

John Calvin's mature view was definitely one of the Real Presence in the Eucharist; and by real, I mean substantially present in His theanthropic Person. I believe that Al's comments in the original thread of this discussion correctly define Calvin's position: "Calvin, in his doctrine of the Supper treated the elements as instruments by which we truly partake of the theanthropic Christ. He argued that this occurs in heaven by the Spirit….(para) Once this approach to the Supper has been understood, the argument over 'local' presence will be seen to be unhelpful. Spatial catergories tend to divert our attention from what is really happening." For the Eucharistic doctrine of Calvin and the classical Reformed to be intelligible, two concepts must be understood: a) the doctrine of union with Christ and b) the concept of the Church's worship taking place in heaven by the power of the Holy Spirit and through the mediatorship of Jesus our High Priest.

a) Union with Christ

Union with Christ is a central motif of Calvin's soteriology, his doctrine of salvation. Calvin develops the Pauline motif of 'union with Christ' and being 'in Christ', and says that all the blessings that the Church has corporately (and individual Christians as members thereof) she has because she is covenantally united to Christ, joined to her Husband at the hip and made the flesh of His flesh and the bone of His bones (cf. Eph. 5:23-32). Now, Christ is locally present in heaven; how then is the Church as a whole (and the individual members thereof) joined to Christ in His whole Person? Calvin (echoing Paul) said that it was by the work of the Holy Spirit that Christians are made members of Christ and joined to Him (for some Pauline examples that Calvin took as his starting point, cf. Rom. 5:12-6:11; I Cor. 1:30-31; I Cor. 12:12-27; 2 Cor. 1:20-22; Eph. 1:3-2:22; Col. 3:1-3). Since Calvin did not separate his doctrine of the sacraments from his doctrine of salvation (as most contemporary evangelicals do), he placed the intiation of union into Christ at Baptism (taking place, again, by the Spirit) and the nourishment of that union in the Eucharist, where by the faithful reception of bread and wine we receive Jesus and all His benefits. If God the Holy Spirit has truly united the Church to the living Christ, and made her sit in the heavenly places, then it is not impossible or unscriptural to confess that the Holy Spirit transcends the bounds of the space-time world and the bounds between earth and heaven to raise us up to heaven in our worship.

b) Worshipping at the Mount

Based upon his doctrine of union with Christ, Calvin could affirm that when the Church worships, she does so in heaven, in the presence of the Triune God, by the power of the Holy Spirit (cf. Heb.6:4-8; 10:19-25; 12:18-24; the Book of Revelation has many examples as well). She comes into the highest heavens through the only veil that is left, the body of Jesus our High Priest, through the work of the Holy Spirit. Based upon this, Calvin could cogently and Scripturally argue that by the faithful reception of the bread and the wine, Christians receive the body and blood of Christ by the work of the Spirit. I'll elaborate more on that below, as I shall now turn to try and answer your concerns.

"This makes little sense to me. Either Jesus' body and blood are substantially present or not. If they are, then they are really there! You can't deny that the elements are transformed (Catholic view) or joined by the true body and blood (Lutheranism) and still hold that there is substantial or "real" presence. Why? Because this is an internal contradiction. Calvin is saying that Jesus is simultaneously there and not there. Even God is bound to that sort of elementary logical distinction. God can't be and not be at the same time. And He can't be "here" and "not here" at the same time."

What Calvin and the classical Reformed are arguing for is a sort of paradigm shift in how we look at the Eucharist. Sure, if we look at the Supper and Liturgy as acts which occur merely on earth as a sort of business meeting, then yes, Calvin missed his contradictions-anonymous meeting and we should start over. But while Calvin maintained the Real presence of the Lord Jesus in the Supper, he maintained that the Supper was a heavenly act. By the power of the Spirit, said Calvin, the worship of the Church becomes a place of reciprocal action between heaven and earth: through the minister's giving out the elements of the Supper, and our reception, we ascend into heaven, into the very presence of the Triune God, and receive our Lord Jesus Christ and all His benefits. Worship (and the sacarments as an aspect thereof), said Calvin, is about coming into the presence of the Triune God in heaven, in the Spirit and through the mediatorship of Jesus. In worship, heaven and middle-earth meet in anticipation of that Last Day when heaven and the new creation will be perfectly joined. This mystical (when we Reformed say that, we mean by the transecndant power of the Spirit) ascension of the Church occurs because she is united with the One who has been crowned the King of kings and the Lord of all lords, who sits at the right of the Father. Thus, the worship of the Church is a heavenly act; and so, the Eucharist is a heavenly act (as Al noted earlier, this view of the worship of the Church being a heavenly act, a participation in heavenly realities, is generally shared by the Eastern Church; cf. the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom.

To sum it up: Calvin's Eucharistic doctrine is that by the transcendant and divine power of the Holy Spirit, the Church's reception of the elements takes her to heaven, wherein she receives the whole Person of Christ. If worship occurs in heaven, where Jesus is, then we can surely feed upon and be nourished by Him there. Of course, worship and Communion don't feel that way; but the Word of God tells us that it is so, a good deal of the liturgy of the Church catholic witnesses to this (lex ordani, lex credendi), and it is sheer unbelief for us to deny it. No, Jesus is truly present in the Supper; the Supper is a heavenly event and; our instrument of participating in this event and receiving the theanthropic Christ is by eating the bread and drinking the wine in faith.

"So you appeal to "a real miracle!"? That won't do, because miracles are not irrational. The supernatural is not irrational; it simply transcends natural laws governing matter or is outside of it (as spirit, since science and naturalism deals with matter). It will do no good to simply say, "it is above our understanding, and so we will construct irrational scenarios and not try to make them coherent. It's a mystery . . . " "

By 'miracle', I was referring to the Spirit's work in communicating the whole Christ to us through the reception of the elements, esepcially the aspect of this of our union with Christ in heaven. We are agreed that a miracle is a transcendent event; as CS Lewis once said (I'm badly paraphrasing), a miracle is God shouting in capital letters what He normally does. That is to say, a miracle is a somehow expanded act of God than His normal acts of Providence (I take natural laws to not be some fixed, autonomous things, but simply our descriptions of how God usually works). But no disagreement there…

"The bottom line is my original criticism about this "mystical view" of Calvin: if Jesus is really there it seems that he must adopt either a Catholic or Lutheran position. If He isn't really (substantially?) there, then the Calvinist eucharist is scarcely distinguishable from the omnipresence of God or Zwinglianism. So God is there but is not "really" or "substantially" there. So what? How is that particularly special or unique? It still appears to me to be a "mystical Zwinglianism." I don't understand how saying Jesus is "mystically" (but not substantially) present is logically distinguishable from pure Zwinglian symbolism, or how this is a miracle at all, because Jesus is already "mystically present" at all times and even lives within us. What sense does it make to say that "He is always here spiritually and now He is here 'in Spirit 'more" than He was"? Spirits have no spatial or quantitative qualities. It reminds me of the Jehovah's Witness "invisible" return of Jesus in 1914. No one saw anything, but it really happened!"

I believe that the Church's ascension into heaven in the Spirit to feed upon Christ (which occurs by the means of the reception of the physical elements) answers those objections. Jesus is substantially present in heaven; we worship in heaven; therefore, the celebration of Communion is a heavenly act wherein we feed upon Christ where He is. Again, this occurs by the work of the Spirit through the faithful reception of bread and wine…Jehovah's Witnesses: Those Gnostics! Yuck!

"That may be, but I don't see the logical distinction. Perhaps I am misunderstanding the position. Certainly you would agree that it is not all that easy to understand, no?"

Our Zwinglian brethren say that the bread and wine are mere signs which symbolize something that is not present and are signs which are not a means to the reception of such presence. Calvin denied this, saying that the elements are the means of receiving the whole theanthropic Person of Christ, and that the fact that they are signs means that Triune God is present and at work in His sacraments.

"That's what I am saying: if you take away these things, the distinctiveness and "sacramentality" of the miracle is abolished, thus you deprive the rite of its very essence. Unless something physical is there, it can't be a sacrament, by definition, because a sacrament is the conveying of grace by physical means."

If we conceive of the Supper as participation in a heavenly reality by the Spirit, then truly we receive Christ through the faithful reception of bread and wine without having to posit a local (i.e., enveloped in the elements) presence. When we celebrate the Supper, our focus should be not on the elements as such, but that, by the work of the Spirit we ascend into heaven and receive the theanthropic Lord Jesus to the nourishment of our entire persons. And, as I said before, the instrumentality of this is by eating the bread and drinking the wine.

"But not substantially? Not body, blood, soul, and divinity? Again, if it is indeed a substantial presence, I don't see any rational explanations besides transubstantiation and consubstantiation (though I am quite open to further suggestions). If it isn't substantial, it reduces to symbolism, because (at least in my analysis, for what it's worth), why should we receive a spiritual presence that we already have through omnipresence and the indwelling? So it strikes me as betwixt and between; neither fish nor fowl."

Yes! Substantially! I would humbly offer up the suggestion that what Mathison calls suprasubstantiation is the remedy: "According to Calvin, Christ's body is present in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, but the mode of his presence is not specifically connected with the substance of the elements…Christ is present by virtue of the supernatural working of the Holy Spirit, not by the transformation or combination of the material substances". This is consistent when we remember the heavenly nature of the sacrament; and it also holds together the reality that when we receive the elements, we receive the entire theanthropic Christ; to quote Al again, "Calvin, in his doctrine of the Supper treated the elements as instruments by which we truly partake of the theanthropic Christ. He argued that this occurs in heaven by the Spirit." The place of the Supper is heaven; the instrumentality, the elements and; the cause, the work of the Spirit in transcending the boundaries of the space-time world. We are agreed that if there is no substantial presence (in terms of not receiving the whole Christ by the Spirit; I don't believe that either Scripture or the consenus fidelium requires us to say that substantiality is neccessarily connected with the transformation of the susbtance of the elements), then we are left with an impoverished Zwinglianism.

Again: Calvin says that the Supper is a heavenly act (as the whole worship of the Church is) wherein we receive the whole theanthropic Christ by the faithful reception of the bread and wine. This is intelligible because of his doctrines of a)union with Christ, b)the Holy Spirit, and c) worship.

Thanks again for your comments, and I do hope that what I've said makes sense. I believe that most of what I've said covers your critique of Dr. Horton's article; however, I will try to respond to that as well. I appreciate your critique and your willingness to discuss this. In Christ,

Josh

Dave,

Unfortunately I will not be able to take part in this debate over the next few weeks, although I would really love to. I am going to be in America for a week or so and then I return home to a backlog of work. However, I will make a few brief comments now.

1. On the issue of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist. As I have remarked in earlier comments, the Eucharist is ultimately an action and Christ’s presence within it is threefold. Christ is present within the Church as His body. Christ is present in our midst as our Host. Christ is also present in the elements eaten and drunk. These forms of presence are interdependent. Were we not gathering together in His name, Christ would not be in our midst as our Host. Were the elements not part of the Church’s Eucharistic action Christ would not be present in them. Were the Church to cease its Eucharistic practice it would cease to be Christ’s body and know His presence. The Church is constituted by its Eucharistic practice. The wording of my point regarding the presence of Christ in the elements is important. Christ’s presence within the elements is a presence that is revealed as the elements are the object of the Church’s action. Detached from the Church’s action, Christ is not present in the same sense within the elements.

2. ‘Substantial’ presence? I find that this sort of language has the tendency (albeit not necessary) to lead our debates up blind alleys. The presence of Christ within the elements is not a ‘static’ presence. It is a real presence of Christ, but not the sort of presence that exists outside of the action in which it is found. We cannot take the elements out of the immediate context of the Eucharistic action and still have Christ’s presence within them. In this I am agreed with Eastern Orthodox theologians like Schmemann who argue that this is the reason why the ‘holy gifts themselves never became in the Orthodox East an object of special reverence, contemplation and adoration’. I am convinced that we are truly given to feed upon the theanthropic Christ (both in His deity and humanity) through the ‘instruments’ of bread and wine. When I eat the bread I am feeding upon the very body of our Lord, not a naked or empty symbol. However, trying to explain this within the categories provided by this age is dangerous. The Eucharist is essentially a movement from this age to the age to come through the action of the Spirit.

3. Dave, you write: “Calvin is saying that Jesus is simultaneously there and not there. Even God is bound to that sort of elementary logical distinction. God can’t be and not be at the same time. And He can’t be “here” and “not here” at the same time.” I beg to differ. You seem to taking a binary view of presence and absence, something that has rightly been attacked over the past century. Presence and absence are just not possible to absolutely distinguish. [see link]

4. Regarding miracles. One of the chief objections I have to some forms of Catholic theology is their tendency to make transubstantiation into an extrinsic miracle. This can detach the elements from the rest of the Eucharistic liturgy. We must remember that transubstantiation is not, in the final analysis, a theory of the Eucharist itself. It is only a theory about the elements of the Eucharist. Its tendency to obscure the importance of the action as a whole (just like the bare symbolic view) is a weakness in my estimation.

5. I also think that the debate over ‘local’ presence is unhelpful and misleading. In the Supper we truly partake of the substance of Christ and do not merely have communion with Christ in His omnipresent divine nature. However, as our partaking of the body and blood of Christ is bound up in the Eucharistic action of the Church, we should beware of thinking of Christ’s presence as something crassly material to be assimilated by the human digestive system. If anything we are that which is assimilated as we eat. Faith is our mouth and digestive system. Nonetheless, the physical action of eating is essential; faith is never disincarnate. It is a faithful physical eating by which we partake of the substance of Christ. In the Eucharist we taste of a world that has become sacramental again. [see link]

6. Again on ‘local’ presence. I do not believe that ‘heaven’ is some place occupying space somewhere in our solar system, galaxy or universe. Heaven is not ‘locally present’ anywhere in our universe. Heaven is a real place but, in my understanding at least, it occupies a distinct but parallel realm. Heaven and earth were divorced by the Fall. Only when this union between heaven and earth is reestablished can the world become sacramental again. This, of course, has occurred in Jesus Christ and it is He who offers us His body and blood in the Eucharist. Christ is the Lord from heaven and, in the action of the Eucharist the Church becomes one with Him. Calvin is, in my opinion, perfectly right to deny local presence in favour of the marriage of heaven and earth. Heaven is, of course, an eschatological concept. As we feed on the heavenly Man in the Eucharist we are tasting of the powers of the age to come. The marriage of heaven and earth is the future reality of salvation that awaits us. For this reason it might be better to think in terms of ‘temporal presence’. The Eucharist is God’s future ‘thrown forward’ into our present. I think that Calvin was right to oppose the RC doctrine which seems to collapse heaven into earth. Nevertheless, I believe that his doctrine could be honed at points here as well.

7. My personal opinion. I often get frustrated with the anemic form of Eucharistic theology held by many Reformed people. In some areas I would want to go further than Calvin himself, but recognize the validity of many of his points. I simply feel that there are ways to get around the vast majority of the differences that exist on this issue between Reformed, Lutheran, Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Christians. Zwinglians are usually a different issue entirely. I feel that most parties in this debate are protecting truths that the other parties have tended to forget or overlook. I think that many of the categories that have served to polarize the various positions are the wrong ones and should be abandoned in favour of better ones. Calvinistic Eucharistic theology is the form of Eucharistic theology that I feel most comfortable with. However, I am convinced that it is often hamstrung by its failure to ask the right questions and work in the right categories. Aren’t we all?

Hope that this helps to move the debate on a bit. I greatly appreciate your desire to dialogue on this issue. Thank you very much!

* * * * *

Calvin's Short Treatise on the Supper of our Lord is available online in at least three places (One / Two / Three)

St. Thomas Aquinas denies that Jesus' body is in the Eucharist "locally" or "as in a place." Would that overcome Calvin's objection about Jesus being at the right hand of the Father?:

Whether Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a place?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a place. Because, to be in a place definitively or circumscriptively belongs to being in a place. But Christ's body seems to be definitively in this sacrament, because it is so present where the species of the bread and wine are, that it is nowhere else upon the altar: likewise it seems to be there circumscriptively, because it is so contained under the species of the consecrated host, that it neither exceeds it nor is exceeded by it. Therefore Christ's body is in this sacrament as in a place.

Objection 2: Further, the place of the bread and wine is not empty, because nature abhors a vacuum; nor is the substance of the bread there, as stated above (Question [75], Article [2]); but only the body of Christ is there. Consequently the body of Christ fills that place. But whatever fills a place is there locally. Therefore the body of Christ is in this sacrament locally.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above (Article [4]), the body of Christ is in this sacrament with its dimensive quantity, and with all its accidents. But to be in a place is an accident of a body; hence "where" is numbered among the nine kinds of accidents. Therefore Christ's body is in this sacrament locally.

On the contrary, The place and the object placed must be equal, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. iv). But the place, where this sacrament is, is much less than the body of Christ. Therefore Christ's body is not in this sacrament as in a place.

I answer that, As stated above (Article [1], ad 3; Article [3]), Christ's body is in this sacrament not after the proper manner of dimensive quantity, but rather after the manner of substance. But every body occupying a place is in the place according to the manner of dimensive quantity, namely, inasmuch as it is commensurate with the place according to its dimensive quantity. Hence it remains that Christ's body is not in this sacrament as in a place, but after the manner of substance, that is to say, in that way in which substance is contained by dimensions; because the substance of Christ's body succeeds the substance of bread in this sacrament: hence as the substance of bread was not locally under its dimensions, but after the manner of substance, so neither is the substance of Christ's body. Nevertheless the substance of Christ's body is not the subject of those dimensions, as was the substance of the bread: and therefore the substance of the bread was there locally by reason of its dimensions, because it was compared with that place through the medium of its own dimensions; but the substance of Christ's body is compared with that place through the medium of foreign dimensions, so that, on the contrary, the proper dimensions of Christ's body are compared with that place through the medium of substance; which is contrary to the notion of a located body.

Hence in no way is Christ's body locally in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ's body is not in this sacrament definitively, because then it would be only on the particular altar where this sacrament is performed: whereas it is in heaven under its own species, and on many other altars under the sacramental species. Likewise it is evident that it is not in this sacrament circumscriptively, because it is not there according to the commensuration of its own quantity, as stated above. But that it is not outside the superficies of the sacrament, nor on any other part of the altar, is due not to its being there definitively or circumscriptively, but to its being there by consecration and conversion of the bread and wine, as stated above (Article [1]; Question [15], Article [2], sqq.).

Reply to Objection 2: The place in which Christ's body is, is not empty; nor yet is it properly filled with the substance of Christ's body, which is not there locally, as stated above; but it is filled with the sacramental species, which have to fill the place either because of the nature of dimensions, or at least miraculously, as they also subsist miraculously after the fashion of substance.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Article [4]), the accidents of Christ's body are in this sacrament by real concomitance. And therefore those accidents of Christ's body which are intrinsic to it are in this sacrament. But to be in a place is an accident when compared with the extrinsic container. And therefore it is not necessary for Christ to be in this sacrament as in a place.

I believe that St. Thomas' position is not as opposed to that of Calvin as many might think. Nor am I the first to say this. I for one feel that Calvin and many Reformed people following him (myself included) have often manifested a failure to recognize the existence of more moderate forms of the doctrine of transubstantiation and sympathetically interact with them.

Calvin represents Roman Catholics and Lutherans as holding to 'local conjunction or contact' or 'enclosing', which some do seem to hold to, but many do not. The issue of 'local' presence is a big one for Calvin and I think that he is right to see it as such.

The resurrected, ascended Christ exists in the freedom of the eschatological Spirit. This freedom defies the limitations of both time and space. A focus on a 'local' presence can damage both the truth of the ascension and the Second Coming. Heaven can fall down to earth and the future can collapse into the present. Calvin's doctrine allows for both of these realities to retain their integrity whilst asserting a real presence in the Eucharist.

I am increasingly convinced that Calvin and St. Thomas Aquinas can be reconciled, as can Calvin and many forms of the Eastern Orthodox doctrine.

This will probably be my last comment for a while, but I suggest that this article might help to explain some of the strengths and weaknesses of Calvin's Eucharistic theology. [see link]

I am still looking for replies to my particular difficulties with Calvin's position, as expressed in the new post above. I hope that some Reformed Christian who is interested in and informed about this issue will give me some sort of counter-reply to those. If someone is directly expressing troubles that they have with another position, that is an opportunity for said position to clarify and further defend itself.

Here's one thing I wanted to comment on at the moment: Alastair wrote:

‘Substantial’ presence? I find that this sort of language has the tendency (albeit not necessary) to lead our debates up blind alleys. The presence of Christ within the elements is not a ‘static’ presence.

This is part of my confusion about the Reformed view. The way it is being expressed and explained to me seems to waver back and forth between "substantial" and "mystical" (as opposed to the merely physical or "substantial"). Alastair made this statement, but Calvin speaks often about "substance" and we are basically debating his view here, no? If Reformed Christians feel they have actually developed eucharistic theology to the point where it contradicts Calvin at sime points, then I need to know where that is, so I can better understand the dynamics of the debate.

Here are instances of Calvin's use of "substance" (and a few of "presence") in his Short Treatise on the Lord's Supper). Emphases are added:

". . . the substance of the sacraments is the Lord Jesus . . . It is necessary, then, that the substance should be conjoined with these, otherwise nothing would be firm or certain. Hence we conclude that two things are presented to us in the Supper, viz., Jesus Christ as the source and substance of all good; and, secondly, the fruit and efficacy of his death and passion." (11)

". . . all the benefit which we should seek in the Supper is annihilated if Jesus Christ be not there given to us as the substance and foundation of all." (12)

". . . in order to have our life in Christ our souls must feed on his body and blood as their proper food. This, then, is expressly attested in the Supper, when of the bread it is said to us that we are to take it and eat it, and that it is his body, and of the cup that we are to drink it, and that it is his blood. This is expressly spoken of the body and blood, in order that we may learn to seek there the substance of our spiritual life." (13)

"Thus it is with the communion which we have in. the body and blood of the Lord Jesus. It is a spiritual mystery which can neither be seen by the eye nor comprehended by the human understanding. It is therefore figured to us by visible signs, according as our weakness requires, in such manner, nevertheless, that it is not a bare figure but is combined with the reality and substance. It is with good reason then that the bread is called the body, since it not only represents but also presents it to us . . . the sacraments of the Lord should not and cannot be at all separated from their reality and substance." (16)

"We must confess, then, that if the representation which God gives us in the Supper is true, the internal substance of the sacrament is conjoined with the visible signs; and as the bread is distributed to us by the hand, so the body of Christ is communicated to us in order that we may be made partakers of it. Though there should be nothing more, we have good cause to be satisfied, when we understand that Jesus Christ gives us in the Supper the proper substance of his body and blood, in order that we may possess it fully, and possessing it have part in all his blessings." (17)

". . . feeding on his own substance." (18)

". . . the reality and substance of the Supper . . . " (30)

". . . the presence and conjunction of the reality with the sign (of which we have spoken, and will again speak) is well understood." (43)

"Zuinglius and Œcolompadius . . . forgot to show what presence of Jesus Christ ought to be believed in the Supper, and what communion of his body and blood is `there received . . . Luther thought that they meant to leave nothing but the bare signs without their spiritual substance. Accordingly he began to resist them to the face, and call them heretics." (56-57)

". . . on receiving the sacrament in faith, according to the ordinance of the Lord, we are truly made partakers of the proper substance of the body and blood of Jesus Christ." (60)

Likewise, in the Institutes, Calvin insists on denying "local physical presence," yet continues to insist that the recipient of communion receives Jesus' literal "substantial" body and blood. Either he is contradicting himself right and left and simply doesn't care (the "faith has nothing to do with logic" outlook) or he hasn't shown how his view is at all superior to transubstantiation theologically or logically, or that there is no major distinction — thus making his extremely hostile rhetoric against transubstantiation and the Sacrifice of the Mass mostly empty, groundless rhetoric. Here are some more relevant quotes, from the Beveridge translation of the Institutes, available online:

"The presence of Christ in the Supper we must hold to be such as neither affixes him to the element of bread, nor encloses him in bread, nor circumscribes him in any way, (this would obviously detract from his celestial glory;) and it must, moreover, be such as neither divests him of his just dimensions, nor dissevers him by differences of place, nor assigns to him a body of boundless dimensions, diffused through heaven and earth . . . But when these absurdities are discarded, I willingly admit any thing which helps to express the true and substantial communication of the body and blood of the Lord, as exhibited to believers under the sacred symbols of the Supper, understanding that they are received not by the imagination or intellect merely, but are enjoyed in reality as the food of eternal life."

(IV, 17, 19)

"We say that Christ descends to us, as well by the external symbol as by his Spirit, that he may truly quicken our souls by the substance of his flesh and blood."

(IV, 17, 24)

"Still I am free to confess that that mixture or transfusion of the flesh of Christ with our souls which they teach I repudiate, because it is enough for us, that Christ, out of the substance of his flesh, breathes life into our souls, nay, diffuses his own life into us, though the real flesh of Christ does not enter us."

(IV, 17, 32 — a remarkably incoherent and contradictory statement)

See link.

* * * * *

In Douglas Farrow's article, Between the Rock and a Hard Place: In Support of (something like) a Reformed View of the Eucharist, recommended by Alastair, my difficulty is at least expressed (if not granted):

"Might it not be admitted that there is a fundamental problem with Calvin's sursum corda and with his interpretation of the eucharistic mystery — viz., that the body of the worshipper, unlike his or her soul, appears to be uninvolved in the secret union and communion with Christ in the heavenlies . . . ?" (p. 4 in pdf file)

Describing Aquinas' view on the next page, Farrow writes:

". . . by virtue of his divine omnipresence and omnipotence as the Logos, Jesus is able to provide on earth a eucharistic form of his humanity under the accidents of the bread and wine, making present (albeit non-spatially) the actual substance of his exalted body and blood . . . Was Calvin . . . over-hasty in exchanging this account of the presence of the absent Christ for one which leaves Christ strictly in heaven, and which postulates rather a secret relocation of the worshipper through faith and the ministry of the Spirit? . . . If we are not permitted to appeal to the miracle of transubstantiation, how are we to conceive of a real union of soul and body with the heavenly Christ? . . . Prima facie it is by no means apparent that a simple appeal to the Spirit can justify such claims, if by them we mean to include our corporeal nature and with it the entire sphere of human culture."

On p. 12 he states:

"The simple fact of the matter is that Calvin's view is not unlike that of Aquinas — which is to say, it is an entirely orthodox view, however tainted by cosmological misinformation."

See also his footnote 41 on p. 14:

". . . one meets today relatively few Reformed theologians who take the eucharist with anything like the seriousness that Calvin did."

[Earlier he had noted that the notable 19th-century Presbyterian theologian Charles Hodge actually had a Zwinglian view]

In good scholarly fashion, Farrow mentions these difficulties of mine in his overview of the controversy, but doesn't really answer them (at least not to my satisfaction). So I continue to seek answers to the dilemma.

* * * * *

Dave,

In answer to your question:

I am firmly persuaded that we do partake of the substance of Christ in the Eucharist. Elsewhere in the post you quote I wrote:

"It is a faithful physical eating by which we partake of the substance of Christ."

The point I was trying to make is that there might be better ways to speak of some of these things, without denying the Reformed view. I fear any position that would make the elements objects of adoration and worship as I feel that this obscures a number of important distinctions.

I also feel that if we focus too much upon the mode of Christ's presence in the elements we can fail to keep sight of the place of the elements within the larger action of the Eucharist. For this reason I oppose any 'static' understanding of the Real Presence. As I feel that many of the debates have drawn our attention away from the action to the static elements I was wondering whether there might be better terminology that we could employ, terminology that has less tendency to limit us to a 'zoom lens'.

For myself, I will readily assert that we partake of the substance of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist. The important thing is that we keep the broader nature of the Eucharist in our vision. This is what I was trying to maintain in my (admittedly rather confusing) point.

As regards your other points, I do believe that important distinctions exist between Calvin's doctrine and many of the common forms of the doctrine of transubstantiation. As I pointed out in my previous post, Calvin does seem to be reacting against a somewhat distorted form of transubstantiation (one of local, corporeal presence) in many places. Consequently he probably overreacted considerably. Some forms of transubstantiation are quite a bit closer to Calvin's view than either the Zwinglian or Lutheran views.

I suggest that you read the article I linked to above. It should help to clarify where some of the key (and I believe quite significant) differences lie. The author argues that there is room for real constructive and fruitful dialogue between Calvinists and Thomists on this issue and that the two positions are not far removed. From my own reading I am increasingly inclined to agree. The biggest sticking point for me remains the worshipping of the elements.

I agree that it is an unusually interesting and (I think) fruitful discussion. I disagree with Calvin's view and find it a bit contradictory, and of course I don't care for his excessive polemical lambasting of the Catholic position, but I can appreciate the view that his theology is far more "realist" than the usual Protestant position today (even amongst his own followers, according to you guys who have commented on that).

Calvin's eucharistic theology reminds me of Luther's Mariology: both were much "higher" than most later Lutherans and Calvinists held. Those facts lend themselves to the view that some Protestant theological trends seem to be primarily of a negative nature" in reaction to Rome rather than proactive and proceeding from the best in Protestant internal principles, from the thought of the key figures of Luther and Calvin.

Yet Another Lying, Dishonest Catholic Convert: John Henry Newman, Part II

See Part One.

Greg Krehbiel (Catholic) and Tim Enloe (Presbyterian) have chimed in with their negative opinions of Cardinal Newman on the Theological Discussion Board:

(at least they spare us the charge of dishonesty):

[Greg] "I seem to be alone in my opinion on Newman. I think he's stuffy and pretentious and too full of himself, and I don't particularly like reading him. It seems that everyone else reacts to Newman the way you do — that his thoughts are deep and his prose wonderful — so it must be me who's wrong."

Crowhill Weblog

[Tim] "It's not just you. I, too, find Newman stuffy and pretentious. But I've not made a close enough study of him to write out a detailed explanation of why that is."

For articles on the Newman-Kingsley debate, see:

"Clash of Religious Titans: Kingsley vs. Newman" (John Spencer Neumann)

"Newman's Controversies" (Fr. John McCloskey)
[From The Catholic Answer, March/April, 2002]

From the latter:

"Perhaps the best known of all Newman's works, acknowledged as a great classic both of literature and autobiography, is his Apologia Pro Vita Sua: History of My Religious Opinions. This is the book that finally established his reputation as a great Englishman and Catholic. In some way, it prepared for the crowning honor of his life—being named a Cardinal in 1879 by Pope Leo XIII, "when the shadow was lifted forever." Newman was attacked in a magazine by a well-known advocate of Protestant "muscular Christianity," the novelist Charles Kingsley. In the review of an anti-Catholic History of England by J.S. Froude, Kingsley gratuitously attacked Newman by writing, "Truth, for its own sake, had never been a virtue with the Roman clergy. Father Newman informs us that it need not, and on the whole ought not to be'; that cunning is the weapon which Heaven has given to the saints wherewith to withstand the brute male force of the wicked world which marries and is given in marriage. Whether his notion is doctrinally correct or not, it is at least historically so." After an exchange of letters over some months, Newman replied to this insult against himself and the Catholic priesthood with his masterpiece. Newman wrote not to attack Kingsley personally as it was "very difficult to get up resentment towards persons whom one has never seen, but I wish to impute nothing worse to Mr. Kingsley than that he has been furiously carried away by his feelings." He wrote the Apologia to defend himself against the charges of his being "deceitful", hypocritical, and cunning," and as one "who has given up so much so much that he loved and prized and could have retained, but he loved honesty better than name, and Truth better than dear friends."

"The book was written as rapidly as possible in six weeks with Newman writing standing up sometimes as long as 22 hours straight in order to get his story before the public. He said' it was "the most arduous work I ever had in my life" in "one of the most terrible trials I ever had." The reviews of the book were universally favorable, and the sales were enormous. His reputation was restored and heightened and indeed even his constant financial worries were over."

Fr. McCloskey concludes:

"Reading Newman requires an intellectual effort but it is a refined and elevating taste that once acquired is never lost."

Obviously, Greg Krehbiel and Tim Enloe have not yet acquired this taste. :-)

And now a few excerpts from Newman's fanulous Apologia pro vita sua, specifically responding to the false charges of unconcern for truth and insincerity:

"Most wonderful phenomenon! An educated man, breathing English air, and walking in the light of the nineteenth century, thinks that neither I nor any members of my communion feel any difficulty in allowing that "Truth for its own sake need not, and on the whole ought not to be, a virtue with the Roman clergy;" nay, that they are not at all surprised to be told that "Father Newman had informed" the world, that such is the standard of morality acknowledged, acquiesced in, by his co-religionists! But, I suppose, in truth, there is nothing at all, however base, up to the high mark of Titus Oates, which a Catholic may not expect to be believed of him by Protestants, however honourable and hard-headed."

". . . I should be committing a crime, heaping dirt upon my soul, and storing up for myself remorse and confusion of face at a future day, if I applied my abstract belief of the latent sensuality of Protestantism, on à priori reasoning, to individuals, to living persons, to authors and men of name, and said (not to make disrespectful allusion to the living) that Bishop Van Mildert, or the Rev. Dr. Spry, or Dean Milner, or the Rev. Charles Simeon "informs us that chastity for its own sake need not be, and on the whole ought not to be, a virtue with the Anglican clergy," . . . "

"XII. Reflections on the above.

"I shall attempt a brief analysis of the foregoing correspondence; and I trust that the wording which I shall adopt will not offend against the gravity due both to myself and to the occasion. It is impossible to do justice to the course of thought evolved in it without some familiarity of expression.

"Mr. Kingsley begins then by exclaiming,—"O the chicanery, the wholesale fraud, the vile hypocrisy, the conscience-killing tyranny of Rome! We have not far to seek for an evidence of it. There's Father Newman to wit: one living specimen is worth a hundred dead ones. He, a Priest writing of Priests, tells us that lying is never any harm."

"I interpose: "You are taking a most extraordinary liberty with my name. If I have said this, tell me when and where."

"Mr. Kingsley replies: "You said it, Reverend Sir, in a Sermon which you preached, when a Protestant, as Vicar of St. Mary's, and published in 1844; and I could read you a very salutary lecture on the effects which that Sermon had at the time on my own opinion of you."

"I make answer: "Oh … Not, it seems, as a Priest speaking of Priests;—but let us have the passage."

"Mr. Kingsley relaxes: "Do you know, I like your tone. From your tone I rejoice, greatly rejoice, to be able to believe that you did not mean what you said."

"I rejoin: "Mean it! I maintain I never said it, whether as a Protestant or as a Catholic."

"Mr. Kingsley replies: "I waive that point."

"I object: "Is it possible! What? waive the main question! I either said it or I didn't. You have made a monstrous charge against me; direct, distinct, public. You are bound to prove it as directly, as distinctly, as publicly;—or to own you can't."

"Well," says Mr. Kingsley, "if you are quite sure you did not say it, I'll take your word for it; I really will."

"My word! I am dumb. Somehow I thought that it was my word that happened to be on trial. The word of a Professor of lying, that he does not lie!

"But Mr. Kingsley re-assures me: "We are both gentlemen," he says: "I have done as much as one English gentleman can expect from another."

"I begin to see: He thought me a gentleman at the very time that he said I taught lying on system. After all, it is not I, but it is Mr. Kingsley who did not mean what he said. "Habemus confitentem reum."

"So we have confessedly come round to this, preaching without practising; the common theme of satirists from Juvenal to Walter Scott! "I left Baby Charles and Steenie laying his duty before him," says King James of the reprobate Dalgarno: "O Geordie, jingling Geordie, it was grand to hear Baby Charles laying down the guilt of dissimulation, and Steenie lecturing on the turpitude of incontinence."

"While I feel then that Mr. Kingsley's February explanation is miserably insufficient in itself for his January enormity, still I feel also that the Correspondence, which lies between these two acts of his, constitutes a real satisfaction to those principles of historical and literary justice to which he has given so rude a shock.

"Accordingly, I have put it into print, and make no further criticism on Mr. Kingsley.
J. H. N."

For all of the above from the Apologia, see the online version.

Is this not priceless, and a picture of so much of Catholic vs. Anti-Catholic discourse? Would that I could find theological opponents as clever and conniving, at least, as Charles Kingsley. I don't have to look far to find anti-Catholics casting aspersions on my honesty and truthfulness and apologetic competence (see the sidebar for the "dissing" remarks) — I even have one of such opinions continually hounding me on my own blog as I write —, but they entirely lack Kingsley's presumptuous and perverse charm, chutzpah, and mettle. At least Kingsley stuck around for the correspondence . . .

I think he knew who he was up against early on, and that he couldn't succeed in his purpose, so he quickly retracted. But as Newman shows, the man was lying from the beginning, and couldn't even document the charges he made that Newman cared little for truth. Reading the exchange provides some high comedy and irony indeed. Converts who get accused of ridiculous and outrageous things and whose every move and opinion is scrutinized from cynics who show only scant comprehension of the intellectual, emotional, and psychological dynamics in the process of conversion — let alone understanding of Catholic theology —, can readily relate. Add to that Newman's delightful prose and sometimes gut-bustingly hilarious satirical bent, and you have one of the greatest masterpieces in English and theological literature.

*****

Anti-Catholic author David T. King has tried to cast aspersions on Cardinal Newman also, by citing his former anti-Catholic opinions and suggesting (ever so subtly) that he "should have known better" (wink, wink) than to convert.

He does this in a paper called "A Discussion on Newman's Pre- and Post-Conversion Positions on the Historical Legitimacy of Roman Catholic Patristic Work" — originally from a discussion on Eric Svendsen's NTRMin Areopagus Discussion Board and then posted on Tim Enloe's website, Grace Unknown. The Internet Archive was able to provide me a copy of this paper, which also speaks volumes about the anti-Catholic psyche and mentality.

"Newman came to realize that Rome's claims could not be substantiated on the basis of patristic evidence or the history of the early Church. Thus he found refuge in his "development of doctrine," which got Rome off the hook from having to substantiate its claims by means of the early Church.

[translation of the condescending rhetoric: "Newman (sharp as he was) knew the Fathers and the early Church precluded belief in Catholicism, so he came up with this rationalization and canard of 'development of doctrine' to explain away facts which should have kept him Protestant"]

"But if development proceeds from the seed to the tree (e.g., acorn to the Oak), there has to be the seed from the beginning. But the anachronistic planting of seeds that were never there in the first place is just as barren as the field in which they are imagined."

[translation: "I will engage in self-serving circular reasoning and simply deny that there were even seeds of Catholic doctrines in the early Church, and forget by an act of willful blindness that if I am looking for absence of beliefs in the early Church, my own Protestant view vis-a-vis Church history is doomed to shipwreck. But we mustn't ever apply the same standards to ourselves as we do to dreaded, deceitful Rome."]

This is the same guy who was trying to argue (quite laughably and ridiculously) that Cardinal Newman was a modernist and that Pope St. Pius X thought him to be so. That was, until I showed up and produced a letter from the saintly pope proving otherwise. See:

Protestant Contra-Catholic Revisionist History: Pope St. Pius X
and Cardinal Newman's Alleged "Modernism" (Dave Armstrong vs. David T. King)

And this is the guy who wrote about Catholics in Svendsen's forum:

"I already have a very low view of the integrity of non-Protestants in general, and you aren't helping to improve it."

". . . most of you are too dishonest to admit what you really think."

(4-15-03)

". . . those who wish to ignore the evidence of the fathers themselves, which I have repeatedly found to be typical of the average Roman apologist like yourself. Ignore the evidence and belittle it. I guess that's what works in the world of Roman apologetics."

(6-3-03)

"It is a typical Roman Catholic tactic to misrepresent one's opponent purposely in order to "name and claim" a victory."

(6-5-03)

Finally, in the last section of the following paper, I have collected dumb things that anti-Catholics have stated about Cardinal Newman:

Historical Development in the Understanding of Doctrinal Development of the Apostolic Deposit

Some highlights:

Dr. Eric Svendsen:

"[Newman's theory of development is] a concept pulled out of the hat by Newman . . ."

William Webster:

". . . this clear lack of patristic consensus led Rome to embrace a new theory in the late nineteenth century to explain its teachings — the theory initiated by John Henry Newman known as the development of doctrine."

Tim Enloe:

"Newman's late nineteenth century theory of evolution, er, I mean development . . ."

"How interesting that it was not until then that someone came along to provide Rome with just the neat little airtight theory she needed to explain away all her corruptions and additions to the depositum fidei."

"Newman's . . . development has to be waved like a magic wand all over the historical record."

". . . waving "development" around as if it's the universal answer to the reams of historical problems created by Roman Catholic claims is at best a non-answer, and at worst a mere rationalistic chimera . . ."

George Salmon:

"Romish advocates . . . are now content to exchange tradition, which their predecessors had made the basis of their system, for this new foundation of development . . . The starting of this theory exhibits plainly the total rout which the champions of the Roman Church experienced in the battle they attempted to fight on the field of history. The theory of development is, in short, an attempt to enable men, beaten off the platform of history, to hang on to it by the eyelids . . . The old theory was that the teaching of the Church had never varied . . . Anyone who holds the theory of Development ought, in consistency, to put the writings of the Fathers on the shelf as antiquated and obsolete . . ."

Dr. James White:

"You said that usually the Protestant misunderstands the concept of development. Well, before
Newman came up with it, I guess we had good reason, wouldn't you say? . . . those who hang their case on Newman and the development hypothesis are liable for all sorts of problems . . . And as for Newman's statement, "to be deep in history is to cease to be a Protestant," I would say, "to be deep in Newman is to cease to be an historically consistent Roman Catholic."

Pastor David T. King

"I think Newman's theory is rejected by Pius X. And simply assuming he's not condemning the
theory of development of dogma under the language of "the evolution of dogma" is avoiding
reality. I can't play in that kind of fantasy world."

"Contrast Newman's theory of development with the words of Pius X as given in The Oath Against the Errors of Modernism . . . You'll do your best to explain away these words of Pius X, and do you want to know why? Because you have a precommitment to your erroneous theory, and no amount of historical evidence is going to pry you loose."

"It's a case [of] historical reality vs. historical fantasy. You keep making claims you know nothing about, . . . repeated exposure of grandiose claims made in ignorance . . . It's this kind of posture that is so typical of the average Roman apologist."

"You can weave the web all you desire, but the theory of development is denied and condemned
under the language of "the evolution of dogma" by Pius X."

Jason Engwer

". . . to be deep into history is to cease using the arguments of Cardinal Newman. If Roman Catholicism is as deeply rooted in history as it claims to be, why do its apologists appeal to development of doctrine so frequently and to such an extent? . . . The argument for development of doctrine, as it's used by today's Catholic apologists, is unverifiable, irrational, and contrary to the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. It's a nebulous excuse for Roman Catholic teachings being absent and contradicted in early church history."

So much nonsense (filled with factual errors and misrepresentations of Catholic teaching) from small minds against a great man and theological genius . . . It reminds one somewhat of Luther's irrational, asinine rantings against St. Thomas Aquinas and some of the Fathers.

Dialogue on the Ethics of, and Biblical Support for, Vegetarianism (Part I) (vs. Sogn Mill-Scout)

See Part II / Part III. Sogn's words will be in green.

Thanks for a well-stated and articulated position. I hope we get lots of discussion on this. Here are my own initial thoughts:

>Most people in our society would agree that peace is a laudable goal toward which we should exert considerable effort. It is self-evident to most of us that peace is intrinsically desirable, largely because human beings flourish in peaceful conditions.

Yes. Whether this includes animals is not self-evident. "Peace" is usually assumed to refer to human relationships.

>In the history of humanity we can discern a series of advances in terms of popular understanding of what peaceful coexistence implies. At one time it was normal to regard only the members of one's own tribe or clan as legitimate objects of moral concern. All others were outside the circle of moral obligations.

Gradually people learned to look outside their local groups to regard others who were previously outcasts as worthy of concern. In our nation's recent history, blacks were long considered inferior to the white majority. Similarly, women were second class citizens in a male dominated society. Now, however, there is a more widespread inclusion of formerly outcast groups within our consensual circle of ethical concern.

Yes, particularly preborn human babies, who can be wantonly (legally) slaughtered in the abortion slaughterhouses; oftentimes including severe torture. They are ripped limb from limb, or burned over their entire bodies with saline solution, or sucked into a vacuum cleaner, or stuck in the neck with scissors, in order to suck out their brains (so-called "partial-birth abortion").

>In the eyes of most people, humanity still defines the outer limit of their moral obligations. I submit that this fixation on our own species is an arbitrary and unjustifiable boundary to our moral sensibility. Just as our civilization has gradually expanded the perimeter within which individuals and groups are recognized as making moral claims upon us, now we have the opportunity to see ourselves as members of a much larger group. We can choose to recognize that we are all part of the vast number of sentient beings that are united in our capacity to suffer and feel pain. It is our unique privilege as a species to be able to choose to refrain from inflicting suffering upon our fellow sentient beings.

I wholeheartedly agree with that. I also don't see torture and other infliction of suffering on animals in the Bible. But I see the permissibility of swiftly killing them (and eating them, and using their fur, etc.) all over the place, and sanctioned by God, Who cannot (by nature) sanction something that is intrinsically sinful and evil. That's why much of this has to rest on an optional, non-obligatory idealism (much like pacifism).

It is impossible, I will argue, to make this entire argument and also accept a Bible which is an inspired revelation from God. You are a Christian, so your task is to harmonize biblical teaching with your beliefs on this score. Frankly, what I've seen thus far has done a very poor and insufficient job of doing that.

>The challenge we face is to recognize that there is no morally compelling reason not to take this step into moral solidarity with non-human beings. We have the great opportunity to enlarge the circle of our moral concern to its logically utmost extent.

Panzoism is the term my wife and I coined for this philosophy of life that embraces all sentient beings as worthy of our compassion and concern.

What if we discovered that plants feel pain, too? I vaguely remembering reading something along those lines. The Secret Life of Plants sort of thing . . . If that were proven scientifically, what would you do then? Make an exception for plants? Otherwise, we would all have to starve to death in order to consistently live out this vision, as all food is organic. Only water is non-organic, and we can't survive on water only.

>It is a way of life that strives to bring about genuine peace on earth by renouncing violence

Is chopping down a tree violence? If so, that would take out all wood products.

>and, to the best of our ability, eschewing participation in all activities and commerce which rely upon or promote the suffering or exploitation of not only fellow humans, but all sentient beings.

If you wanna really get radical with this, we would all have to make massive changes in our lives; some entailing considerable financial sacrifices. What about all the stuff made in China? I believe they have slave labor camps there. Every utility company or credit card company or bank, etc., which invests in, or supports the abortion industry or Planned Parenthood, or supports or does business with other companies which do the same, would have to be off limits for our business, as they are participating in the slaughter of the preborn. Arguably, we are helping maintain the culture of death in supporting them. People make this argument a lot. If we extend it to animals, that would introduce a host of new complications. It gets to the point where you would have to live in an igloo in Siberia in order to avoid all unethical or immoral entanglements with the "world" (Greek: cosmos, or world-system).

>What I've written here to this point does not depend on any particular religious or philosophical outlook. It presupposes nothing more than the capacity to feel compassion for any being capable of suffering.

Yes, but as a Christian, you have an obligation to explain your ethical system as consistent with biblical revelation.

>Much of the preceding material was written before my wife and I became Christians.

Maybe that's part of the problem. You may have retained elements of a pagan philosophy (however praiseworthy in itself, and in intent) that are in disharmony with biblical revelation. Most of us do that in one way or another. You're certainly not alone in that.

>It was our panzoism which, in part, paved the way for our return to faith in Christ, the Savior who bore the suffering of creation in His own body. Since our conversions we have realized that the Christian faith provides the most reasonable and consistent basis for the panzoist way of life. This makes it all the more tragic that Christendom - i.e. Christianity as a set of denominational institutions - has failed to fulfill its proper role in the vanguard of those who would bear the love of Christ in their hearts and bodies, and bring peace to a blood-soaked world.

Well, we'll see how well strict panzoism holds up in light of Scripture.

>Most meat-eating people in our society are able to live in a state of blissful ignorance regarding the violence inflicted on thousands of innocent beings every day in the routine course of providing the masters of the food chain with the meat they crave. Most of us never have to handle or interact with the animals we devour, much less kill and dismember them.

This is very true.

>But if we dare to inform ourselves about the industry of mass-slaughter, and if are hearts are not hardened and dead to compassion, we will be sorely troubled by the way humans treat weaker beings.

I agree. I am against the sort of ruthless, callous exploitation of animals that takes place, just as I oppose the same sort of non-lethal exploitation of the working class by greedy ethics-challenged corporate capitalists (not all wealthy capitalists — I hasten to add — , but many, fall into this category). And of course I am against abortion on these same grounds, and you should be, too — ALL abortion. I don't see you arguing that this hog here ought to be allowed to be tortured and killed because it's mother was raped by another hog, or because it was conceived as a result of sex between its father-hog and sister-hog.

>And if we already love an animal companion, such as a cat or dog, the haunting question is inevitable: why is it wrong to kill and eat my pet but appropriate to slaughter cows and pigs? (or pay people to do it for me!).

Because the Bible allows killing animals for food. I do agree that there is a certain disconnect between the two scenarios. But I would say that it is not inconsistent to love a being while killing them, anymore than it is inconsistent to kill an enemy in war without personally hating them.

>For me, vegetarianism requires no more basis than that; the mere fact that I can and do love even one animal dictates that I refrain, if at all possible, from harming any of them.

That doesn't follow. I could love my dog or cat or hamster, yet be forced to kill a wild bear attacking my daughter or a poisonous snake slithering into a nursery, or a great white shark coming after my grandmother at Cape Cod. There are also issues of self-defense here which apply to animals just as they apply to malevolent human beings.

>And to be the cause of suffering after having tasted the boundless love of Christ would be an act of sacrilege.

Inflicting suffering is a much more clear-cut case than all killing or use of animal products for food.

>In my experience of discussing panzoism with other Christians I have found all too many of them far more interested in finding biblical excuses to continue their carnivorous habits than in honestly confronting the magnitude of suffering to which they contribute with
their blood money.

I think that is true. Again, I note that to kill an animal swiftly is ethically different from causing them to suffer for months or years in order to be used in some fashion.

>Instead of asking, "Is this an opportunity to show the merciful love of Christ," their question seems to be "what can I get away with in the name of some bible verses?"

That may happen a lot, but there is also much biblical data that you have insufficiently grappled with, as I will show.

>It fills me with sorrow and bewilderment that fellow Christians who talk so easily of the love of Christ can so harden their hearts as to be stone-deaf to screams of pain and terror just because they don't come from humans.

It seems to be enough for many Christians to simply say, "look, Christ ate fish," and happily resume eating the steak on their plate, serene in their toothsome joy. Such cynical use of scripture is a transparent rationalization, as shown by the preference for looking historically
backward through scripture rather than prophetically forward to the peaceable Kingdom envisioned by Isaiah. I often wonder why Christians don't want to do whatever lies within their power to anticipate the promised Kingdom by renouncing violence and harm here and now. The habits of the palate are indeed powerful and hard to escape; it is no wonder that gluttony is one of the Seven Deadly Sins.

Nice sermon, but now I will show how it is a biblically-untenable position, on many grounds, and neither a "cynical" use of Scripture, nor necessarily a rationalization.

Passing over the issue of "dominion" (Gen 1:28) for the time being, you may argue that Adam and Eve were possibly vegetarians (based on, e.g., Gen 1:29-31 and 2:16). But alas, we find that God approved of animal sacrifice as early as Cain and Abel, where he accepted Abel's animal offering and rejected Cain's fruit offering (Genesis 4:2-5). If you argue that meat-eating came from the Fall, how do you explain the fact that God sanctions the killing of an animal in this fashion? Man may have fallen, but God doesn't change, and He cannot sanction an immoral, intrinisically evil act. Furthermore, right after the Fall, God Himself made Adam and Eve "garments of skin" (Gen 3:21). I would hardly expect Jesus, then, to be among the fur protesters.

The entire system of animal sacrifice in the Old Testament presupposes that it is not wrong to kill animals. The priests were commanded to eat the lamb that was slaughtered (see. e.g., Lev 6:26, 7:6). That would mean that God was commanding an utter evil. The Jews ate lamb at every Passover, as commanded by God.

This was all, of course, a precursor to the Sacrifice of Jesus on Calvary (book of Hebrews). Jesus is even referred to as the Lamb of God, slain before the foundation of the world. That would be interesting, if God can call Himself a name which is a direct reference to acts which you find intrinsically immoral (and acts which He commanded the Israelites to do regularly as part and parcel of the regular system of animal sacrifice under the Law (itself a divine revelation given to Moses on Mt. Sinai).

Furthermore, Jesus did not abolish this law at all, but rather, fufilled it (Matt 5:17). He observed the law Himself, and attended synagogue (e.g., Matt 4:23, Acts 18:19, many others), as did the early Christians before the complete separation of Judaism and Christianity. So they accepted the Law. Jesus and the disciples observed Passover (e.g., Jn 13:1, Mk 12:14). Jesus went to Jerusalem specifically to observe Passover, because He was an observant Jew (Jn 2:13,23; 12:1,12; 13:1). Mark 12:14 reads,

"And on the first day of Unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the passover lamb, his disciples said to him, 'Where will you have us go and prepare for you to eat the passover?'"

Jesus ate the Passover lamb (Mk 14:14, Lk 22:8,11,15, Mt 26:17-19). He was not a vegetarian at all. According to you, then, he sinned against charity, against lambs. The Last Supper, where the Eucharist was instituted, was a Passover feast (Mk 12:14-25, Lk 22:1-20, Mt 26:17-29, Jn 13:1 [implied]). Jesus, Joseph, and Mary observed the Passover when our Lord was growing up (Lk 2:41-42). The Eucharist was a direct parallel to the system of animal sacrifice: applied to Jesus in a sacramental way (Lk 22:17-20). St. Paul calls Jesus "our Passover" (1 Cor 5:7).

He could not have made such an anology if it was based on a practice itself wicked and indefensible and unloving. For that would mean that Jesus sinned and lacked charity, and that is not possible. If you say we should look forward to the coming kingdom and the lion laying down with the lamb, etc., then I immediately ask, "then why didn't Jesus do it and become our example to follow?"

Paul urged abstention from meat and wine not because they were evil or because it was uncharitable to the animals from which the meat came, but in cases of making a brother stumble (Rom 14:20-21). In other words, if meat-eating itself were wrong, Paul did not think so. He thought it could only voluntarily be renounced for the sake of others (precisely as I believe; I would never eat meat in front of you, on these very grounds, knowing that you were severely offended by it). In the same passage, he says "everything is clean." He expands upon this understanding in 1 Cor 10:25-26:

"Eat whatever is sold in the meat market without raising any question on the ground of conscience. For 'the earth is the Lord's, and everything in it.' "

The only meat that was to be avoided by command was that which was sacrificed to idols (1 Cor 10:19-21,27-29; Acts 15:28-29). If you try to argue that the Old Testament meat-eating and sacrificing system was somehow changed in the New Testament, I answer that God allowed even more meat to be eaten than was before. This is shown in St. Peter's vision at Joppa (Acts 10:12-13):

"[in the vision, Peter saw]. . . all kinds of animals and reptiles and birds of the air. And there came a voice to him, 'Rise, Peter; kill and eat.'"

Peter protests that he had never eaten ritually unclean foods under the Law (10:14). But he is answered, "What God has cleansed, you must not call common." (Acts 10:15). So much for biblically-harmonious ethically-obligatory vegetarianism . . .

Of course we all know how Jesus ate fish, even after His Resurrection (Jn 21:9-11). He performed the miracles of the feeding of the four thousand and five thousand, including fish (Mk 8:2-8; Mt 15:32-38). He chose several fishermen to be His disciples; He helped them have a good catch (Jn 21:4-8). he even compares the kingdom of God in one parable to a great catch of fish. Fishing involves suffering for the fish (though far less than what pigs and bulls (or minks) go through. They flop around before they die and are in obvious discomfort. If they are caught with a hook, they suffer that pain as well. So Jesus and many of His disciples were big sinners, being cruel to all these fish?

Lastly, God gave the Jews in the wilderness quail to eat (Numbers 11:18-33).

The biblical evidence seems compelling then: meat may be eaten and it is no sin at all. Jesus gave no indication that this was to cease. But I see no indication of mistreatment of animals, unless you include what fish experience when they are caught.

>As for Jesus' consumption of fish (the only flesh he his documented as eating, the sometimes-assumed Passover lamb being nothing more than conjecture),

It's not conjecture at all. It is historical fact that He observed Passover, and that eating a lamb was part of that. No one can dispute this. His own description as the "Lamb of God" reflects this, because He, too, was sacrificed as an atonement for sins, and His flesh and blood were eaten sacramentally and miraculously in the Eucharist.

>it is irrelevant for us today, in American society, unless the only meat you ever eat is fish.

Not at all. As I showed, God and the disciples explicitly sanctioned meat-eating. Paul even says, "eat whatever you find at the meat market." Christianity moved towards an even wider range of meat-eating than Judaism, with its prohibition of pig-meat and other unclean foods.

>Consider the recently popular WWJD (What Would Jesus Do?) motto and then ask yourself: How do you imagine Jesus would react if you accompanied Him on a tour of a modern slaughterhouse?

He would recommend, I think, that a quick method of killing these poor creatures was adopted, regardless of the loss of profit. But He would not recommend a total cessation of all killing of animals, nor vegetarianism.

>The rubber meets the road here. Christians who seriously consider the issue of vegetarianism need to confront their beliefs about Jesus and his compassion. I think in order to justify
continuing one's economic participation in our carnivorous culture, such a Christian would have to conclude (most implausibly) that Jesus would give his blessing to our industrial abattoirs. If you can believe that, I can't imagine anything that could change your mind, and wouldn't waste my time trying.

He would oppose mistreatment, I firmly believe.

>Another point to be made to meat-eaters who cite Jesus' fish-eating in their defense, is that Jesus - and the Bible in general - tolerated slavery, yet virtually no Christian today would dream of defending slavery on that basis (though, sadly, this was done not so many generations ago).

The Bible gives the principles which would eventually render slavery obsolete. And even the slavery it did sanction was under many ethical injunctions as to proper treatment (this was not followed by many American slaveholders, needless to say). With meat-eating, however, there is no indication at all that it is a siun or that it would or should eventually be abolished. Quite the contrary; it is positively recommended, as shown. Peter is virtually commanded to kill animals and eat them, in a supernatural vision.

>In general I find that the use of Scripture in defense of one's preferences or habits is extremely selective.

Oftentimes it is, yes. But if you wish to dispute all that I have produced above, you have your work cut out for you, believe me. You can always, of course, pick and choose what you like and don't like in Scripture, according to your preconceived preferences and opinions. But then you would be doing what you just condemned, wouldn't you? So you have to overthrow all of the above data. Good luck!

>The simple question I pose to anyone who is genuinely willing to face this issue is this: Why should we continue needlessly to do violence to innocent beings? It is a plain fact that we in the technologically advanced nations do not need to harm other creatures in order to pursue our lives happily.

We shouldn't do it "needlessly." I completely agree, as you know.

>Therefore, we all ought to answer this question: Is there any reason which could possibly justify such practices?

No.

>I believe that most people, when they openly and honestly grapple with this question, will find it difficult if not impossible to continue a violence-based, exploitative lifestyle. And if they are also Christians, they must bear an extra burden of conscience whenever the
subject of innocent suffering is raised.

Yes.

>Having asserted that there is no need to harm other beings, I may be challenged to defend this claim. Let us consider the issue together. First, it is certainly true that we do not need to eat the flesh of animals to survive. We are not carnivores.

That's correct. But you need plenty of non-meat protein to do that: lots of grains, nuts, dairy products (if you allow that).

>We are omnivorous in the strict sense, in that we are capable of digesting both vegetable and animal foods. However, it is becoming increasingly clear in the light of medical research in recent years that humans are generally healthier on a vegetarian diet than when regularly consuming meat. Our digestive system is not optimally suited for digesting meat, and we see widespread consequences in high cholesterol, clogged arteries and heart disease. (There may be cases of medical conditions - Dave Armstrong cited his own situation - in which an individual is unable to thrive on a vegetarian diet, but this is rare and of no avail to the vast meat- eating majority.)

My choice is not based on a "medical; condition" but purely on aesthetics. I simply grew tired of red meat and found it distasteful (in the larger sense). If that helps the cause of animals in slaughterhouses, so much the better. I do eat fish and chicken and turkey occasionally. How much do turkeys and chickens suffer during their "processing"? I eat tons of milk products (ice cream, cheese, yogut, etc.). How much do cows suffer? Not much that I can see. As long as you get enough protein, you can go completely vegetarian, but many people have found that they get quite weak and need some meat or fish as a supplement to that diet.

>Secondly, it is not necessary to wear clothing derived from animal products, though avoiding all such clothing does pose a much greater challenge than abstaining from meat.

I don't see how. It's easy not to buy a fur coat. There are plenty of synthetic insulations. I'm not sure if down harms the ducks and geese it is taken from. Getting wool doesn't harm sheep. I don't know how leather works: what is entailed in that. I've wanted a black leather jacket my whole life, and finally got one last year. Cotton and all the synthetic fibers involve no animals at all. What I have on right now is virtually all cotton, with maybe a little synthetic stuff. I have a leather watchband. :-)

>It is gradually becoming more feasible to do this because there are synthetic alternatives to every essential article of animal-derived attire.

Yep.

>However, whether it is feasible for any particular person to completely avoid animal-derived clothing depends on how this would affect that individual. For example, a person whose feet are uninjured and of a typical size may easily obtain appropriate synthetic shoes, but if one needs an unusual size shoe, or orthopedic shoes, or must use orthotic devices, the search for synthetic shoes can be almost impossible (just as it might be for leather shoes).

I would like to learn what is involved in leather production.

>It is also very feasible to reject many common items of everyday use that are derived from animal byproducts and/or tested on animals. Cruelty-free alternatives are widely available for cosmetics, household chemical products like detergents, shampoos and deodorants, and sundry other such items taken for granted in our civilization.

That would be a huge project, too. But I agree in principle.

>Beyond that point the issue becomes more challenging and controversial. What about medical drugs and medical procedures that have been tested on animals or manufactured with animal byproducts? This is a very divisive issue, and understandably so. People are inclined to pose the issue in stark terms, as, for example, a choice between the life of my child and the life of a rat. Although this is a simplistic and rhetorically charged view of the problem, we can't deny that there is a real ethical issue that is confronted by anyone who wants to forego all
violence, yet must turn to medical science when seeking relief for the suffering of themselves or their loved ones.

I'm inclined to think that God would permit such testing for the sake of human beings, but I agree that this poses somewhat of an ethical dilemma, far more than not eating meat, where I see no case whatsoever in the Bible.

>CS Lewis, for example, was an outspoken anti-vivisectionist and Christian, but I doubt that he abstained from medications - and, in any case, he (inexplicably!) ate meat.

Yes. I'm not sure how all that is connected. For what pourpose fdo they do vivisection?

>There are some proponents of animal liberation that are intransigent on this issue no less than on vegetarianism: animals must not be harmed - period - for any purpose. However, while it is true that the suffering of any creature is never good or innocuous in itself, it seems at least arguable, in Christian terms, that compensatory goods for humans might outweigh the evil of our sacrifice of innocents in the cause of medical research.

What if all such animals were put to sleep or anesthetized during the research? That seems to be a happy medium, and a possible compromise. If the argument is that they shouldn't feel pain, then we can prevent much of that, just as we do in humans. If it is only wrong if they suffer, then it isn't wrong to do things when they feel nothing.

>One might even try to draw an analogy to the horrific death of Christ, which was, paradoxically, our greatest good. This is why I would assign this issue the lowest priority of moral persuasion, and vegetarianism the highest.

The OT system of animal sacrifice was all meant to prefigure Jesus' death. He is the "Lamb of God" and the "Passover Lamb." Therefore, it was good.

>Nevertheless, I believe that in an ideal world it would not even occur to any sensitive person to exploit another sentient being for any purpose, just as most people now would never even consider harming another human even if that was the only means of saving someone else's life.

"Most people" don't hold that position, which is extreme pacifism. We don't have to make animals suffer if we kill them swiftly. Hunters perform a great service to, e.g., the deer population, because it is a known fact that without hunting, a great many of them would suffer terribly and starve every winter. So it is instant death by a gun shot or a slow, tortuous death in the elements.

And, of course, nature itself is every bit as cruel to all sorts of animals as men are to them. I need not elaborate. If you say all that is because of the Fall, it still remains true that God allowed it to happen, and that the natural world involves things like the food chain and insects eating each other, and the T-Rex, and large snakes eating rabbits and sharks and tigers and queen bees devouring their male lovers, and spiders eating alive their helpless prey; all sorts of lovely things like that. We actually prevent many animals from being exposed to such hideous potentialities.

>In such a world the present situation could not even arise, where we are faced with the option of availing ourselves of medical methods of dubious moral status when we face desperate situations.

Being kind to animals is a good Christian virtue. But we can kill them for food. There is nothing wrong with that, according to God, as He has revealed to us in His revelation.

>Honest disagreement over this particular issue need not and should not be a cause of strife among people who can at least be united in their concern that the unnecessary infliction of suffering is to be avoided to the utmost degree consistent with conscience. Ethical choices are faced every day in whether to consume medications that are tested on animals or whether to allow an operation that was tested on animals, etc. When no other alternatives exist or when the alternatives have not worked, we are left with difficult decisions. We may differ in some of the particulars of our choices while nevertheless sharing a common ultimate goal. Surely our goal should be a peaceful world where no sentient beings are intentionally harmed, and where the temptation to do so is a thing of the past because we have found means of promoting our welfare that do not depend on such violence. Emotions run high from all who are concerned but the one thing we should be able to agree on is to actively promote the search for alternatives to animal research methods.

I do agree. Well-stated.

>I recognize the difficulty involved in making sweeping changes in one's everyday lifestyle and behavior, especially when living in a society that is generally so hostile to the commitment to peaceful existence.

Christians must make a lot of difficult choices, if they are to be consistent disciples of Jesus.

>It is nevertheless imperative that we all take some steps toward establishing our civilization on a foundation of peace among all the inhabitants of our planet. The cost to each of us, especially for vegetarianism alone, is some inconvenience and psychological adjustment. The cost of rejecting this noble goal, however, is continued bloodshed and suffering on a terrifying scale.

Nothing is more terrifying and evil than abortion. I will always see that as a gross inconsistency in your position, but maybe you are changing your mind, as you have indicated is a possibility.

>Dave Armstrong has recently written: "Christians ought to oppose all unnecessary cruel treatment of animals (e.g., painful traps, excessive hardships in research and caged environments …" Yet he views vegetarianism as optional. Any informed person knows that meat obtained by typical means (bought in stores) is derived from conditions of unspeakable cruelty to the animals on whose flesh we feast. No fair and reasonable person who uses English in a normal way could possibly claim that the savagely cruel methods of today's industrial slaughterhouses are necessary. Therefore, for a Christian living in typical urban or suburban circumstances, vegetarianism is a no-brainer, and anything but optional.

I agree with this, and find it troubling, as you do. I'm not sure how badly chickens are treated. I don't agree that we can't even eat fish. If Jesus did, that's good enough for me, as He is my example. The apostles did, too, and they are also our models for behavior.

>I wonder if so many conservative Christians would be so antagonistic to animal liberation if they really believed, like Dave Armstrong, that it's a biblical idea that people have a moral obligation to treat animals well and minimize their suffering, "to oppose all unnecessary cruel treatment of animals." Clearly most Christians do not believe that. Does any informed person seriously believe that industrial slaughterhouses treat animals well, much less minimize their suffering?

If they killed them quickly, with minimal suffering, they could be ethically justified.

>What I often observe is Christians giving lip-service to an ethic of kindness to animals, while continuing their habit of procuring meat from the local supermarket. This is, at best, culpable ignorance, and, at worst, hypocrisy in need of repentance.

I want to hear other opinions, too. I like provocative discussions. I've almost made a career out of them. :-)

>I'm sure that most Christians, if asked by a pollster, would say they care about animals and would claim to treat animals well and avoid unnecessary cruelty. People do like to feel good about themselves, after all, so if forced to confront this issue, most Christians would
say what one 'should' say. But after the question or discussion has passed, they resume their typical American consumer lifestyle and give nary a thought to how that meat in the supermarket was treated while it was still alive.

That's true. We give very little thought to anything at all, I'm afraid. That's part of what my ministry is about, too: to get people to think, and to think Christianly.

>Furthermore, even if, as Dave Armstrong and countless Christians contend, we are permitted by God to eat animals, and thereby permitted to kill them for that purpose, it by no means follows that we are permitted to give financial support to the meat industry.

Correct.

>After all, as Dave says, we shouldn't support "unnecessary cruelty." And thus the typical American lifestyle is indicted simply by the biblical ethic mandating treating animals with kindness. In other words, even if we believe we can continue to take their lives under SOME circumstances, the question is, WHAT circumstances? Do those particular circumstances conform to the biblical ethic of kindness in which we purport to believe? If not, we are presumably called upon to make certain sacrifices, certain inconvenient adjustments, lest our profession of a vital biblical principle be exposed as empty rhetoric.

I agree again.

>I don't mean to single out Christians for criticism; most people, Christian or not, conduct their lives in terms of relatively unreflective convenience. The reason I'm discussing Christians specifically now is because of Dave Armstrong's invitation to me to hold forth on the relation between Christian faith and panzoism (vegetarianism and/or animal liberation).

Understood. And because you are a Christian yourself, and need to synthesize your beliefs with biblical revelation and almost universal Christian practice in eating.

>I have also observed that some Christians who oppose the cause of animal liberation (Charles Colson comes to mind) like to characterize panzoism as an anti-Christian, even naturalistic and Darwinian, philosophy.

I will make that determination as I observe how you deal with the biblical texts I produced. :-) If you try to dismiss them at every turn, then I will conclude that you 1) reject biblical inspiration, and/or 2) that non-Christian philosophies have overcome Christian ones in you, with regard to this matter.

>This would be funny if the slander weren't so widely accepted. The truth is that no ideology could be less conducive to panzoism than Darwinism. And I don't know where one would get the idea that panzoism is essentially naturalistic.

That's a good point. Naturalism causes immense suffering. "Dog eat dog." But that doesn't mean there are no "anti-naturalistic pagan, non-Christian philosophies.

>Of course it's true that there is not a singular and consistent metaphysical philosophy underlying the animal liberation movement. For example, Peter Singer, a utilitarian and atheist, is one of the principal philosophers behind the movement.

Just as there are atheist pro-lifers, such as Nat Hentoff and (formerly) Bernard Nathanson (he is now a Catholic).

>However, there is nothing essentially naturalistic about panzoism, any more than it's essentially theistic.

Granted. But revelation would give it an objectivity and obligatory nature on a more solid ground than atheism could.

>In fact, I believe panzoism's proper and logical foundation is Christian theism and the biblical concept of humans as benevolent stewards of God's creation. It is our glory as creatures bearing the divine image - albeit tarnished - that we can choose not to kill or harm weaker creatures.

God has a big ethical problem then (which becomes your problem in defending this).

>You can't get less Darwinian and more Christlike than that. And I'm happy to see that Christians are increasingly coming to the awareness that they belong in the vanguard of the animal liberation movement, just as they once were in the anti-slavery movement, and are now in the anti-abortion movement.

Yes.

>I urge you to take steps, if you haven't done so already, such as adopting a vegetarian diet - no meat of any kind -and ideally, if feasible, a vegan diet and lifestyle. (Veganism is abstention from consumption or any kind of use of animals or animal byproducts. This has ramifications for choices of clothing, household products, and so forth, as well as dietary change.) This rejection of socially sanctioned violence has been embraced by an increasing number of people in recent years. My wife and I are trying to do our small part to further this transformation of civilization. These words are not intended to demean anyone nor to emotionally manipulate anyone. I only want to provide people - especially my fellow Christians - with the challenging opportunity to think long and deeply about the malignant effects of maintaining a society based on violence to innocent beings, and consider the glorious possibility of extending the love and grace of our Lord and Savior to the weaker of earth's inhabitants, who have suffered so much and so long at human hands.

May God grant us wisdom!
Isaiah 11:6-9; Romans 8:19-22

Thanks for your thoughts. I enjoyed this, and look forward to your reply.

*****

I "discovered" another good proof of the biblical (and Jesus') sanction of meat-eating in the readings at Mass yesterday. It's in the parable of the prodigal son, told, of course, by Jesus (Luke 15:11-32).

Note how when the son returns, the father is jubilant, and celebrates in the following manner:

". . . bring the fatted calf and kill it, and let us eat and make merry." (Luke 11:23; cf. 11:27)

This shows a lot of things:

1. One could kill an animal for the reason of celebration (in addition to nutrition).

2. By implication, Jews (including Jesus Himself) ate beef.

3. The calf was prepared specifically for human consumption ("fatted"). I believe that is what this means, though I might be mistaken.

One might quibble that this is simply a story, so what does that prove? Well, all parables are meant as parallels or analogies which illustrate God and the kingdom of God. The father represents God, so if he is killing a calf for celebration, then this must be an ethical thing; quite the opposite of unethical. Jesus can't use an immoral action as representative of what God would do — to explain His actions or intentions.

Sogn has already indicated his way out of all this: he will simply assume a critical stance towards the Bible where it disagrees with his view. I refuse to argue that in this context, as biblical inspiration and inerrancy is an entirely separate discussion (involving examination of the usual unsavory and incoherent liberal so-called "higher critical" methodologies).

I'm interested in biblical (not higher critical) rationales for vegetarianism. As far as I am concerned, it is an utterly impossible case to make. So if Sogn has to question every text that personally gives him pause because of a pre-commitment to vegetarianism, then to me that is proof positive (practically the best conceivable proof) that he has conceded the biblical case and abandoned a consistent biblical exegesis in support of his position — if not in so many words, then by virtue of his actions.

I don't mean to be presumptuous, but this was the impression I got from some of Sogn's remarks. If I have incorrectly stated my objection and his views, I apologize and eagerly await Sogn's counter-exegesis of the abundant biblical evidences against vegetarianism that I have compiled.

Dialogue on My Critique of James White's Book, "Mary -- Another Redeemer?" (vs. "BJ Bear")

A discussion along these lines started up on the very large, anti-Catholic-dominated CARM Catholic Discussion Board. For background, see my (co-written) paper (which BJB is critiquing):

"Whitewashing History": Critique of James White's Book, Mary -- Another Redeemer? (William Possidento and Dave Armstrong vs. James White)

Lutheran BJ Bear's remarks will be preceded by "BJ" (and/or are in blue) and mine by "DA". Citations of William Possidento's portion of the paper will be preceded by "WP" and my statements in the paper under consideration by "DA*". My older words will be in purple.

WP: St. Irenaeus wrote, for example, of Christ as the pure one opening purely that pure womb which regenerates men unto God (Against Heresies IV,33,11) - words with which Irenaeus credited the Virgin’s womb and assigns to her a universal motherhood. Writing of the economy, that is, the plan of salvation, St. Irenaeus remarked ..without Joseph's action, Mary was the only one to cooperate in the economy... (Against Heresies III, 21,5, in Miravalle, p. 178). Contemplate that. St. Irenaeus gave, with those words, a second century statement of belief that Mary had a unique role in the plan of salvation.

St. Irenaeus wrote of Mary c.190-200, in Proof of the Apostolic Preaching:

"Adam [had to be recapitulated] in Christ, so that death might be swallowed up in immortality, and Eve in Mary, so that the Virgin, having become another virgin’s advocate, might destroy and abolish one virgin’s disobedience by the obedience of another virgin."

(Proof of the Apostolic Preaching 33, Sources Chrétiennes 62 , pp. 83-86, in Gambero, p. 54, brackets in Gambero, boldface mine)

DA: This is evidence of the mediatrix doctrine in a primitive, relatively undeveloped sense, as seen in his words, "Mary was the only one to cooperate in the economy" and in the general idea of Mary as the New Eve or Second Eve. Elsewhere (Mary as Mediatrix: The Patristic, Medieval, and Early Orthodox Evidence) I have recorded similar aspects of St. Irenaeus' teaching:

St. Irenaeus (130-202), in his famous Against Heresies (bet. 180-199) wrote:

". . . so also Mary . . . being obedient, was made the cause of salvation for herself and for the whole human race . . . Thus, the knot of Eve's disobedience was loosed by the obedience of Mary. What the virgin Eve had bound in unbelief, the Virgin Mary loosed through faith."

(3,22,4; from Jurgens, W.A., The Faith of the Early Fathers, Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press,
1970, vol. 1, p. 93, #224)

". . . for in no other way can that which is tied be untied unless the very windings of the knot are gone through in reverse: so that the first joints are loosed through the second, and the second in turn free the first . . . Thus, then, the knot of the disobedience of Eve was untied
through the obedience of Mary."

(Against Heresies, III, 22,4; from Most, William G., Mary in Our Life, Garden City, NY: Doubleday Image, 1954, 25)

William Most comments:

"Mary, says St. Irenaeus, undoes the work of Eve. Now it was not just in a remote way that Eve had been involved in original sin: she shared in the very ruinous act itself. Similarly, it would seem, Mary ought to share in the very act by which the knot is untied -- that is, in Calvary itself."

(in Most, ibid., 25)

"Just as the human race was bound over to death through a virgin, so was it saved through a virgin: the scale was balanced -- a virgin's disobedience by a virgin's obedience."

(Against Heresies, V, 19, 1; cited in Most, ibid., 274)

Protestants like BJ often act as if this is extraordinary special pleading to see in remarks such as these a kernel of the notion of mediatrix or the always vastly-misunderstood term, "co-redemptrix". Funny, then, that the well-known Protestant patristics scholar J.N.D. Kelly doesn't think so (he precisely agrees with me):

The real contribution of these early centuries, however, was more positively theological, and consisted in representing Mary as the antithesis of Eve and drawing out the implications of this. Justin was the pioneer, although the way he introduced the theme suggests that he was not innovating . . . Tertullian and Irenaeus were quick to develop these ideas. The latter, in particular, argued [Against Heresies, 3, 22, 4; cf. 5, 19, 1] that Eve, while still a virgin, had proved disobedient and so became the cause of death both for herself and for all mankind, but Mary, also a virgin, obeyed and became the cause of salvation both for herself and for all mankind. "Thus, as the human race was bound fast to death through a virgin, so through a virgin it was saved." Irenaeus further hinted both at her universal motherhood and at her cooperation in Christ's saving work, describing [Ibid, 4, 33, 1] her womb as "that pure womb which regenerates men to God."

(Early Christian Doctrines, San Francisco: HarperCollins, revised edition of 1978, 493-494, emphases added)

So we see that William Possidento and myself were merely citing most of the same passages that Kelly cites, and interpreting them in precisely the same way. Even Bishop White is not a Church historian, so if it comes down to a conflict of historical fact between White and Kelly, it is obvious who has the advantage and who can be trusted for the facts. And that is not all one can find by way of Protestant historians. How about Philip Schaff? He writes:

The development of the orthodox Mariology and Mariolatry originated as early as the second century in an allegorical interpretation of the history of the fall, and in the assumption of an antithetic relation of Eve and Mary, according to which the mother of Christ occupies the same position in the history of redemption as the wife of Adam in the history of sin and death [Rom 5:12 ff., 1 Cor 15:22] . . . Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, and Tertullian, are the first who present Mary as the counterpart of Eve, as a "mother of all living" in the higher, spiritual sense, and teach that she became through her obedience the mediate or instrumental cause of the blessings of redemption to the human race, as Eve by her disobedience was the fountain of sin and death.

[Footnote: "Even St. Augustine carries this parallel between the first and second Eve as far as any of the fathers . . . "]

(History of the Christian Church, Vol. III: Nicene and Post-Nicene Christianity: A.D. 311-600, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1974; reproduction of fifth edition of 1910, 414-415, emphases added. This work is available in its entirety online, too)

But James White makes the following profoundly ignorant historical summation:

"...the idea of Mary as Coredemptrix or Mediatrix completely absent from the Bible and from the early Church, it does not have its origin in history but in this kind of piety or religious devotion that is focused upon Mary." [pp. 75-76 of White's book]

This being the case, I have the utmost sympathy and compassion for "BJ Bear" in his effort to defend such a ridiculously wrongheaded point of view. The old wise proverb says that "you can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear," but maybe BJ and White can somehow pretend that these notions were absent from history, when they clearly were not, according to Protestant historians Kelly and Schaff (two of the very best and most-cited, at that). Best wishes! I don't envy you. And I think we can already see one reason why Bishop White won't come out from behind his word-processor and defend his own historical absurdities from his book.

Furthermore, Lutheran historian Jaroslav Pelikan (who converted to Orthodoxy after the following was written), observed the true focus of patristic and Catholic Mariology, during St. Irenaeus' time:

. . . as Christian piety and reflection sought to probe the deeper meaning of salvation, the parallel between Christ and Adam found its counterpart in the picture of Mary as the Second Eve . . . in is fundamental motifs the development of the Christian picture of Mary and the eventual emergence of a Christian doctrine of Mary must be seen in the context of the development of devotion to Christ and, of course, of the development of the doctrine of Christ.

For it mattered a great deal for christology whether or not one had the right to call Mary Theotokos [Mother of God] . . . an apt formula for their belief that in the incarnation deity and humanity were united so closely . . . It was a way of speaking about Christ at least as muich as a way of speaking about Mary.

(The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, Vol. I: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600), University of Chicago Press, 1971, 242-243)

DA: The concept (in early development) of mediatrix was there in the quotes themselves and in the summary of Irenaeus' teaching by Kelly and Schaff, where they actually relate it to "redemption" and "salvation" and use words like "mediate" and "instrumental" with regard to Mary's place in the economy of redemption. The word no more has to be present than the word "Trinity" has to be in the Bible, in order to think that the teaching is there.

Co-redemptrix is also implicit in the concept of Second Eve, by its very nature, as shown above. It's not just development (though that is a crucial component of this discussion), but the fact that the concept of New Eve was already in full force at this early stage (as early as Justin Martyr, who died in 165 -- and Kelly says it looks like he was just passing on what he received).

It is not necessary to have a "Roman Catholic notion of development of doctrine" in order to accept this development, but to have whatever kind of development Schaff and Pelikan and Kelly accept (since they are not Catholics). This is the whole point. It's not a "Catholic thing"; it is an "historical thing." Schaff detests the very doctrines he is describing, and makes no bones about it, but he is also (invariably) an honest historian who presents the facts -- whatever he thinks of them.

White detests the doctrines, too, but then tries to vainly pretend that they were absent from patristic history. This is the difference, and this is one of a multitude of reasons why I have long maintained that White is a sophist and special pleader.

In my portion of the book review I made elaborate and involved arguments showing that White himself accepts development in one area but denies it in another, and his criteria for doing so are completely arbitrary, self-contradictory, and instances of glaring double standards.

Development of Mariology is no different than development of any other doctrine. One may quibble with it because it is supposedly so "unbiblical," but then one would have to also toss out the canon of Scripture, which is absolutely unbiblical. Etc. I've made all the arguments.

I read the response to White as far as the first three proposed substantive points. I don't know what White wrote but after looking up the first three citations I stopped reading the response because it is simply a matter of three strikes and you're out!

DA: I see. Then I am "out" with Kelly, Pelikan, and Schaff. I'd much rather be in their "camp" than in yours and James White's (nothing personal).

I'll be back later to demonstrate how the first three citations were abused in the response if you or someone else hasn't already done so in detail.

DA: I can't wait. It's certainly an uphill battle after this additional documentation I have provided.

* * * * *

As far as I am concerned, so far, not one thing I have contended has been overthrown or refuted. It was claimed (by White and his defenders) that St. Irenaeus taught not a thing about Mary Mediatrix. I responded with Protestant historians Kelly and Schaff (and a bit indirectly), Pelikan, who thought quite otherwise. It was claimed that I was demanding people to accept a presupposed Catholic version of development of doctrine. I showed how that was not the case, and my extensive reasoning for why I think that, in the review itself, needs to be dealt with.

Oh, and BJ Bear managed to discover a typo of "not" added to a citation of Pelikan by my co-author William Possidento (for which I thank him). As the addition weakened the argument a Catholic would make, rather than strengthen it, we can safely dispose of the potential charge of deliberate dishonesty and gross scholarly incompetence (BJ's frequent tactic vis-a-vis his opponents — as he has done with me twice — see an example in the CARM post above).

So we don't have much substance so far. Let's see how much can be produced . . .

*****

I currently think it is possible to clearly demonstrate Irenaeus' meaning in the first three quotes such that a reasonable person will be able to preclude the conclusions of artisans determined to fashion the wax nose of their choice out of Irenaeus' words.

That would include (as I have already pointed out) the interpretation of Protestant historians J.N.D. Kelly and Philip Schaff (and arguably a bit more indirectly, Jaroslav Pelikan's as well). By simple logic, then, BJ is contending that neither is a "reasonable" person, and that they are "artisans" or examples of "a papal propagandist or other religious authority claiming or laying claim to ultimate spiritual authority and infallibility" (a description BJ used in another post on this same URL as a veiled reference to me). And that is quite unreasonable (in fact, ludicrous). If BJ wants to self-destruct and reduce his own argument to absurdity right in front of our eyes, he is most welcome to do so. Makes my job all that much easier.

Nailing down the details is time consuming.

Indeed it is, especially if the details will sink your case. This was BJ's tactic in our big discussion about a Luther quote, too (documented in the comments for the "CARM" thread above). Once I got too "detailed" and demonstrated exactly what happened, so that I wasn't at fault at all, BJ was nowhere to be found. Too many "details" make one uncomfortable if they don't support one's case.

So, "better" to condescend and wax confident, while saying little. It won't work. But it does provide a bit of entertainment on a certain superficial psychological level.

*****

St. Irenaeus wrote, for example, of Christ as the pure one opening purely that pure womb which regenerates men unto God (Against Heresies IV,33,11) - words with which Irenaeus credited the Virgin’s womb and assigns to her a universal motherhood. Writing of the economy, that is, the plan of salvation, St. Irenaeus remarked ..without Joseph's action, Mary was the only one to cooperate in the economy… (Against Heresies III, 21,5, in Miravalle, p. 178). Contemplate that. St. Irenaeus gave, with those words, a second century statement of belief that Mary had a unique role in the plan of salvation.

Actually, the above comments are William Possidento's at this point (just to clarify). My arguments in the review were mostly analogical ones dealing mostly with development of doctrine, whereas his were textual ones from the Fathers and James White's own book.

In fighting heresy, one may express points of Mariology, just as he might express various aspects of christology, soteriology, anthropology, theology proper, etc. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure that out. If you are fighting heretical theology, you have to give orthodox theology to counter it (in fact, fighting error is often the occasion for some of the most elaborate expositions of orthodox theology, as a counterpoint; e.g., St. Augustine's reactions to the Manichees and Donatists and Pelagians).

And if Mary is mentioned in any "theological" way, that is Mariology, pure and simple. It may be very primitive and undeveloped (of course it is, in the second century (Irenaeus' era), though it is remarkably and surprisingly well-developed, given Protestant hostile assumptions about how little it should be by this time), but it remains Mariology because it offers some theology and interpretation of Mary.

Catholics have always stated that Mariology is christocentric, and that this was its primary purpose. It was to safeguard the deity and incarnation of Jesus. You guys are the ones who try to make out that we are somehow separating Mary from her Son Jesus, as some sort of ridiculous rival "goddess." So now we have to be accused of the caricature that you try to make out is our belief, that we always deny, and you see this as some "debating point"? :-)

This is precisely why I cited Jaroslav Pelikan, in agreement with Catholic theology and perspective:

[I]n its fundamental motifs the development of the Christian picture of Mary and the eventual emergence of a Christian doctrine of Mary must be seen in the context of the development of devotion to Christ and, of course, of the development of the doctrine of Christ.

But somehow you miss that "detail" because (apparently) you are so uninterested in my first response that you repeat things already dealt with in it, and agreed-to. Weird . . . but this is common in the Protestant response to Catholic apologetics. It's almost as if we are talking but the words don't register. Many times in debates like this, I find myself repeating the argument I just made, because my opponent acts as if I never made it, in the very structure and thrust of his "response." It's very frustrating, and a bit insulting, I must say. In effect, you are forcing us to "believe" only what you want us to believe (i.e., the polemical caricature of "Catholicism"), no matter what we say; no matter how many times we clarify, till we're blue in the face. Even when we fully agree with you, you don't want to believe it.

You haven't proven that to argue about Christ necessarily excludes discussion of Mary, as if the two are like oil and water or two magnetic poles. In fact, the long citation you just provided puts the lie to this. Mariology was (and is) a subset of christology. This is how Irenaeus approaches it, and how the Catholic Church does, as well.

Secondly, when people are presenting a primitive, undeveloped form of a doctrine, they don't themselves know how far it will be developed in the future, by definition. If they did, there would be no development! But there is development, of every doctrine. The canon of Scripture developed; so did original sin, and the Hypostatic Union, and trinitarianism, and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and Mariology, and sacramentology, and the doctrine of the atonement, and eucharistic theology. Irenaeus would have been incapable of presenting, e.g., the full intricate doctrine of the Hypostatic Union, which was fully-developed at the Council of Chalcedon in 451.

St. Irenaeus wrote, for example, of Christ as the pure one opening purely that pure womb which regenerates men unto God (Against Heresies IV,33,11) - words with which Irenaeus credited the Virgin’s womb and assigns to her a universal motherhood.

First of all, this is not just Catholic "special pleading" and "anachronistically reading our 'papist' views back into the 2nd century. I cited J.N.D. Kelly arriving at the same exact same conclusion about this very passage:

Irenaeus further hinted both at her universal motherhood and at her cooperation in Christ's saving work, describing her womb as 'that pure womb which regenerates men to God.'

So how is it that I am somehow the unreasonable one even though I can cite one of the leading Protestant patristic experts in exact agreement with my interpretation of Irenaeus? This gets old. But I'll pray for patience and keep refuting what you write as long as I can stand your utter ignoring of my arguments.

Schaff (repeat, REPEAT) also asserts a "universal motherhood" as an early patristic belief:

Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, and Tertullian, are the first who present Mary as the counterpart of Eve, as a 'mother of all living' in the higher, spiritual sense, and teach that she became through her obedience the mediate or instrumental cause of the blessings of redemption to the human race, . . .

Writing of the economy, that is, the plan of salvation, St. Irenaeus remarked ..without Joseph's action, Mary was the only one to cooperate in the economy… (Against Heresies III, 21,5, in Miravalle, p. 178). Contemplate that. St. Irenaeus gave, with those words, a second century statement of belief that Mary had a unique role in the plan of salvation.

The passage From St. Irenaeus is actually from Against Heresies, III, 21, 7, as Miravelle indicated in his notes. Here is the whole passage (emphasis added):

7. On this account also, Daniel, foreseeing His advent, said that a stone, cut out without hands, came into this world. For this is what "without hands" means, that His coming into this world was not by the operation of human hands, that is, of those men who are accustomed to stone-cutting; that is, Joseph taking no part with regard to it, but Mary alone co-operating with the pre-arranged plan. For this stone from the earth derives existence from both the power and the wisdom of God. Wherefore also Isaiah says: "Thus saith the Lord, Behold, I deposit in the foundations of Zion a stone, precious, elect, the chief, the corner-one, to be had in honour." So, then, we understand that His advent in human nature was not by the will of a man, but by the will of God.

Miravalle gives the Latin of the relevant phrase: sola Maria cooperante dispositioni.

James White claims that mediation and co-redemption are "completely absent" from "the early Church." But Kelly, writing about Irenaeus' Mariology, uses descriptive words like "cause of salvation," "through a virgin it was saved," "universal motherhood," "cooperation in Christ's saving work," and "[her womb] regenerates men." Schaff uses words like "The development of the orthodox Mariology and Mariolatry originated as early as the second century," "redemption," 'mother of all living'," and "mediate or instrumental cause of the blessings of redemption to the human race." What more does one need?

Furthermore, a few centuries later, these concepts became extremely explicit in some of the Fathers (precisely as we would expect from the nature of development itself). So. e.g., St. Ambrose of Milan (c. 339-397) wrote:

Mary was alone when the Holy Spirit came upon her and overshadowed her. She was alone when she saved the world — operata est mundi salutem - and when she conceived the redemption of all — concepit redemptionem universorum.

(in Miravelle, Mark I., editor, Mary: Coredemptrix, Mediatrix, Advocate: Theological Foundations, Santa Barbara, CA: Queenship Publishing, 1995, p. 14; from Epist. 49,2; ML 16, 1154)

And:

She engendered redemption for humanity, she was carrying, in her womb, the remission of sins.

(in Miravelle, ibid., p. 14; from De Mysteriis III, 13; ML 16,393; De instit. Virginis 13,81; ML 16,325)

St. Ephraem of Syria (c. 306-373) called Mary the "dispensatrix of all goods." (in William G. Most, Mary in Our Life, Garden City, NY: Doubleday Image, 1963, 48)

Basil of Seleucia (died c. 458) referred to her as the "Mediatrix of God and men." (in Most, ibid., 48)

St. Cyril of Alexandria (d. 444) wrote:

"Hail, Mary, Mother of God, by whom all faithful souls are saved [sozetai].

(in Miravelle, ibid., p. 13; from MG 77,992, and 1033; from the Council of Ephesus in 431)

The expression Mediatrix or Mediatress was found in two 5th-century eastern writers, Basil of Seleucia (In SS. Deiparae Annuntiationem, PG 85, 444AB) and Antipater of Bostra (In S. Joannem Bapt., PG 85 1772C. The theory developed in the work of John of Damascus (d.c. 749; see Homilia I in Dormitionem, PG 96 713A) and Germanus, Patriarch of Constantinople (d.c.733; see Homilia II in Dormitionem, PG 98 321, 352-353).

(see Miravelle, ibid., 134-135)

The Protestant reference Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (ed. F.L. Cross, 2nd ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1983, p. 561), states concerning Patriarch Germanus:

"Mary's incomparable purity, foreshadowing the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, and her universal mediation in the distribution of supernatural blessings, are his two frequently recurring themes."

St. Andrew of Crete (c. 660-740) referred to Mary as the "Mediatrix of the law and grace" and also stated that "she is the mediation between the sublimity of God and the abjection of the flesh."

(Nativ. Mariæ, Serm. 1 and Serm. 4, PG 97, 808, 865; in Miravelle, ibid., 283)

St. John of Damascus (c. 675-c. 749) spoke of Mary fulfilling the "office of Mediatrix."

(Hom. S. Mariæ in Zonam, PG 98, 377; in Miravelle, ibid., 283)

But remember, James White has informed us on pp. 75-76 and 137 of his book:

In fact, not only is the idea of Mary as Coredemptrix or Mediatrix completely
absent from the Bible and from the early Church, it does not have its origin in
history but in this kind of piety or religious devotion that is focused upon Mary.

[T]he push to define Mary as Coredemptrix flows out of the piety seen so plainly in Alphonsus Ligouri [sic] and Louis Marie Grignon de Montfort. It does not come to us from Scripture, nor does it come from history.

White consistently misspells Liguori as "Ligouri". That saint lived from 1696-1787. White appears to date this theological development to him, but he is more than 1200 years off the mark, since, as shown, the very terms mediatrix or mediatress were being used in the 5th century by at least two writers, and the concept in kernel can be traced as far back as Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and Irenaeus. So much for Bishop White's historiographical abilities . . . they are almost as deficient as his theological methodologies and conclusions.

Of course, he might want to argue that the 5th century (when St. Augustine and St. Jerome and St. Cyril of Alexandria lived) was not the time of the "early Church." It wouldn't be the oddest thing he has argued.

We need to avoid amateur historians like James White who is clearly in over his head when trying to discuss early Mariology. I'm no historian, either, but it is very easy for me to find substantiation from the best Protestant historians of Church history and the history of doctrine, for my point of view.

I suggest as a friend that you (BJ Bear) give up this fight, before you dig yourself deeper into self-contradiction and futile opposition to plain historical facts. Let James White defend himself! Why should you have to take the fall for him?

*****

Since BJ Bear continues to ignore the troubling implications of the strong disagreement with J.N.D. Kelly and Philip Schaff with James White's position on the supposed "complete absence" of Mary Mediatrix and co-redemption in the early Church, I thought it would be fun to search James White's site in order to find out what he thinks of the scholarly abilities of Kelly and Schaff. This is what I found:

1) Article: "Exegetica: Roman Catholic Apologists Practice Eisegesis in Scripture and Patristics" (3-4-02)

White cites "Protestant church historian" Kelly once with regard to whether Rome had a single bishop or a group of bishops in the second century (the same era as Irenaeus).

2) Article: "Did The Early Church Believe In the LDS Doctrine of God?" (7-27-00)

White, arguing against Mormonism, cites Kelly at length, introducing him as "One of the greatest patristic scholars". And he is the only historian White cites, in an article about the "early Church".

3) Article: "The Pre-existence of Christ In Scripture, Patristics and Creed" (7-27-00)

Again, in an article dealing in part with patristics, White cites only Kelly as a scholar in his section "Patristic Interpretation." And then in the following footnotes, look who he mentions:

"25) For the text of the Nicene Creed, see J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds (New York: Longman Inc., 1981), pp.215-216 and Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985) vol. 1:27-28.

26) Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 1:30."

4) Article: "A Test of Scholarship" (7-26-00)

Again, Kelly is proclaimed as "One of the greatest patristic scholars" and White notes after a very long citation from Kelly: "I am appending a selection of quotations from the early Fathers that substantiates the conclusions of . . . Kelly quoted above." White writes later:

". . . J.N.D. Kelly’s fine work, Early Christian Doctrines (1978), a work that occupies a space close to my desk (for frequent reference)."

Jaroslav Pelikan's comments on the notion of theosis in the early Church are also cited at length.

5) Article: How Reliable Is Roman Catholic History?: An Example in a Recent Edition of This Rock Magazine" (7-25-00)

Kelly is cited three times as an expert on early Church ecclesiology. It stands to reason, that if Kelly can be used in an effort to show that Catholic Answers' history on a certain disputed point is inaccurate, he can also be used in such a fashion against James White. After all, Kelly is obviously White's favorite patristics scholar and historian of the early Church.

6) Article: "A Debate Between Professor James White, Director of Alpha and Omega Ministries, and Brother John Mary, Representing the Slaves of the Immaculate Heart of Mary" (7-24-00)

Kelly is cited as an expert about the very Church Father under consideration:

"I note that J.N.D. Kelly asserts that Ireneaus, Tertullian, and Origen all felt Mary had sinned and doubted Christ (Early Christian Doctrines, 493)."

Note: Kelly sees no contradiction between Irenaeus' belief in a non-sinless Mary and a Mary who is involved in co-redemption. He asserts that Irenaeus believed both things about Mary. So this is no disproof of the question at hand, but rather, a strong proof, since Kelly is obviously not an advocate of specifically "Catholic" dogma.

Philip Schaff is also cited pertaining to the question of whether Pope Sylvester called the Council of Nicaea.

7) Article: "The Trinity, the Definition of Chalcedon, and Oneness Theology" (7-21-00)

White cites "noted patristic authority J.N.D. Kelly".

Philip Schaff is mentioned even more times on White's site (29 compared to 11 for Kelly):

8) "An In Channel Debate on Purgatory" (2-21-02)

White cites Schaff twice with regard to the views of Pope Gregory the Great.

9) "Catholic Legends And How They Get Started: An Example" (6-11-01)

Schaff is cited interpreting a letter from Pope Zosimus.

10) "Failure to Document: Catholic Answers Glosses Over History" (10-25-00)

Schaff is mentioned twice with regard of the history of the proceedings of Vatican I.

11) "Whitewashing the History of the Church" (8-31-00)

Schaff is cited with regard to Cyril's views and the Council of Florence. This provides us with more delightful irony (never lacking when one deals with the illustrious Bishop White), since if Schaff can be cited as a "witness" to alleged Catholic "whitewashing" of history, he can be utilized to show White engaging in this practice (with White's full consent!).

12) "Truths of the Bible or Untruths of Roman Tradition? James White Responds to Tim Staples' Article, "How to Explain the Eucharist" in the September, 1997 issue of Catholic Digest" (7-25-00)

Schaff is cited twice with regard to historical debates on transubstantiation.

13) "The Trinity, the Definition of Chalcedon, and Oneness Theology"
(7-21-00)

Schaff is cited with regard to the Council of Chalcedon and Christology, and his work is recommended for further reading on the Council.

ADDENDUM

Terry O'Connell, a friend of mine, made the following excellent observations on the CARM Board:

Irenaeus's statements are unaffected by context. As I see it, context only clarifies an individual statement in two cases: 1) when the statement itself is so apparently contradictory of some greater truth that only understanding its full context can resolve the contradiction, or 2) when a statement is so ambiguous that only understanding its full context can clarify its meaning. Neither case applies here. It is not a legitimate use of context to use it, as you are using it here, to simply blunt the force of a plain declarative statement that you do not like by making it look small incomparison with a large block of words. That isn’t providing context, but obfuscating.

Consider the offending phrase more closely: “(the pure One opening purely that pure womb which regenerates men unto God, and which He Himself made pure);” It doesn’t matter whether or not Irenaeus was thinking about Gnostics, Nestorians, or Ninevites—by stating that Mary’s womb was pure, that it had been purified by Christ, and that this pure womb of Mary’s regenerates men unto God—by stating this, he was saying something clear, unmistakeable, and incontrovertibly Marian (in the Catholic sense) about Mary. He was saying something that you would never say, or James White would never say, unless you were saying it just to deny it, and JPII could say today, without qualification.

You can examine the context in all four directions as far as you want, and it will not make this statement mean the opposite of what it says, nor less than what it says. Dave’s point, in which I concur, is that James White was flatly wrong when he stated that the early church knew nothing of Mary as a co-redemptrix, when Irenaeus just identified her with the great Redemptive act of the Incarnation.

Whether Irenaeus “intended” to present a “kernel” or not is completely irrelevant. He intended to say something about Mary, and he did. If a kernel resulted, praise God. In fact, the offhanded way in which he includes this profound remark in a masterwork intended as a compendium of orthodoxy speaks volumes (to those with ears to hear), about how widely established Irenaeus’s view of Mary’s role in redemption must have been in the Church of his day, and in the Church in the days before him, since he seems to assume it as utterly self-evident to his readers.

He surely is protecting Christian doctrine, by reiterating Christian doctrine, including this little detail about Mary that context can never erase.

As far as Irenaeus assigning universal motherhood to Mary, I certainly don’t see how you can rule out that inference from what he said, especially since, as he so memorably puts it, it is from the fruit of her womb that regeneration comes, thus joining all the regenerate in a common brotherhood. And wherever you have a brotherhood, it is hard to avoid the existence of a Motherhood.

As for Irenaeus assigning Mary a role of suffering with Christ, it is true that Irenaeus, as you so memorably put it, was not here attempting a complete discourse on Mary, so it proves nothing that he doesn’t mention her suffering here. But it was already well known from the time of the Apostles that Mary shared a role of suffering that is inextricably intertwined with that of her Son, as Simeon predicted: “Behold, this child is set for the fall and rising of many in Israel, and for a sign that is spoken against (and a sword will pierce through your own soul also), that thoughts out of many hearts may be revealed.” Lk 2.34. The piercing of a soul is suffering, by any measure.

Dr. James Dobson Sanctions Masturbation, Part II

See Part One. EL Hamilton's words will be in green.

>In fairness to Dobson, I think his position is a little more nuanced than you've suggested here.

It may be (I hope so). Now I'm curious to find a definite reference in writing. I looked through a few books I have by him but found nothing.

>Even in what you've written above, I think that's implied by the wording of "not telling" adolescent boys that masturbation is a sin. I strongly suspect that Dobson is taking some intermediate position that says it can be sinful under certain circumstances.

Maybe. In any event, it is a softening of not only the Catholic position but also the traditional Protestant position (you saw what Luther and Calvin thought about it). Forgive me if this smacks of the all-too-common caving in to the zeitgeist. As the secular society goes, so go Christians, so often. It doesn't take a rocket scientist (which you practically are! LOL) to figure out that this is a compromise, rather than holding firm what Christianity has always taught.

>Your objections would still apply to that position, but it couldn't fairly be equated to advocating "free availability of cocaine" or the other extreme comparisons you've drawn.

The degree may be different but the libertarian principle is the same: something is widespread and so we take the view that it must be okay. Instead of "might makes right," instead we have "frequency and commonness makes right." These are not Christian principles, and I think you know this as well as I do.

>So clearly Dobson (or at least ministries associated with him) do view "habitual" masturbation as problematic, and are willing to speak against it. That's more moderate than the Catholic position, admittedly, but is nonetheless not quite the same thing as "calling evil good".

I'd like to learn more detail, if for no other reason than my great respect for Dr. Dobson. As for "calling evil good," if we fail to say that God condemns some sin as wrong, and water it down, and in fact, deliberately refuse to say it (and perhaps assert the contrary), then I don't see much difference. It is a sea change. We don't talk this way about other sins. I'm sure Dobson doesn't advocate fornication and cohabitation. Those sins are extremely common today, even among Christians, so by his reasoning regarding contraception, he would have to also say (it seems to me) that we should refrain from telling the fornicators that they are in grave sin. What's the difference? In fact, by his own reasoning elsewhere, if pornography leads to fornication or masturbation, then it is quite likely that masturbation would lead further to fornication (or adultery, as the case may be), due to the progressive nature of sexual desire (and particularly that desire gone awry). It just doesn't add up.

>(After all, it's not as if he's actively encouraging it on any level.)

I don't know. I was careful to state his position in the "negative" fashion that you noted, rather than call him an "advocate." So far, I am going by vague comments in a video, but I know that a friend of ours saw comments in a book, too, and was disappointed because he was teaching his almost-teen son about sexuality and ran across this compromise.

>From the standpoint of logical consistency, of course, the Protestant position on contraception really isn't compatible with any absolute opposition to masturbation in the context of a single act, but only with opposition to its inclusion in addictive behavior patterns.

This shows two things:

1) the slippery slope of the game of denying traditional Christian ethical standpoints;

2) inconsistency once again, because if we overcome addiction to nicotine or alcohol or cocaine or heroin or pornography by going cold turkey, why should we think that masturbation (itself highly prone to addiction) should be any different?

So we get completely away from the flame in the other instances, but we keep it at a medium-low flame in this one? That makes no sense. It is literally non sense. All of this madness presupposes (at some level —or, I should probably say, reduces to, once scrutinized) the libertarian mentality and lie that "doing this little thing with your own body hurts neither yourself not anyone else." Well, hogwash (and I almost used another quite appropriate term for this sort of outlook).

>If Dobson did take the classical Catholic position, you'd instead be after him for being logically inconsistent with respect to refusing to condemn artificial contraceptives— and you'd have a perfectly good argument to make.

I wouldn't go after him, but after Protestants in general (as indeed I do). My wife and I were victims of this "anti-traditionalist" sexual compromise, too. We used three different forms of contraception in our first six years of marriage. We (in all likelihood) killed our own children, too, as most birth control pills are abortifacients. We didn't know that. We would have stopped using at least the Pill if we had known this fact (after all, we were pro-life activists, and would have been utterly repulsed ath the thought of participating in the culture of death like that).

>Incidentally, there is some precedent in Christian tradition for Dobson's approach. Medieval guidelines for the penances applied for masturbation were the most severe for men over 20, were more moderate for teenagers, and were relatively mild for boys younger than 14. This seems sensible to me, inasmuch as the motivations for masturbation at a young age are more likely to involve sexual curiosity than entrenched lust— and since young boys are unable to be married, neither is there any sense that the masturbation is "displacing" a more valid expression of sexuality. It might still be ethically preferrable to avoid autoerotic behaviors entirely, of course, but I don't see the basis for elevating every form of premarital sexual self-exploration to a "mortal sin". Here is what the CCC has to say on the subject:

"By masturbation is to be understood the deliberate stimulation of the genital organs in order to derive sexual pleasure. "Both the Magisterium of the Church, in the course of a constant tradition, and the moral sense of the faithful have been in no doubt and have firmly maintained that masturbation is an intrinsically and gravely disordered action."[137] "The deliberate use of the sexual faculty, for whatever reason, outside of marriage is essentially contrary to its purpose." For here sexual pleasure is sought outside of "the sexual relationship which is demanded by the moral order and in which the total meaning of mutual self-giving and human procreation in the context of true love is achieved."[138]

To form an equitable judgment about the subjects' moral responsibility and to guide pastoral action, one must take into account the affective immaturity, force of acquired habit, conditions of anxiety, or other psychological or social factors that lessen or even extenuate moral culpability. "
You appear not to grasp the distinction between subjective culpability and objective graveness of the sin (though I may be misunderstanding you). The former doesn't affect the latter in the least. It is, of course, true, that there are all sorts of factors affecting individual culpability, as you note, through the CCC. People are so ignorant today that they very often can't be in mortal sin by definition because that requires three conditions being met:

1) Sufficient knowledge
2) Grave matter
3) Full consent of the will

Ignorance and disinformation abounds (#1); people don't know or understand the teaching in the first place (let alone the reasons behind it — #2), and addictive behaviors and other psychological factors affect consent (#3). None of this, however, affects the graveness of the thing itself, which is, as CCC states, "an intrinsically and gravely disordered action."

>I often have trouble decoding the CCC, but I assume that the references to "affective immaturity" and "force of acquired habit" are not too far removed from the distinctions that Dobson would draw. For Dobson, I assume that the distinction would be between "minor sin" and "not a sin at all", as opposed to Catholics who would be distinguishing only between "mortal" and "venial", with an overall affirmation of basic sinfulness. But Dobson's methodology, that a certain dispensation toward tolerance must be granted to younger persons who are still confused by their emergent sexuality, strikes me as a useful pastoral principle.

It's fundamentally different, because pastoral understanding and mercy depending on age, circumstances, one's background, etc., are one thing, but flat-out denying the wrongness and immorality of the act is another altogether. Once you hold that it ceases being a sin based on circumstance, then you are right smack dab in the middle of situation ethics and ethical relativism (I know: the dreaded word). Dobson said it himself: he would not tell a teenager that God thinks masturbation is a sin.

So what is next? Fornication becomes "not a sin at all" if a young person is screwed-up enough or abused by their parents or had lots of tragedy in their lives? Let them go at it, because now it is no longer wrong? C'mon! All of this is utterly obvious, as far as I am concerned. If one didn't believe that masturbation was wrong, one could still point out that the reason Dobson gives for not opposing it is fallacious, inconsistent, and smacking far too much of libertarian compromise with the spirit of the age. And one could contend that it is inconsistent with his other positions. Inconsistency ought to be closely examined, because it usually indicates a serious flaw in premises or reasoning, somewhere. It's a warning signal.

>Oh, and if you really had the discipline to go all the way until your wedding night before having your first sexual climax, then I have to admit that I'm quite impressed (and more than a little jealous). Given the extent to which America media audiences are bombarded with sexual messages and imagery, I would imagine that this has grown much rarer in the last century. Some people are just more suspectible to some sins than others, and apparently you've been granted an unusual resistance to lust. You should feel very grateful to God for that gift, and make sure it doesn't lead you to excessively harsh condemnations of those not similarly blessed.

Certainly it is all God's grace. Let's get this straight, for the record: I am no "sexual saint." I have succumbed to tremendous amounts of lustfulness, as my besetting sin, for over thirty years (only in the last few years is it thankfully receding, due — I presume — to the age I am now: 45). Lust is an interior sin, and it is just as serious (according to Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount) as the outward acts. So I am not excused from my considerable share of "the blame" in this area. I was simply citing my own experience as an exception to Dobson's claim (echoed by a commenter here) that virtually 100% of boys growing up masturbate. And if that was true for me (given my propensity for lustfulness all those years), then I am absolutely positive that there are many many more, because if I could do it (by God's grace), then others can, too.

I was also a virgin when I got married at age 26 (as was my wife), so that is possible, too. This is purely God's grace. I don't want anyone getting ridiculous, thinking this was my doing, or somehow to my (or my wife's) great credit. I could no longer do that on my own than I could swim the Atlantic. The interesting thing to me about all that is that for many years (till 18) I wasn't following Christianity at all, to speak of. And then even for three years after I converted to evangelical Protestantism, I was compromised in my sexual views. If I had had a chance to have sex, I would have, during those years (another long story: has to do with my sensitivity, extreme selectivity in choosing girlfriends, etc. — but my "stubbornness" and "perfectionism" paid off in the end as I have been very happily married for 20 years).

From this, I deduce two things (at least as applicable to myself): 1) grace is given even to those not following Christ, and 2) it is often given outside formal sacraments (this is all good Catholic theology). The only sacrament I had (according to Catholic criteria) was baptism. I didn't have the spiritual benefits of the Eucharist or confession (nor did I believe in either one in the Catholic sense. I was very unsacramental as a Protestant (I was closest to the free will Baptist position). But I was able to hold to this traditional sexual morality. And knowing myself very well, I know it wasn't me. This was God's grace. And I wish to give testimony to it. To God be all the praise and glory.

What God commands, He gives the power to carry out; even with regard to the most extremely difficult issues of sexual abstinence. C.S. Lewis said that the people who really know the power of the devil and temptation are the ones who resist the devil and immorality. This is true particularly in sexual matters. I came to my view that fornication was wrong in the middle of 1980, at age 22 and after three years of evangelicalism. I also knew it instinctively as a child (after I knew the facts of life, of course). But we all know how that can be thrown out the window, don't we?

God lets us know on the inside that something is wrong, but if we refuse to listen to His voice, that can all be discarded with frightening rapidity with the onset of puberty and the emotional, social, and hormonal onslaught of adolescence. Basically, then, I was a sexual liberal in my beliefs (though not practice) throughout the entire 70s.

Once I came to my present views (excepting contraception) in 1980, I still had four years to go till I was married in October 1984 (ages 22-26). Now, if someone wants to understand the power of temptation, try being madly in love with your future wife and not having sex! This was absolutely the most difficult thing I've ever done in my life. But we DID it. And we did because we knew it was right and we knew that God enabled sinners to do what He commands them to do (also the fact that we BOTH believed the same thing, and so could help each other. This is crucial, too). Other than that, forget it! Kiss any resolve goodbye. Our saving grace was that this intense period was for only seven months, because we had been best friends for at least a year previously, and then felt that we were moving into a serious relationship leading to inevitable marriage (else why switch from the existing platonic friendship?).

This was BY FAR my greatest struggle with temptation in my entire committed Christian life (now spanning 27 or 24 years, depending on definition). The trouble today is that people have bought the lie that it is impossible to carry out these difficult ideals of the Christian life (even with God's grace). So they give up. But I think that if people would deepen their trust in God and trust in faith that He knows what He is talking about when He makes His commands, and that He has granted the Church wisdom in proclaiming it, that it would be much different. People have to be willing to follow God and to carry their cross and to take the hard road where necessary. Christianity is not easy. Probably the hardest thing in it is its sexual morality (along with forgiving one's enemies). But faith means trusting that God can enable you to do all this hard stuff.

I didn't mean to get into all that, but I'm confident that readers can see my overall point in all this: trust God and you can DO this. Don't accept the lies of our age. Something can be both very difficult and also attainable; able to be accomplished by the grace of God. With God all things are possible (no?). We claim to have faith and belief in God, yet we will compromise with very little provocation. We don't believe He can give us the grace to persevere. Nor do we believe that we can be restored if we fall (as we all do, in one way or another). The devil gets in there and starts the condemnation trip, then: "God won't forgive YOU, you miserable, worthless hypocrite. Who do you think YOU are, thinking you have the power to overcome your addiction and sin?"

I again contend that Dr. Dobson has compromised on this issue. Masturbation is a dead-end. Nothing good can come of it. I don't wish to comment further on that (others have been doing an eloquent job), but I am asserting the general proposition that God knew what He was doing when He designed sex and made all the "rules" about it, and that if a person follows the guidelines and endures the titanic struggle he or she will be rewarded in the end. I can guarantee that. It works. To the singles out there: abstain from sex before marriage. It may be (if you're anything like me) the most difficult thing you ever do in your life, but you will be rewarded a hundred times over, with a happy, fulfilling marriage (and yes, generally even secular researchers are finding that married sex between those who abstain prior to marriage is more fulfilling and pleasurable than for those who did not and who slept around. Committed Christians are more sexually-fulfilled than the wild free love hedonists. It's true, and sociology has proven it).

The current sexual ethic has not produced the paradise and Utopia that all the "enlightened" sexual liberals in the 60s were "sure" would come to pass. That much is utterly obvious, so I won't belabor it.

Thanks for reading! Sorry foe the length. I'm really trying to cut down!

*****

The key distinction is subjective culpability vs. objective seriousness of a sin. I think you guys have to ask yourselves why the Christian Church was against contraception and masturbation all those long centuries? Was it because they were "puritanistic" or "sexually-repressed", etc. (i.e., the often self-serving stereotype and caricature), or because they were really onto something and perhaps more in tune with God than we are today?

If you want to defend these two practices, then do it (I'm all ears). It can't be done by simply picking at the Catholic system of mortal and venial sins and confession. You need to look at psychological and sociological data, consider the connection between abortion and contraception, and between masturbation and impure sexual fantasies or pornography, or as related to how one relates to a future spouse. Those are the important things here.

We don't say someone is going to hell. We don't claim to know that. The Catholic Church hasn't even said (to my knowledge) that Judas is in hell. As I have pointed out many times, it is, rather, a certain kind of Protestant (especially some Calvinists) who gets into that (I know you are not among them). They send to hell all Catholics, or all who haven't physically heard the gospel, or those who are into some serious sin, when formerly they were ostensibly a good Protestant Christian (or — in extreme scenarios — even Arminian Protestants). For these guys, Catholics engage in idolatry and blasphemy every Sunday, and (acc. to the Westminster Confession) follow the antichrist. Where is the intolerance and "puritanism" here?

So why are you (and Sogn) critiquing us for this? We don't do it. All we're saying is that we refuse to yield up intrinsically disordered and grave sins to the zeitgeist, the polls, or the latest issue of Psychology Today (or Time).

I'm no expert on moral theology or on what might be called "pastoral or spiritual theology" (though moral theology played a key role in my conversion). My job as an apologist is to examine the reasons for why we believe as we do. To examine all the particular cases of how "culpable" an individual is, is an entirely different endeavor, and is as complex as the differing degrees of guilt in a criminal trial. it is hardly even appropriate to discuss in this venue and format, because by its very nature (like annulments) it is highly individualized and not given to generalization.

The bottom line (ethically, which is how I am approaching this) is what is right and wrong, and does it remain so, once it is determined that it is wrong, or does it shift according to the times and fads and whims and fancies and how prevalent a behavior is becoming in a sitcom or a dope opera or on Jerry Springer? If you think masturbation is so wonderful, by all means, make your case, and I will interact with you.

In the meantime, I would agree with you (you basically provided your own answers) that much teen sex falls short of subjectively mortal sin. That doesn't mean that the sin itself is any less grave or that we stop in any way warning them about the gravity of the situation and the peril not only to their future married lives but to their mortal souls.

This is what I don't buy. You seem to be insinuating that because there are many "loopholes" and excuses and extenuating circumstances on a variety of levels with these sexual sins, that therefore, we somehow can conclude that sin isn't sin, or that we can wink at it and be unconcerned with the massive personal and societal consequences that all sin has. "Let 'em sow their wild oats," etc.

This is the premise which I attacked (as a good socratic) in Dobson's stance, and in yours. This is the bottom line, as I see it, and what needs to be argued. If it's wrong, then it cannot be justified. We can have all the mercy and understanding in the world towards individuals (and I try my best to do that — I may sound "judgmental" in certain of my writings, but I am not at all like that in person), but sin is sin, and we cannot compromise in describing it as such.

If it is right, on the other hand, then I need to hear from you why you think so, and how it is that you can so easily dismiss overwhelming Christian precedent.

*****

>I'm aware that the Sacraments do not "bind" God, in the sense of restricting the possibility of other avenues of divine grace. But I was under the impression that Catholicism viewed the provision of extrasacramental grace as being triggered only by a status of non-willful ignorance— analogous to the possibility of salvation outside the visible Church being accomplished on account of "invincible" ignorance.

It's not all simply ignorance. There are many avenues of grace, and they are not restricted to the sacraments, which we consider the "ordinary and normative, but not exclusive" means of grace. Besides, we believe that everyone who was baptized with a trinitarian formula was regenerated or born again by virtue of that and received a number of spiritual benefits therein. This occurs ex opere operato. We believe that all married Protestants have received the sacrament of matrimony, just as Catholics have.

>I suppose you are probably right to say that it would be "presumptuous" for a Catholic to act as if God was obligated to save anyone outside of the sacramental system— but rather than this being directed as a criticism against Protestants (who aren't really "presuming", in the sense that they don't believe Catholicism to be true to begin with), it seems to me that the greater "presumption" is on the part of Catholics who are supposing that God will routinely elect to save, by means of extra-sacramental grace, large numbers of Protestants who are committing mortal sin.

I don't know who God will save or not. That is not my concern, but His. I can share what I feel I have received from Him, but it's His job, and He is a merciful and just judge (unlike most of us fallen human beings). Isn't it wonderful that God decides, and not us?

But I do know what has been considered sin throughout Christian history, and I know that sins don't disappear in proportion to how many people are committing them. MY job is to point out what we think is sin, and why we think so. If I am correct, I have helped aid people in arriving at a fuller understanding of Christian and Catholic moral teaching. If I am wrong, I haven't really hurt anyone (I might get regarded as puritanistic or merciless — as we see in Sogn's rhetoric —; well, that's a price I am fully willing to pay, if I can proclaim these truths for the sake of souls). It'll all come out in the end who was being merciful and who was indeed following God's true teaching, when all things are revealed. I'm just trying to do the best I can while on this earth.

>The debate over masturbation, so far as I can tell, is that most Protestants believe is a minor failing, though still something to be avoided, while Catholics believe it is a serious (mortal) sin.

Once you allow it at all as a moral option or an excusable one, then you have already taken the most dangerous step. Human nature will always create a slippery slope. This is especially true in sexual matters. Do you think it is just a coicidence that the most popular posts I have done so far (judging by response) are on the topics of contraception, abortion, and masturbation? It's always this way. It is always the sexual issues. What do the Catholic liberals continually carp about? Contraception, divorce, priestly celibacy . . .

>But it also seems like Catholics also believe that, of the millions of persons who are masturbating without confessing it (sacramentally), virtually none of them will actually be damned. I would argue that the reason why Catholics believe this about masturbation (as opposed to, say, mass murderers or rapists) is that Catholics are quietly aware of exactly the sort of mitigating factors that Protestants are appealing to more directly, in downgrading it to a more minor sin.

Dobson didn't do that. Rather, he said that he would allow the practice. You can't sanction a practice if you think it is a sin (unless you are a "moral schizophrenic").

>So Catholics believe that it's a major (mortal) sin that God will routinely opt to treat as if it were a minor (venial) sin,

That's not true. It is an intrinsically disordered, grave sin (just as sodomy or fornication or adultery are). It's not "routinely" treated as a venial sin (which is contradictory), but rather, the subjective culpability is examined, according to the times we live in and how people are affected by the mass defection in sexual matters from moral sanity and Christian tradition. That's why we allow for human weakness, but we don't compromise our doctrine because of the weakness (which is what Dobson and you and many Protestants seem to be doing).

>whereas Protestants just conclude it's a minor sin without making an intermediate appeal to discretionary mercy.

Luther didn't think so. Calvin didn't think so. Why do you think it changed so radically? Because we are so much "smarter" and "progressive" now?

>I think this is a case where the two positions aren't quite as far apart as the rhetoric suggests, at least on a practical level. On balance, both traditions agree that the effect of masturbation and sexual fantasy is to cause some amount of personal spiritual harm to oneself, but probably not to result in the loss of salvation, or to create a "social debt" that requires concrete restitution. I still think Dave's comparison to championing "free availability of cocaine and heroin" is an overheated one.

You've hardly dealt with my analogical arguments. Rather, you move on to something else. You see the word "cocaine" and get all shocked and alarmed, yet seem to miss the direct analogy I was trying to draw. You haven't shown me that Dobson is making any sense. And if I find a quote of his saying something definite, you may have to revise your position of what he is advocating, even if only by default.

>To the contrary, I worry that Dave is granting too much credibility to the argument made by some gay rights activists (such as Andrew Sullivan) that since— as per the Luther quote— masturbation is effectively "sodomy", and society is indifferent to widespread masturbation, then society ought to be similarly disposed toward homosexuality.

I don't read Sullivan. I'm making my own arguments. But sure, he is "right" if secular society is to be consistent. If the idea is to attain sexual fufillment no matter how, and to hell with Christian sexually-repressed morality, then I see no difference. The ontological and spiritual elements of sexuality have been removed. It is simply about rubbing body parts together and getting off on it. It has no meaning other than sense gratification. The homosexuals can argue that they have committed relationships, and so forth (yeah, I know most homosexuals have only one partner their whole life. Yeah, right. And I am the man in the moon), but that doesn't apply to masturbation, which amounts to an infantile self-gratification.

The Catholic position is that both are intrinsically disordered. They are non-procreative and abnormal sexual acts, because sexuality (like marriage) was designed by God to be between a man and a woman in a committed marriage relationship, and its deepest (but not sole) purpose is procreation.

>Asserting that "every sexual sin carries the same gravity as every other sexual sin" is not an argument that will likely result in Protestants resolving the inconsistency by becoming more intolerant of masturbation, but by becoming more tolerant of homosexuality. I think Dave ought to be more careful about conflating sexual pathologies that have more overt sociological consequences with those that don't.

You're just talking past my analogical critique of Dobson. I await your counter-replies to my analogies. For now, I'm not at all sure that you even understood my reasoning. We border perilously on mutual monologue. Basically, you're not interacting with my argument, but only talking "about" it without making an argument. There is a vast difference between the two scenarios.

>There are important distinctions of degree that ought to be respected rather than trivialized—

Case in point. What you see as "trivializing," I see as exactly to the point and crucial to the entire discussion, because it gets down to premises.

>just as I'm not convinced that it's helpful, even assuming the Catholic position that contraception is immoral, to classify contraception together with abortion as if they both raised issues of comparable enormity.

The two are connected in many ways. There are differences to be drawn, sure (abortion is a far greater evil, I would say). But there is a connection.

>I actually think you have a good point in saying that being intrinsically grave is not the same thing as being intrinsically mortal, and that this might be a sensible solution to the intuitive implausibility of the idea of masturbation being grouped with rape, murder, etc. Everyone knows those other things are deeply evil on the basis of the witness of conscience, whereas the case against masturbation is a more technical one.

You need to ponder what "intrinsically disordered" means. If every time I met someone I immediately put my big toe in their nose, that would be "intrinsically disordered" would it not? If I put dog feces in the mouth of a girl as soon as I started to like her, that would be equally disordered. Now you will say I am making absurd exaggerations, and getting extreme (as is your wont). But exaggerations are necessary (sometimes to the point of shock) to make a point when someone doesn't get the point being made. And that point is this: some things are wrong in the nature of things, and contrary to God's will.

This is how we view masturbation and contraception and sodomy and fornication and any other grave sin. We arrive at these judgments based on revelation, Christian tradition, human experience, sociological and scientific and anthropological data, philosophizing, etc. And we know things from natural law and moral intuition and instinct, and how we feel after we do them (a little phenomenon called "guilt" that our society comprehends less and less these days). But we can unlearn these things, too.

Now note that being intrinsically disordered does not translate into "being equally serious and damning sins." Putting a big toe in someone's nose is not exacly on the same level as slashing their throat or cutting off their nose. Any sane, rational person understands that. So we don't need to argue it. On the scale of things in that light, masturbation is pretty "high." But that makes it no less wrong or disordered or abnormal or contrary to God's will and design for sexuality.

I want to know: do you think it is wrong and disordered or not? Just a yes or no will suffice: not six paragraphs of angels dancing on pins and hairsplitting distinctions.

>So what we really have is a case where a sin is universally grave but usually not mortal on account of near universal defects in "knowledge". I'm still not sure that this helps me much, since I don't think I suffer from any lack of knowledge, but that's already a problem that I've raised in the context of salvation outside the Church. It seems like the more I learn during interconfessional debates, the more culpable I ought to become for my own ignorance.

It depends on whether you accept the validity of the Catholic position or not. If you fully understand it, know it is true, and then willfully reject it, with full knowledge, and full consent of the will, in a grave matter, then you are culpable. I have no idea where you are at on that scale and wouldn't presume to judge. I only know that you are either overlooking, or not comprehending my original argument vis-a-vis Dr. Dobson. That's my primary interest here, not how close to the truth you may be on this or that issue. You want to make this a personal thing. For my part, I am strictly talking about Christian ethics.

>To the extent that the obligation to join the Catholic Church will ever deny salvation to any Protestants, I guess it will only affect well-educated Protestants who are familiar with authentic Catholic teaching. I guess it seems like this is another example of the same principle at work. Which still appears to me to be a perverse effect of Protestant-Catholic dialogue.

Why should you care so much about it? If you don't accept our view on this "salvation outside the Church" business, then just ignore it and talk about something else. Why are you so troubled about it, and why do you keep shifting the discusison towards the personal rather than the abstract?

>Really, I see the state of modern evangelicalism as more of a counterexample to slippery slope arguments than a manifestation of them. Is there any evidence that the tolerance of evangelicals toward contraception has caused a drift toward a pro-abortion stance generally,

Absolutely. Just look at how one denomination after another caved on abortion. That all started with caving on contraception first (Anglicans, 1930). The two go hand in hand in that mentality, because it is seen that it is "control of one's own body." Even if this goes contrary to God's will, the person doesn't care. They will do what they wish. It is known, furthermore, that abortion follows legally upon the heels of liberalized contraception laws. This was very much the case in the US. First, they had to get rid of Griswold (v. Connecticut, I think it was), in 1965. Legal abortion was arguably inevitable after that, given the increasing availability of contraceptives, feminism, and the sexual revolution.

>or that tolerating masturbation is causing greater tolerance of homosexuality.

I don't know if that follows, but it was not my argument in any event. I suggest you go read that again, as you keep drifting further and further away from it.

>As usual, I think this is a case where Dave thinks the slope ought to be slippery, but in practical terms it is showing far more friction than the abstracted argument would imply. Which, to me, is a reason to distrust the abstracted argument, and conclude that the slope isn't so slippery after all.

I see. Well, you can think whatever you like, of course, but I want to see you argue your points and attempt to refute mine, rather than continually describe it (or what you mistakenly _think is my position). I am still awaiting that. And that is very "Armstrongian" rhetoric indeed!

*****

I found an excerpt of Dr. Dobson discussing pornography:

Taken from Bringing up Boys by Dr. James Dobson, Tyndale House Publishers, Inc.

"Many, perhaps the majority of young adolescents exposed to pornography magazines or who watch obscene videos will develop full-blown addictions to smut. It is a huge cultural problem. …
"This pattern [of pornography addiction] is responsible for untold numbers of divorces and dysfunctional marriages. I know this is true because I hear almost every day from women whose husbands are heavily involved with pornography. Availability of the Internet has increased the incidence of this tragedy immeasurably.

" … Selling sex to our children makes a lot of money for a lot of businesses. There’s one reason why we live in the most promiscuous nation on the face of the earth. There’s one reason why we allow sex to be sold to our children: money.

" The results are horrifying. "We live in the midst of an epidemic of diseases, bacteria and viruses which are making their way up to the beautiful and tender reproductive tracts of our children and strangling them towards infertility and cancer and threatening their very lives. …”

*****

I found some solid documentation on this, from one of Dr. Dobson's books. This page is no longer available on the Internet (unless the URL was changed); suggesting that controversy caused the FOTF folks to remove it. But I found it on the good ole Internet Archive.

Complete Marriage and Family Home Reference Guide

Question:

My thirteen-year-old son is in the full bloom of adolescence. I'm suspicious that he may be masturbating when he's alone, but I don't quite know how to approach him about it. Should I be concerned, and if so, what should I say to him?

Dr. Dobson Responds:

I don't think you should invade that private world at all unless there are unique circumstances that lead you to do so. I offer that advice while acknowledging that masturbation is a highly controversial subject and Christian leaders differ widely in their perspectives on it. I will answer your question but hope you understand that some Bible scholars will disagree emphatically with what I will say.

First, let's consider masturbation from a medical perspective. We can say without fear of contradiction that there is no scientific evidence to indicate that this act is harmful to the body. Despite terrifying warnings given to young people historically, it does not cause blindness, weakness, mental retardation, or any other physical problem. If it did, the entire male population and about half of females would be blind, weak, simpleminded, and sick. Between 95 and 98 percent of all boys engage in this practice — and the rest have been known to lie. It is as close to being a universal behavior as is likely to occur. A lesser but still significant percentage of girls also engage in what was once called "self-gratification."

As for the emotional consequences of masturbation, only four circumstances should give us cause for concern. The first is when it is associated with oppressive guilt from which the individual can't escape. That guilt has the potential to do considerable psychological and spiritual damage. Boys and girls who labor under divine condemnation can gradually become convinced that even God couldn't love them. They promise a thousand times with great sincerity never again to commit this despicable act. Then a week or two passes, or perhaps several months. Eventually, the hormonal pressure accumulates until nearly every waking moment reverberates with sexual desire. Finally, in a moment (and I do mean a moment) of weakness, it happens again. What then, dear friend? Tell me what a young person says to God after he or she has just broken the one thousand first solemn promise to Him? I am convinced that some teenagers have thrown over their faith because of their inability to please God at this point of masturbation.

The second circumstance in which masturbation might have harmful implications is when it becomes extremely obsessive. That is more likely to occur when it has been understood by the individual to be "forbidden fruit." I believe the best way to prevent that kind of obsessive response is for adults not to emphasize or condemn it. Regardless of what you do, you will not stop the practice of masturbation in your teenagers. That is a certainty. You'll just drive it underground — or under covers. Nothing works as a "cure." Cold showers, lots of exercise, many activities, and awesome threats are ineffective. Attempting to suppress this act is one campaign that is destined to fail—so why wage it?

The third situation around which we should be concerned is when the young person becomes addicted to pornographic material. The kind of obscenity available to teenagers today has the capacity to grab and hold a boy for the rest of his life. Parents will want to intervene if there is evidence that their son or daughter is heading down that well-worn path.

The fourth concern about masturbation refers not to adolescents but to us as adults. This habit has the capacity to follow us into marriage and become a substitution for healthy sexual relations between a husband and wife. This, I believe, is what the apostle Paul meant when he instructed us not to "deprive" one another as marital partners: "Do not deprive each other except by mutual consent and for a time, so that you may devote yourselves to prayer. Then come together again so that Satan will not tempt you because of your lack of self-control" (1 Corinthians 7:5).

As for the spiritual implications of masturbation, I will have to defer to the theologians for a more definitive response. It is interesting to me, however, that Scripture does not address this subject except for a single reference in the Old Testament to a man named Onan. He interrupted sexual intercourse with his sister-in-law and allowed his semen to fall on the ground to keep from producing offspring for his brother, which was his "duty" (Genesis 38:8). Though that verse is often cited as evidence of God's disapproval of masturbation, the context doesn't seem to fit.

So, what should parents say to their kids about this subject? My advice is to say nothing after puberty has occurred. You will only cause embarrassment and discomfort. For those who are younger, it would be wise to include the subject of masturbation in the "Preparing for Adolescence" conversation I have recommended on other occasions. I would suggest that parents talk to their twelve- or thirteen-year-old boys, especially, in the same general way my mother and father discussed this subject with me. We were riding in the car, and my dad said, "Jim, when I was a boy, I worried so much about masturbation. It really became a scary thing for me because I thought God was condemning me for what I couldn't help. So I'm telling you now that I hope you don't feel the need to engage in this act when you reach the teen years, but if you do, you shouldn't be too concerned about it. I don't believe it has much to do with your relationship with God."

What a kind thing my father did for me that night in the car. He was a very conservative minister who never compromised his standards of morality to the day of his death. He stood like a rock for biblical principles and commandments. Yet he cared enough about me to lift from my shoulders the burden of guilt that nearly destroyed some of my friends in the church. This kind of "reasonable" faith taught to me by my parents is one of the primary reasons I never felt it necessary to rebel against parental authority or defy God. Well, those are my views, for what they are worth. I know my recommendations will be inflammatory to some people. If you are one of them, please forgive me. I can only offer the best advice of which I'm capable. I pray that in this instance, I am right.
————————————————————————————————————————

The entire Complete Marriage and Family Home Reference Guide is available at Focus on the Family's Online Resource Center.

Dr. James Dobson is president and founder of Focus on the Family.

This article was excerpted from Complete Marriage and Family Home Reference Guide by Dr. James Dobson with the permission of Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. Copyright © 2000 by James Dobson, Inc. All rights reserved. International copyright secured.

See link.

*****

Here's another article on Dobson, where it quotes him, saying:

>>>His counsel on masturbation: "Attempting to suppress this act is one campaign that is destined to fail—so why wage it?" Of course God wouldn't do that and of course Catholics don't believe such a ridiculous thing. So this is neither here not there. If one truly "can't help" doing something (and God knows whether that is true or not), then it can't possibly be a mortal sin because the condition of "full consent of the will" has not been met. Therefore, mortal sin has not occurred and the person is not worthy of damnation. "Conservative" Protestants argue on other (IMO, much more questionable and biblically-challenged) grounds. They may say the existence of the sin proves the person isn't following God or "born again" or "saved" or what not, so that he will go to hell on those grounds.

I don't know whether to laugh or cry at the following. Even advocates of this sin can't escape from the self-reports of those who practice it, and their powers of rationalization are unequal to the task:

"After I'm done masturbating I usually feel guilty and don't know why. I know that almost 95% of all men do it, but I still feel guilty. It's like I'm hiding something."

[age 12, Canada]

"How come whenever I'm done masturbating, I feel like I was being stupid and have the urge to put on my clothes immediately?"

[age 14, New York]

[Then the "expert" chimes in]

"That is an extremely common reaction, and it's almost certainly physiological (i.e., physical rather than mental) in origin. For most guys, something just shuts their brain off to sex when they're done ejaculating. For many, this manifests itself in the form of guilt — that you were 'being stupid' (as you put it), or they ask themselves, 'Why did I just do that?' This is all normal, and you'll probably outgrow it as you get older. Some males find less problem with the feelings of guilt if they only masturbate before they go to sleep at night. That way, the body and mind has many hours to chill out before tackling the outside world again."

[and then we are given the testimony of one more poor miserable soul who can't stop his addicting sin because — in all likelihood — no one has the guts to tell him the truth about it]

"Why can't I stop masturbating? If I could go back 2 years, I would not have started to masturbate in the first place. First, I feel guilty. Second, it now takes up a lot of my time. Third, I don't think it has benefited me in any way — it has just made me less pure. I think masturbation is a waste of my time. I don't even really enjoy it, and I feel miserable afterwards. Why the heck can't I stop masturbating?"

[age 17, Nova Scotia, Canada]

The page then sends readers to Dobson's advice on the page I have already cited above.

See link.

And here is an article on ChristianityToday.com:

=========================================================
What to Say about Masturbation

Like it or not, if your child has reached middle school it won’t be long before you’ll be faced with the uncomfortable subject of masturbation.

Studies show that most teenagers masturbate. "It is beyond question that the majority of teenage boys masturbate at least occasionally," note Brenna and Stan Jones in their book How and When to Tell Your Kids about Sex (NavPress). The same can be said for girls. In fact, experts believe adolescents are far more likely to masturbate than to become sexually involved. Yet, while many Christian parents have made their peace with talking to their kids about sex and virginity, they often don’t know how to address the more widespread phenomenon of masturbation.

Christian parents should be aware that the Bible has remarkably little to say about masturbation. Some point to Genesis 38:9-10 where Onan is struck down by God because he "spilled his semen on the ground." But in this instance, Onan was not masturbating but practicing a form of birth control known as coitus interruptus. His selfish and deliberate refusal to provide a family for his widowed sister-in-law was considered "wicked in the Lord’s sight."

[that was discussed on this blog at great length — see the link on the sidebar, near the bottom]

In his classic parenting book Preparing for Adolescence (Tyndale), Dr. James Dobson said, "It is my opinion that masturbation is not much of an issue with God. It’s a normal part of adolescence … and Jesus did not mention it in the Bible." [pp. 86-87] To those kids who do to masturbate, Dobson says, "You should not struggle with guilt over it."

If you learn your child is masturbating, don’t panic. Instead, use the opportunity to open a discussion about sex and sexual desire. Being careful not to make him or her feel guilty or more embarrassed, explain to your child that we all have sexual feelings—sometimes intense—and those feelings are a sign that your son or daughter is nearing adulthood.

While masturbation itself might not be a sin, it can involve other worrisome practices. First, masturbation is often accompanied by lust, which Jesus compared to the sin of adultery (Matt. 5:27, 28). Second, teens need to understand that God created sex to be shared by two married people. It’s an act of love. Masturbation, however, is a solitary act, and therefore less than what God wants for us. Finally, help your teen understand that masturbation can sometimes become a consuming habit.

In their book Facing the Facts (NavPress), Stan and Brenna Jones remind adolescents that masturbation is only a small glimpse of what God has planned for their future sexual pleasure.

"Masturbation is surely not the full blessing God wants for our sexuality," they write. "Maybe one reason so many people have confused feelings about masturbation is that it falls short of what God intended for our bodies and feelings."

—Lauren Winner
Writer, doctoral candidate

See link.

*****

Another Protestant site gets it right in responding biblically to Dr. Dobson's view:

"Dobson tells us that masturbation is a harmless inevitability. He could scarcely do otherwise and avoid being a laughingstock among his professional peers. Yet what does Jesus mean when He says that lust must be overcome, even if by removing an eye or cutting off a hand (Matt. 5:28-30)? Although He may not be alluding primarily to masturbation, the passage as a whole clearly condemns any thought or action proceeding from adultery in the heart. A leading concern of Scripture here and elsewhere (1 Thess. 4:3-8; 1 Cor. 6:13-20) is to defend marriage from all rival uses of male sexuality. Masturbation by unmarried boys is one objectionable use because it may foment desire for sexual experience prior to lawful marriage, or corrupt the patient seeking of God's will concerning a marriage partner, or even produce lifelong habits of fantasy and autoeroticism that to some extent take the place of conjugal love (1 Cor. 7:4). Even if masturbation leads to nothing worse, the practice still must be recognized as a sin disallowed by the Biblical standard of absolute purity (Eph. 5:3; 1 Tim. 5:2).

"Dobson is afraid of the destructive consequences of guilt arising from repeated failure in self-control. But any suggestion that a young man should seek freedom from guilt somewhat redirects him from his main goal, according to Scripture, which is freedom from sin (1 John 2:14; Psa. 119:9). It is the destructive consequences of sin that should be feared, and guilt (though sometimes unprofitable) is merely the sign that warns of sin's presence. In minds dulled by modern values, guilt is falsely perceived as the great villain that robs men of easy happiness. But the Christian life does not offer that kind of happiness, always smooth and smiling. Dobson's recall of his own Christian life as an unbroken span of untroubled years is entirely discordant with the experience of others and with the pictures of righteous living found in the Scripture (see Psalms 34 and 73)."

Here's a sensible website which makes the connection between masturbation, pornography, and sexual addiction, and shows how destructive they can be to relationships.

An entire book, entitled, The Most Personal Addiction: How I Overcame Sex Addiction and How Anyone Can Overcome it, by Joe Zychik, is available online.

The website porn-free.org offers a number of observations as to why Masturbation is both wrong and harmful. The Introduction by Paul Cook reads:

"I've been collecting the information for this page over the past 5 years. I've drawn from a combination of sources, including the Bible, my experience as a former sex addict and correspondence with thousands of people involved in various stages of sex addiction. I honestly have not found one long term benefit of masturbation, yet plenty of reasons to refrain from it. Regardless of whether you are a Christian or not, I encourage you to thoughtfully consider the below points about masturbation and how it affects us."

Elsewhere he wrote:

"Masturbation is often that one topic that people (especially Christians) really don't like to talk about. Having been addicted to masturbation for about 20 years, I know the shame that often accompanies this act. I secretly fantasized about sex with women in porn, at school, work and church, and used masturbation to gratify my lust. Though I knew that I was sinning, I tolerated masturbation and lust as acceptable alternatives to pre-marital sex and adultery. It wasn't long before I was hooked on masturbation. Things changed dramatically when God stepped into my life in 1998 and delivered me from masturbation addiction.

In the months and years following this deliverance, I gained peace in my mind and body that I had never known before. My sexual relationship with my wife improved and my thought-life became less saturated with sex. I no longer felt alienated from God. The difference in my life was incredible and I wrote this study to help others find the same freedom God gave me."

Here's nother discussion between two Christians: "Masturbation and Pornography: Wrong or Not?"

ProtectKids.com offers an article by Donna Rice Hughes (yes, that's the woman who was connected with Gary Hart: she is a Christian activist against pornography now):

Pornography's Progressive Pattern of Addiction

Excerpted in part from Kids Online: Protecting Your Children In Cyberspace
by Donna Rice Hughes (Revell, September 1998)

"Dr. Victor Cline, a clinical psychologist at the University of Utah and a specialist in the area of sexual addictions, has observed a four-step syndrome common to almost all of his clients who have been involved with pornography.

Step 1-Addiction. Once consumers of pornography get hooked, they keep coming back for more and more. The sexually graphic material provides the viewer with an aphrodisiac effect, followed by sexual release, most often through masturbation. Pornography gives the viewer powerful imagery that can be recalled and elaborated on with the person's fantasy life. Despite negative consequences, most addicts are unable to rid themselves of their dependence on pornography. Their addiction rules their lives."

The website offers sexual addiction recovery sources, and a listing of Donna Rice Hughes' many articles about protecting children from pornography.

Dialogue on John Calvin's View of the Eucharist (vs. Alastair Roberts)

Alastair's words will be in green; "Josh"'s in blue:

You note that Luther believed in the Real Presence, but Calvin believed in it as well (though not in a presence that was physically enclosed within the elements): "Therefore, if the Lord truly represents the participation in his body throught the breaking of bread, there ought not to be doubt that he truly presents and shows his body. And the godly ought by all means to keep this rule: whenever they see symbols appointed by the Lord, to think and be persuaded that the truth of the thing signified is surely present there. For whys hould the Lord put in your hand the symbol of his body, except to assure you of a true participation in it? But if it is true that a visible sign is given us to seal the gift of a thing invisible, when we have received the symbol of the body, let us no surely trust that the body itself is also gives to us" (Institutes, 4.17.10; p.1371, McNeill/Battles trans.).

Would you agree that the biggest difference concerning the Eucharist between your church, the Lutherans, and the [classical] Reformed is not over the Real Presence, but rather the means or mode of that presence (i.e., the relation between the signum and the res)?

Yes. Calvin adheres to a "mystical presence." Luther and Catholics accept substantial presence (which is a more accurate term for our view than "real presence"). I think Calvin's view (with all due respect) is confused, and not able to be defended on solid philosophical (or for that matter, theological and exegetical) grounds. It seems incoherent and, frankly, strange, to me. He wants the presence of Christ to be real, yet he has to separate the consecrated elements by making them symbols. I don't see how this mose of "presence" is distinguishable from God's omnipresence. Of course, God is everywhere, and He is always everywhere. So of what additional use is a symbolic (or semi-symbolic) "reality" that is not substantial?

The whole miracle of the Eucharist is that it is an extension of the Incarnation: Jesus actually became a man: a physical person, and walked among us. Transubstantiation means that Jesus is actually present just as He was when He walked the earth. But the rub is that it always requires faith to believe this, because the accidents remain the same, and it seems nonsensical to a naturalistic mind that what looks like bread and wine really aren't. I think that causes disbelief in it: I would call it an excessive rationalism, and I say that Calvin (and Zwingli) succumbed in part to that. They can't accept the miracle that all the Fathers accepted.

Of course the comeback is that it is not a "rational" thing, but a mystery, but I reply that even mysteries don't have to be (indeed, should not be) contrary to reason; they can be reasonable as far as reason goes, and then require faith for those aspects which transcend (but do not contradict) reason.

This is the Catholic view: always reason and faith; not faith and reason some of the time, or reason and faith some of the time, or faith and unreason, or faith as inalterably opposed to reason, etc. We will not yield the mind or reason. The Bible doesn't require such a thing. So why does anyone go that route? I've never understood it.

I know this is yet another deep subject, and I am not trying to simplify Calvin's view. We can pursue the discussion further, time-permitting, if you like.

Hi Alastair,

I find many of your comments highly abstract and a bit difficult to follow (and you may take that as a compliment — it means I can learn a lot from you), but I will reply as best I know how:

>First, Calvin's doctrine of the Supper did develop over the course of his lifetime. He later regretted some of his compromises with the Zwinglian view.

That's fascinating. Could you briefly summarize and direct me to passages in the Institutes or the Commentaries or paste something to elaborate on this? The trouble with dealing with these great minds (people like Augustine and Calvin) is that they do develop their views, precisely because they are thinkers. And that is easy to overlook.

>Second, Calvin's doctrine stressed the work of the Holy Spirit. In this respect I feel that his approach can be seen as somewhat akin to the Eastern Orthodox view with its emphasis upon the epiklesis as the moment of transformation. Reading Schmemann, for instance, on the Real Presence in the Supper I see essentially the same doctrine that I as a Calvinist hold to. I would like to hear more on the RC view of the role of the Spirit in the Supper.

Nothing particular to say on that at the moment. Sounds like a heavy (therefore, good) topic. I have often noted, though, similarities between the Orthodox and the more presuppositional Reformed, in how they view the relation of faith and reason.

>Alongside this concern I would like to know more of the eschatological aspect of the RC celebration of the Eucharist. I feel that this element can easily be downplayed and where it is present (e.g. the transubstantiated elements as firstfruits of the new creation) it can be problematic.

I feel this is, again, over my head, but it makes a great deal of sense to me to tie in the Eucharist to the Resurrection, because it was precisely that, along with the Incarnation, which "prefigures" the Eucharist and makes it possible. As Jesus had a Glorified, Resurrection body which could do extraordinary things, so He supernaturally enters into the consecrated elements and is truly, substantially there — just in a different form: just as His post-Resurrection body had elements of physical and spiritual (or simply multi-dimensionality, if we follow a more "modern physics" model). I could see exploring this in light of 1 Corinthians 15, in great depth indeed.

>Third, Calvin stressed the instrumental efficacy of the elements, whilst many Reformed only held to occasionalism or even intermittent occasionalism. I feel that his doctrine was a bit higher, at in its developed form, than you suggest.

So this would be akin to our ex opere operato? I guess these differences in your group account for the relative stress on sacramentalism. You have on the continuum people like James White, whose extreme anti-sacramentalism would mean that even Luther and St. Augustine could not have been regenerate Christians (as I think I demonstrated from White's own words), and people like yourself, whose views are very close to ours on baptism and the Eucharist. So learning more about Calvin's actual "mature" views on this would be very interesting to me. I love discovering stuff like this. I knew that he accepted Catholic baptism as valid, which pretty much puts to rest the matter of whether Catholics are Christians or not. But tell that to your anti-Catholic brethren!

>Fourth, I feel that most of these debates hinge around certain presuppositions that are held concerning the 'body of Christ'. I feel that we need to establish a careful balance between the historical, ecclesial and sacramental body of Christ. I am not sure that this has been maintained in RC circles (it certainly hasn't in most Protestant circles), but I would be happy to be proved wrong. I sense that the sacramental body has tended to eclipse the ecclesial body.

This is heavy stuff; you would have to elaborate more fully. Would Col 1:24 and similar verses tie into this?

>I also feel that many of these debates fail to take seriously enough the fact that there is something that we simply don't understand about the resurrection body of Christ.

Oh, sure. Hard to deny that . . .

>I feel that, in general, RCs have been in danger of downplaying the significance of the resurrection in the shaping of different areas of theology (not least ecclesiology). The resurrection of Christ is the future invading the present in Christ. It is the source of the powers of the age to come and the Holy Spirit that raised Christ from the dead is always the eschatological Spirit (John Zizioulas' book Being As Communion is great on this).

I have no problem with that. I'm not sure we minimize it . . .

>When we celebrate the Supper we are tasting of the future that has become present in Christ.

Also the past (Calvary) that has been made supernaturally present to us. I say it transcends time, and that would include whjat is "future" to us.

>This occurs as we are raised up to be with Christ by the eschatological Spirit. We truly partake of Him and have communion with Him both in His divine and human nature. He is not merely our Host; He is also our food. However, the eschatological stress is crucially important, IMHO.

Fascinating line of thought . . . I hope you hang around!

>I fear that many have trepassed on the mystery by trying to fit the resurrection body of Christ into doctrinal boxes that it simply transcends.

I would like to hear more. Much of this needs more explanation (for me, anyway). It may be that you are talking in typically Reformed ways of expression that are more familiar to that group, but a bit strange and different for outsiders.

Thanks for the great post!

In Him,

Dave

Thanks for your comments. Here is a long response, which I trust will serve to clarify some points.

With regard to the development of Calvin’s Eucharistic thought I am thinking particularly of the movement from the compromise document of the Consensus Tigurinus to the later Defense of the Sane and Orthodox Doctrine of the Sacraments. Calvin expressed regret to Bucer concerning the compromise of the first document: “Let us therefore bear with a sigh that which cannot be corrected.” As Thomas Davis points out in The Clearest Promises of God: The Development of Calvin’s Eucharistic Teaching, in the later document Calvin “emphasizes that it is Christ himself the Christian enjoys, in his flesh and blood, and not simply a communion that results because of his receiving Christ’s benefits”. Calvin’s emphasis upon the instrumental power of the elements is seemingly absent in the early Calvin (e.g. 1536 edition of the Institutes). Thomas Davis writes again:

“What we see, then, in Calvin’s last eucharistic writings is the completion of a journey. At the beginning of his career, as he wrote on the Eucharist in his 1536 Institutes, Calvin flatly and unequivocally denied substantial partaking of Christ in the Eucharist. He claimed that the Eucharist could not, in fact, be thought of as an instrument of grace. Moreover, he delineated no clear eucharistic gift. As has been shown, over a period of twenty-three years, Calvin’s eucharistic theology matured. It developed in such a way that Calvin claimed as essential those very elements he had originally denied as part of his eucharistic doctrine.”

For a study of Calvin’s Eucharistic theology I have appreciated John Williamson Nevin’s The Mystical Presence and the records of the subsequent debate with Charles Hodge in such books as Given For You by Keith Mathison. Both of these books chronicle the demise of the high Reformed doctrine of the Supper, particularly in the Puritan era and the following period. For many the relationship between the sign and the reality became merely a subjective one created by the mind and faith of the participant.

The issue of the Spirit and the Supper is crucial in my estimation. It is interesting to notice that the elements have never become the objects of adoration, contemplation and worship in the Eastern Church as they have in the West.

Eastern Orthodox theologians differ with Roman Catholics regarding the place of the transformation of the elements within the liturgy. Orthodox theologians argue that this takes place at the epiklesis (the invocation of the Spirit) rather than at the words of institution. Schmemann maintains that this is not merely replacing one ‘causality’ with another:—

“It is to reveal the eschatological character of the sacrament. The Holy Spirit comes on the “last and great day” of Pentecost. He manifests the world to come. He inaugurates the Kingdom. He always takes us beyond. To be in the Spirit means to be in heaven, for the Kingdom of God is “joy and peace in the Holy Spirit.” And thus in the Eucharist it is He who seals and confirms our ascension into heaven, who transforms the Church into the body of Christ and—therefore—manifests the elements of our offering as communion in the Holy Spirit. This is the consecration.”

The transformation of the bread and wine cannot be explained in the categories of this world (time, essence, causality, etc.). The transformation of the bread and wine is revealed to faith by the Holy Spirit. However, the transformation is not something that takes place in “this world” but it occurs as the Church is made to participate in the “world to come” by the invocation of the Spirit. The manifestation of the bread and wine as the body and blood of Christ must be understood in terms of the action of the Eucharist. He is ‘made known through the breaking of bread’.

Schmemann argues in his book The Eucharist that the elements as the true Body and Blood of Christ are only revealed to faith by the Holy Spirit. He also stresses that the purpose of the Eucharist is the manifestation of the Church itself as the body of Christ. The Roman Catholic doctrine is frequently accused for downplaying this purpose of the Eucharist in my reading (of Reformed, Anglicans and Eastern Orthodox particularly). Perhaps this charge is a trifle unfair, I don’t know. Schmemann complains that trying to explain the cause of the change of the elements is unnecessary and harmful. It places the Supper within the categories of “this world” and loses the sense of a ‘temporal’ gift (for want of a better word).

In the Supper we taste of the powers of the age to come. The presence of Christ is probably best understood, not primarily in terms of ‘local’ presence, but in terms of ‘temporal’ presence. The essence of the Church lies in the future, finding its true existence in Christ Himself. Our relationship with the future is both ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’. By ‘horizontal’ I mean that we are still expecting a final consummation in the future. By ‘vertical’ I mean that we already taste of that realized consummation as we have union with the One in whom that future has already been realized. This union is effected by the work of the Holy Spirit.

Thinking of the Supper in terms of ‘local’ presence can mute the strong eschatological themes of the Supper. We truly eat of the Body and Blood of our Lord. However, we need to be careful of understanding this eating in terms belonging to this present age, as the liturgy of the Eucharist is a movement from this age to the age to come.

As I pointed out in my previous comments, this is closely related to the Eastern Orthodox charge that Roman Catholics have not paid sufficient attention to the Spirit’s constituting of the Church as the Body of Christ. To most outsiders Roman Catholic ecclesiology seems to take the Incarnation more than the Resurrection and Pentecost as its starting point. As I mentioned earlier, John Zizioulas criticizes RCs, and I believe rightly, on this area in his fantastic book Being As Communion. Christology has not, he claims, been significantly conditioned by pnuematology (and consequently by eschatology) in the West. He sees this deficiency manifest in the failure to recognize the equal ultimacy of the local and universal Church in RC ecclesiology. If you have not already done so, I would highly recommend that you read Zizioulas. He is always immensely stimulating, even when one would disagree with him.

Calvin, in his doctrine of the Supper treated the elements as instruments by which we truly partake of the theanthropic Christ. He argued that this occurs as we are raised into heaven by the Spirit. I think that Calvin is generally right on this. However, I would have liked to see him stress the eschatological nature of this movement. We are being raised ‘vertically’ to the heavenly city (cf. Hebrews 12:22) that we are still awaiting ‘horizontally’ (Hebrews 13:14). In Christ — the One who is the same yesterday, today and forever — expectation merges with remembrance and the future invades the present.

Once this approach to the Supper has been understood, the argument over ‘local’ presence will be seen to be unhelpful. Spatial categories tend to divert our attention from what is really happening.

On the issue of the Reformed attitude towards the language of ex opere operato I would suggest that you read the following article, which gives a helpful treatment of the subject.

The chief concern that I would have regarding the language of ex opere operato is not that it presents the elements as ‘instruments’ — I am agreed that the elements are instruments and not merely occasions of the grace that they signify. Admittedly my position is less common within Reformed circles than the lower forms of the doctrine that have developed. Nevertheless, my views on this certainly have a long history and were shared by such as Calvin and Nevin.

There is an inseparable connection between the symbol and the reality. This bond is no mere nominal, external bond. In the proper practice of the sacrament the reality is actually conveyed. If this is all that ex opere operato is taken to mean then I will readily say ‘Amen!’ to it. Reformed theologians have often reacted to a form of transubstantiation (which I am increasingly convinced is a caricature) which imprisons the reality in the symbol. The symbol is done away with rather than consummated by the presence of the reality. Opposed to this position I would stress that the symbol participates in the reality. [At this point I should express my dislike for the terminology of ‘symbol’ and ‘reality’ — reality itself is symbolic]. The reality remains a free and open mystery whilst being partially imparted through the sign. It can never be contained within the sign. To contain the reality within the sign is to bind the mystery.

Biblically the sign is not a substitute for the reality, but the ‘self-supplementing presence’ of the reality (as Catherine Pickstock terms it). Christ’s physical presence did not render His signs in the gospels superfluous. They were a means of manifesting and conveying the reality of His Person to people.

As regards the issue of the sacramental (the bread of the Eucharist), historical (the crucified, resurrected and ascended body of our Lord) and ecclesial (the Church) Body of Christ I think that it is imperative that we do not separate these. It is essential that we recognize that the Eucharist is fundamentally an action not the elements. For this reason it is probably unhelpful to operate in terms of sign / thing signified. This language tends to frame the Eucharist less as an action than as a static symbol. The Eucharist is a ritual whereby the Church fulfills itself as the Body of Christ. Christ Himself is present in our midst as our Host (historical Body). Christ Himself is present in us as His Church (ecclesial body). Christ Himself is present in the elements as our food (sacramental body).

The fact that the Eucharist is an action performed by the Church is crucially important. Were the Eucharist not performed by the ecclesial Body of Christ it would become an extrinsic miracle. I fear that many Roman Catholics have failed to stress the action of the Eucharist as essential to what it really is. Many forms of the doctrine of the transubstantiation seem to make the liturgy itself ‘accidental’ to the ‘essence’ of the sacrament. Little concentration is given to the Eucharist as a meal. The reality interrupts the liturgy, rather than fulfilling it. I would prefer to think of the reality as being made manifest through the liturgy, rather than breaking in from outside the liturgy. The symbol / reality dichotomy is 90% of our problem at this point.

From an outsider’s perspective, the three-fold nature of the Body of Christ appears to have been obscured by RC teaching. In passages like 1 Corinthians 11 they are beautifully jumbled up together. One moment Paul is talking about the bread of the sacrament as the Body of Christ, the next it is the historical Body of Christ that he speaks of; he then proceeds to speak of the Church as the Body of Christ. It is the relationship between these aspects of the one Body of Christ that make the Eucharist what it is, that make the Church what it is and, dare I say, fulfill what Christ Himself truly is — not just an individual but a corporate Personality.

In the light of this, any individualistic celebration of the Eucharist should be out of the question. This is one of the reasons why I believe such things as private masses to be distortions of the true nature of the sacrament. I might also add that even when most churches celebrate the Eucharist it is merely a collection of individuals that do so and not the Church as Church.

As for Colossians 1:24 and other such verses: yes, I would understand them within the conceptual matrix of the three-fold nature of the Body of Christ. Paul’s sufferings can never be seen as an addition to the sufferings of Christ Himself, suggesting that Christ’s sufferings were somehow deficient. Paul’s sufferings can never be opposed to Christ’s own sufferings because Paul is participating in the sufferings of Christ, not competing with them. Paul no longer lives but Christ lives in Him. Paul now will spend and be spent for the sake of the Church. His vocation is the fulfillment of the vocation of Christ Himself who is at work in Paul.

Wow, Alastair,

That was an extraordinary post, almost breathtaking in its depth and insight. Are you a theologian or something? Man! This is a very mystical view of the Eucharist that I have not yet had the pleasure to explore all that much. I am almost certain, however, that some of the more mystically-minded Catholics have dealt with this from basically the same standpoint.

I thought of Matthias Scheeben as a likely candidate right away, and went and looked up what he wrote about the Eucharist in his book, The Mysteries of Christianity (tr. by Cyril Vollert, S.J., St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1952; from 1887 edition, pp. 485-486, 488):

"The Eucharistic presence of Christ is in itself a reflection and extension of His incarnation, as the Fathers so often observe. The changing of the bread into the body of Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit is a renewal of the wonderful act by which, in the power of the same Holy Spirit, He originally formed His body in the womb of the Virgin and took it to His person . . .

"But this presence is multiplied only that the body of Christ may grow and spread throughout the members which He attaches to Himself and fuses with Himself. For this reason alone the true body of Christ is reproduced at the Consecration, that He may unite Himself with individual men in Communion and become one body with them, so that the Logos may, as it were, become man anew in each man, by taking the human nature of each into union with His own . . .

"So completely do we bcome one with Christ that we can say with deep truth that we belong to the person of Christ, and in a sense are Christ Himself. "Christ is the Church," says St. Hilary, 'bearing it wholly within Himself by the sacrament of His body' . . .

"This participation in the divine nature is at the same time a replenishing of man with the Holy Spirit and a fellowship with Him. Since the Holy Spirit dwells in the body of Christ in a quite singular way by a very real union, He must also pour Himself out upon those who have been joined to Christ in one body. That we are filled with the Holy Spirit, that the Eucharist becomes a fellowship with the Holy Spirit for those who partake of it, and that we are all joined to one another in the fellowship of the one Holy Spirit, we find indicated in the ancient liturgies as the aim and effect of the Eucharist."

This is just a drop in the bucket of the riches in this 834-page book.

That was utterly fascinating information about John Calvin. I had never heard that. If you know of any Internet articles on this, please let me know. I'd like to do excerpts from them on this blog.

God bless, and thank you very much for this.

Dave

*****

"Josh" later offered related material to ponder:

. . . Keith Mathison's Given for You: Reclaiming Calvin's Doctrine of the Lord's Supper [Presbyterian and Reformed, 2002]. You might find interesting the following definition that Mathison offers to describe Calvin's view (this is from p.279):

"According to Calvin, Christ's body is present in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, but the mode of his presence is not specifically connected with the substance of the elements…Christ is present by virtue of the supernatural working of the Holy Spirit, not by the transformation or combination of the material substances". Calvin's view is that, whilst the historical body of Christ is located locally in heaven, the mystical work of the Holy Spirit makes Christ truly present in the Supper (present as the whole God-Man):

"Even though it seems unbelievable that Christ's flesh, separated from us by such great distance, penetrates to us, so that it becomes our food, let us remember that the secret power of the Holy Spirit towers above all our senses,and how foolish it is to measure this immeasurableness by our measure. What then, our mind does not comprehend, let faith conceive: that the Spirit truly unites things separated things separated in space" (*Institutes*, 4.17.10). Thus, we see two aspects that of Calvin's eucharistic theology that Al mentioned: the work of the Holy Spirit and eschatology (the latter being related to the former).

Calvin emphasizes the separation in space because He takes the Ascension seriously. All Christians confess, of course, that Christ has ascended bodily into heaven; but, on Calvin's view, the idea that Jesus was bodily present locally in the substance of the eucharistic elements (i.e.,enclosed in them as in transubstantiation), transgressed a clear article of faith proclaimed in the faith: that Christ's body is locally present in heaven alone. So Calvin's reasons for rejecting a local mode of presence as held by Rome and Luther was because of his theology of the Ascension (more on this later); but because of his stress on the Spirit and his eschatological focus of the Church ascendant into heaven for worship, he could still hold real presence:

"In His sacred supper he bids me to take, eat, and drink his body and blood under the symbols of bread and wine [remember: when Calvin means symbol, he doesn't mean what zwingli means]. I do no doubt that he himself truly presents them, and that I receive them" (Institutes, 4.17.32) and "I conclude, that Christ's body is really (italics in original) given to us in the Supper, to be wholesome food for our souls" (Commentaries, 20:379; quoted in Mathison, p.26).

Now for JC's theology of the sacramental union (the union between the signum and res). Calvin's theology here was based upon the Definition of Chalcedon (another evidence of his catholicity!), which defined Christ as full God and full Man, united in one Person without separation, admixture, or confusion. We may distinguish between the two natures of Our Lord, but we must never separate or confuse them.Calvin applies this to the sacramental union of the signum and the res (recalling Augustine's definition; and, according to Mathison [largely quoting Ronald Wallace's Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament, which has been viewed as a magisterial work on Calvin's sacramentology by many], Calvin finds analogy to the sacramental union only in the Incarnation!) to the sacraments.

Ronald Wallace summarizes Calvin's doctrine of the sacramental union thusly[found in Mathison, p.22]:

"First, 'the union formed between the divine and human activity in the event of God's activity in the sacrament is so close as, practically speaking, to become one of identity' [Wallace, p.162]. As Calvin expresses it, 'The name of the thing, therefore, is transferred here to the sign-not as if it were strictly applicable, but figuratively on the ground of that connection which I have mentioned' [Calvin on I Cor. 10:4, in wallace, 147]. Second, thus sacramental union is 'so transcendant and freely personal that the thing signified must be regarded as distinct from the sign' [ibid.]. If the sign actually becomes the thing it signifies, it neccessarily ceases to be a sacrament. Third, 'there is no natural analogy for this union' [Wallace, 167]…The only possibly analogy for the sacramental union is the mystery of the Incarnation. Fourth, observes Wallace, 'There is no doubt that Calvin sees an analogy which at least serves to regulate his thinking on this mystery of sacramental union, in the mystery of the union between God and man in Jesus Christ' [Wallace, p.82]…(para) As Paul Rorem notes, calvin's sacramental theology was 'Chalcedonian balancing act' [Rorem, The Consensus Tigurinus 91549): Did Calvin Compromise, in Calvin Sacrae Scripturae Professor, ed.William H. Neuser, p.73]. Just as the divine and human natures of Christ must be distinguished without being separated, so too the sign and reality signified must be distinguished without beig separated…(para) It is important to note Calvin's view of the relationship between the signs and the things signified because for calvin the bread and wine of the Supper are signs representing something present, not signs representing something absent" (Mathison, pp.23-24).

Thus, when the Chalcedonian formula was applied to the Lutheran doctrine, Calvin found deficiencies because the Lutheran doctrine of ubiquity allowed Christ's body to be locally present in millions of churches throughout the world at the same time. While one could reply that the Resurrected Christ had a transformed body that could allow for such action [as you alluded to in one of your last responses], the fact remains that it is a human body (albeit a glorified one). As such, Christ's historical body can only be in one place at a time; and it is a article of faith amongst Christians that our Lord 'ascended into heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty'. The Lutheran (and thus RC) doctrine contradicts this fundamental Christological principle: it confuses the sign and the thing signified. Mathison again:

"Calvin believed that such a doctrine [the Lutheran doctrine of ubiquity] necessarily confused the properties of the divine and human natures of Christ, contrary to Chalcedonian orthodoxy. According to Calvin, it is a defining characteristic of flesh to 'subsist in one definite place, with its own size and form' (Institutes, 4.17.24). Ubiquitous flesh would, by definition, cease to be true flesh."(Mathison, p.28)

If Calvin viewed the Lutherans as nearing the mixture of natures, he saw Rome as doing the same thing. For Rome, as you state, believes in transubstantiation wherein the substance of the eucharistic elements are transformed into the Body and Blood of Christ. This too results in a confusion of the signum and res based upon the Chalcedonian principle, for (correct me if I'm wrong, please; I don't want to be setting up paper men!) acc. to Rome the visible sign becomes the thing signified. On my reading, Rome does this because she believes that this is the only way to preserve Real Presence; but, Calvin's theology of the Spirit makes this an unnecessary move. Mathison (quoting Calvin) again:

"Christ's physical body, according to Calvin, is locally present in heaven and will remain there until he returns again. he explains, 'Not Aristotle, but the Holy Spirit teaches that the body christ from the time of his resurrection was finite, and is contained in heaven until the Last Day' [Institutes, 4.17.26]. Christ's physical body is in heaven and does not have to descend to earth in order for us to truly partake of it. This is true, according to calvin, first of all because 'the minds of believers (this being an heavenly act) are raised by faith above the world' [*Second Defense of the Pious and Orhtodox faith Concerning the Sacraments*, 280]. Second, the Holy Spirit, 'removing the obstacle which distance of space might occasion, conjoins us with his [Christ's] members' (Ibid). The Holy Spirir is 'sufficient to break through all impediments and surmount any distance of place' [*The Best method of Obtaining Concord*, 577]" (Mathison, p.28). The Spirit makes Christ present at the Table though He is in heaven; I believe that this primarily happens by the Church ascending into heaven for her worship. Worship is a mystical meeting of heaven and earth; it is truly eschatological. I believe that Rome's Aristotelianly-influenced doctrine of the Eucharist, along with the rationalists (including many Presbyterians!!!) in some respects, neglects this focus and so gets off track.

Which leads me to the fact that the Anabaptists and Baptists (and really Zwinglians as well) violate the sacramental union in another direction: they rationalistically rip apart the signum and the res, and rent asunder what God has joined together. While I would say thta Rome messes up their sacramentology by confusing the signum and the res, the 'sacramentarians' err by leaving us with a naked and nominalistic (and inefficacious)sign (SINO, sacrament in name only? :) ). Given the reciprocal nature between sacramentology and christology, it should be no surprise that much of Anabaptist movement ending up in the shipwreck of Socianism (a point made by John Williamson Nevin, a 19th century Reformed theologian whose debate with the famous Charles Hodge is simply fascinating hsitorically; Mathison discusses it on pp.136-86 of Given for You; the preface to Nevin's work, the Mystical Presence, may be found online.

When we apply Chalcedon to the Sacraments (as should be natural for all of us who accept the ministerial and definitive authority of the ecumenical councils), I belive that we can draw several conclusions this is by no means exhaustive, and I'd love to hear your input and/or critique here):

First, the sacramental union must be seen as a real union, not a nominalistic construct (as many Presbyterians are wont to do); while we may distinguish between the signum and the res, we must never separate them. Practically, this means that we can never separate regeneration, remission of sins, and union with christ from Baptism, or the Body and Blood of Jesus from His Supper. This results in a real and objective offer of the substance of the sacraments (which is Jesus Himself) to every receiver; the real, efficaciousness of the sacraments, owing to the promised work of the Spirit (who also effected the hypostatic union of Christ) and; allows us to distinguish